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Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 July 2000 Issue No. 489 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 July 2000 Issue No. 489
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region Focus International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Time to get ready
By Ahmed Abdel-Halim *
Since it began in Madrid, the Arab-Israeli peace process has revolved around two cardinal principles: the return of the land and building peace. For Lebanon, the former expressed itself in the demand that Israel withdraw from the land it had occupied since 1982 in accordance with the relevant UN documents. It is not UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 that govern this situation, but rather the 1949 Lebanese-Israeli truce agreement and UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426, promulgated following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
The Israeli incursion into Lebanon, which began with the Israeli air strikes on Beirut and the artillery bombardment of southern Lebanon on 4 June 1982, marked one of the most important turning points in the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and in the Lebanese as well as Palestinian confrontation with Israel in particular. On 6 June, following this initial preparatory assault, Israel put into effect the "Peace in Galilee" operation. Moving into Lebanon according to three trajectories -- along the coast through Tyre, across the Litani River and, to the east, along the Litani River valley -- the Israeli forces advanced until they reached Beirut. By August, Israel had consolidated its hold on what was to become its self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon, where it remained for almost 20 years.
The official pretext for the invasion and occupation was "to secure the Israeli borders against Palestinian terrorist attacks." In fact, however, the actual objectives were more sinister and included annexing a considerable stretch of Lebanese territory, varying between 10 to 30km in depth, thereby fulfilling the long-held Israeli ambition of securing control over the Litani River. A second objective was to break the back of the Palestinian resistance once and for all, by exterminating as many Palestinians as possible through the systematic bombardment of Palestinian camps and communities in Lebanon. The invasion also aimed to undermine the Syrian military presence in Lebanon and, generally, to push the situation in Lebanon to a point in which the Lebanese would be driven to sign an accord with Israel outside the framework of Resolutions 425 and 426.
Israel's new mode of recourse to military might against Lebanon required a certain psychological, political and strategic willingness, which, in fact, is the factor that governed the course of the conflict as well as the processes of political orientation in the period following the invasion. Perhaps the most serious consequence for Israel was that its occupation triggered the lengthy war of attrition waged against Israeli forces by the Hizbullah-led Lebanese national resistance. The severe toll on the lives of Israeli soldiers inside the occupied zone generated such opposition from Israeli public opinion that Israeli policy-makers were ultimately forced to declare their intention to withdraw from south Lebanon by 1 July 2000. Ultimately, Hizbullah successes forced the Israeli government to advance the date and effect a retreat that proceeded with anything but the desired decorum. Israel's callous and cynical abandonment of its former ally should serve as a clear lesson to any party that still entertains the notion of dealing with Israel under any pretext or guise outside the Arab national consensus.
Now, at this important juncture in the Arab-Israeli peace process, we must ask what scenarios the Israeli withdrawal is likely to usher in, and how they will affect the peace process. More importantly, what are the scenarios for a military confrontation that could result from Israel's intentions with regard to the peace process and the region as a whole?
Perhaps the withdrawal precedes a phase in which Israel will adhere to the established bases for a negotiated settlement to the Middle East conflict, as summed up in the principle of land for peace. If Israel now undertakes the anticipated withdrawal from the Golan Heights, implementing Rabin's pledges in this regard, and withdraws from all other occupied territories in fulfillment of the many agreements it has signed to date, it will create a favourable climate for the final status negotiations, better enabling the Israelis and Palestinians to reach an agreement over all outstanding core issues (including the status of Jerusalem), realising the objectives of both sides and making possible an equitable conclusion to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Logic and regional realities suggest that this is the most viable course for Israel if it wishes to establish cooperative relations with its neighbours and bring peace to the region as a whole. Unfortunately, it is also the least likely scenario.
The alternative is that Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon is purely tactical and intended for public consumption. Clearly, the most important tactical objectives of the withdrawal were to end the embarrassing loss of Israeli lives in Lebanon, eliminate Hizbullah's legitimacy and, finally, force Syrian forces out of the Beqaa, thereby effectively delinking the Lebanese question from the Israeli-Syrian negotiating track, and weakening Syria's negotiating hand. This would pressure Syria to accept the type of settlement Israel, with US backing, is pushing for. The media fanfare generated by the withdrawal, particularly in the West, would further these objectives. Behind the publicity smoke screen, Israel would be able to buy time; then, again with US backing, it could manoeuvre to push its agenda through with the remaining parties in the negotiating process -- forcing the PA to accept its terms and pressuring Syria to make as many concessions as possible, particularly on partial withdrawal from the Golan.
The prospect of such unjust and humiliating developments would very likely trigger Palestinian resistance operations inside the Occupied Territories, inspired by the Lebanese resistance's success against the Israeli occupation forces. Similarly, Syria could toughen its stance, setting armed resistance operations into motion in the Golan. With the heightened tension surrounding the negotiations, the entire peace process would grind to an inevitable halt, making the spectre of limited or full-scale military conflict more likely.
Unfortunately, given the Israeli mentality and negotiating style, this scenario seems the most likely to play itself out. Indeed, we have already seen its prelude, first in the stumbling blocks the Israelis scattered across the Palestinian-Israeli negotiating track, and then in Barak's assertion, shortly before the death of Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad, that a solution with Syria is possible, but not with the Syrian regime.
As for the second question concerning the possibility of military conflicts in the region, they are directly proportional to Israel's obstinacy. In this regard, one can envision four possible scenarios.
First, Israel backs down from its hard-line positions and fulfills its obligations, enabling the peace process to resume its normal course. The obvious effect of this would be to alleviate tension and reduce the likelihood of military conflict and armed resistance. Indeed, this is the scenario that would necessarily presage a just, comprehensive and lasting peace, political stability under an umbrella of reasonable strategic and military parity and a thriving future in a region free of all weapons of mass destruction.
In the second scenario, Israel maintains its declared positions and continues to threaten that it will resort to arms as a means to implement its foreign policy, though without actually implementing this threat. This scenario is sure to sustain the tension, creating an inherently explosive situation, especially since such threats can only precipitate a renewed arms race and intensify the risk of armed conflict. If Israel maintains its hard-line stance, it is effectively challenging the Arabs to rally for confrontation and, specifically, to ready themselves at the inter-Arab level for recourse to arms. Since this is the situation we are currently experiencing, it is all the more vital that the Arabs coordinate their positions and ready themselves for more dangerous eventualities. Any delay in so doing can only encumber their political and strategic position further.
The third scenario is that Israel becomes more aggressively hard-line and actually acts on its threat through tactical or full-scale use of traditional military force. Any recourse to arms, however restricted, is difficult to contain. If Israel targets a specific country -- Syria for example -- for limited military action, the peace process will inevitably collapse and bring the region once more to the brink of full-scale war. In the event that such a war erupts, the participating Arab parties will have to muster all available resources in an attempt to defeat Israel and restore the political and strategic balance. Naturally, the Arabs' chances of success in the confrontation, both individually and collectively, are immediately dependent upon their preparedness. This, in turn, entails considerable preliminary work: continuous contacts to prepare official and public opinion, both regionally and internationally, for the eventuality of armed conflict; on-going coordination and cooperation among the parties involved; and securing the economic and material means necessary to support whatever political and military decisions are taken.
In the fourth scenario, Israel goes yet further to the threat of and actual recourse to non-conventional weapons -- chemical, biological and nuclear. This frightening prospect, while not impossible, is highly unlikely due to a range of political and strategic considerations and local, regional and international restrictions, most notably the "Security Assurances" guaranteed under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Were Israel actually to use this option, however, the Arabs would have no alternative but to respond with every available deterrent, the result being a conflagration so destructive that would cast the entire region back to the Stone Age. That this scenario remains a possibility, no matter how remote, because Israel continues to insist on maintaining the only nuclear arsenal in the region is incentive enough for the other nations in the region to seek parity, or a comparable deterrent. After all, the need to ensure optimum national security should not be taken lightly.
Now, however, a new factor has entered the equation. The death of Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad has left behind an immense void that Syria is attempting to fill quickly. At this difficult juncture, it needs all available support to help it safeguard the stability its late president succeeded in generating through 30 years of development, while simultaneously remaining steadfast against all pressure.
Bashar Al-Assad is young, erudite and energetic. He is committed to the nation's established guiding principles, yet simultaneously forward-looking, eager to steer his country towards modernisation and democracy. Formidable challenges await him, both at home and abroad, challenges that will summon every ounce of resolve, prudence and shrewdness. Above all, however, he will need Arab, and especially Egyptian, support as he finds his feet.
The security equation in the Middle East is now more complex than ever, with the new variables in Syria and Jordan added to the obstacles devised by the Israeli government and the forthcoming US presidential elections. Nevertheless, given the sudden movement in the variables of the security equation, the Arabs are working to adjust the balance of power in favour of national security and shared goals. Our foremost priorities are to liberate Arab territories and, to this end, back the new government in Syria, enabling it to defend its territory at this crucial time in its history.
A strong Syria will not only be able to force Israel to withdraw from the occupied Golan; it will also serve as a powerful mainstay for the Lebanese, the Palestinians, and the Arab cause as a whole, a function to which Egypt will give its fullest support.
Ultimately, our fate depends on political resolve, backed by material means and the unswerving will not to forsake Arab rights. Israel, for its part, should attune itself to the practical requirements of a just and lasting peace, the only true safeguard against the destructive warfare into which its headstrong policies must inevitably plunge the region.
* The writer is deputy director of the National Centre for Middle East Studies.
