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Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 July 2000 Issue No. 489 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 6 - 12 July 2000 Issue No. 489
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region Focus International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Foundations of dynastic rule
By Abdel-Azim Hammad
The methods used to sweep aside the constitutional and procedural obstacles to Bashar Al-Assad's accession to the presidency in Syria aroused considerable dismay. Arab public opinion fears that this will set a precedent to be emulated by other Arab regimes. Such apprehensions are mingled with a certain commiseration for the Syrian plight; observers worry in particular that the son, lacking experience and know-how, will not be able to fill his father's shoes, and that the country therefore will be plunged into political instability, a fate that is certain to have repercussions throughout the region. Some are more pragmatic in their approach, preferring to view the question of succession from the perspective of the commonly held belief that, once in power, a younger generation of leaders will steer their country towards greater democracy and modernisation.
The specific circumstances in Syria and the qualifications of its new president aside, the phenomenon of family-based succession in non-monarchical Arab regimes is not so new as to elicit quite the sense of shock it aroused in Arab public opinion. In fact, this type of succession has been remarkably widespread. Perhaps the most conspicuous example in modern Arab history occurred in Iraq in 1966, when Chief of Staff Abdel-Rahman Aref succeeded his late brother, Field-Marshall Abdel-Salam Aref, to the presidency.
Although the case of the Aref brothers differs in many respects from the other instances we will mention below, it is important to allude here to the fragility of a regime the perpetuation of which relied almost exclusively on the armed forces and upon the support of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, who sent an Egyptian military regiment to protect it. This sense of fragility, which compelled the Iraqi army to accept a family-based order for securing political allegiance, is a recurrent theme in the Arab world.
It may come as a surprise that a country as democratic and pluralistic as Lebanon takes the lead in kinship-based political succession, even in those political organisations that boast the most progressive ideologies. Walid Junblat, president of the Lebanese Socialist Progressive Party, inherited his position from his father, Druze leader Kamal Junblat, who founded the party. Similarly, Bechir Jumayil, and then his elder brother, Amin, rose to the leadership of the Phalangist Party, founded by their father, Pierre Jumayil. Leadership of the Lebanese National Bloc passed from Emile Eddé to his son Raymond, while the presidency of the National Liberal Party passed from Camille Chamoun to his son Danny. Tony Frinjiyyeh took over leadership of the northern Lebanese Maronites from his father, former Lebanese President Soliman Frinjiyyeh, who, in turn, had inherited that leadership from his elder brother, Hamid. Meanwhile, the leadership of the Sunni community based around Tripoli was held for some time by the Karami family, passing from Abdel-Hamid to his son Rashid, and then to Rashid's younger brother, Omar. A similar arrangement applied to the leadership of the Beirut-based Sunni community, which passed from Riad Al-Sulh to his sons Taqiyyeddin and Rashid, and from Saib Salam to his son Tammam.
Moreover, all the above-mentioned heirs to political and confessional leadership rose to the highest echelons of government. All occupied various ministerial positions under more than one government. Soliman Frinjiyyeh, Camille Chamoun and Amin Jumayil served as presidents of the republic, while all the above-mentioned members of the Sulh and Karami families served at various points as prime minister, a position no less important than that of the presidency.
Lebanon, which has elaborated well-known constitutional accommodations for its denominational diversity, is not the only Arab republic where family ties constitute the predominant determinant of succession to political party leadership. In Sudan, too, leadership of the Umma and Democratic Union parties passed in hereditary fashion through the Mahdi and Mirghani families respectively.
Even in Arab monarchical systems, hereditary succession exists outside the ruling family. In Jordan, the position of prime minister was filled by three members of the Al-Rifa'i family, beginning with Samir Pasha Al-Rifa'i in the 1950s, as well as by three members of the Al-Bali family.
Syria, too, experienced this form of succession well before Bashar took over the presidency after his father's death. In the liberal and early Baath periods, the Atay family supplied the country with several of its presidents.
How can we explain the prevalence of this phenomenon?
Clearly, the examples cited above all indicate that a political regime's security rests on a foundation of tribal, sectarian or regional affiliations. With the exception of Lebanon and Sudan, in which such affiliations have been constitutionally formalised, this foundation permeates the armed forces, the mainstay of the regime, in one way or another. It follows, naturally, that the family that founded the regime is the focal point of such allegiances. Arab history offers precedents for the prevalence of such allegiances, in the form of tribal solidarities, Sufi and guild networks and the military ethos of the Mamelukes, through whose ranks many of the region's sultans rose.
In Syria, in particular, President Hafez Al-Assad, a member of the minority Alawi sect, had to rely heavily on the bonds of sectarian allegiance to secure his hold on the country. In the early days of his presidency, he also depended upon the members of his immediate family, such as his brother Rifaat, who was instrumental in countering the many revolts and insurrections that faced the new regime. In these crises, sectarian and regional affiliations also permeated ideological and party conflicts and frequently governed the routes through which foreign powers sought to meddle in Syrian affairs. Thus, despite the modern, secularist Arab nationalist ideology and policies Assad professed, 20 years of instability in Syria forced him to consolidate his regime through very traditional non-secular frameworks.
How does Egypt fare in this respect? Modern Egyptian history offers only a single instance in which the question of hereditary succession in politics posed itself. When Saad Zaghlul, leader of the 1919 Revolution and leader of the Wafd Party, died in 1929, his nephew, Fathallah Barakat Pasha, was nominated as his successor. There was no reason to doubt Fathallah's political acumen, personal integrity and revolutionary credentials. Wafd leaders, however, openly opposed his candidacy, precisely because they feared establishing a precedent for hereditary succession in government. Instead of Fathallah, therefore, they promoted Mustafa El-Nahhas, who at the time had none of the stature and popularity of Zaghlul's nephew. In a similar spirit, they resisted all attempts on the part of Zaghlul's wife, the highly influential and powerful Safiya Zaghlul, to impose her mandate on the party. While many leaders eventually broke away from the Wafd, the party continued to garner popular support, in large part because the party leadership demonstrated its integrity by averting the dangers inherent in allowing family control over a political party.
Perhaps Egyptians' sensitivity to this issue is rooted in the fact that sectarian, regional and tribal affiliations are alien to society at the level of national politics, where allegiances have always been determined by ideological, or at worst, by class or occupational affiliations. Family and regional affiliations have seldom made themselves felt in politics beyond the local level, where, moreover, they generally remain a secondary consideration. But then, the same applies to the most modern democratic systems in the world, such as those of Great Britain and the US.
