 |
Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 July 2000 Issue No. 490 
|
||
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
|
Al-Ahram Weekly 13 - 19 July 2000 Issue No. 490
|
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
| ||
Egypt Focus International Economy Opinion Interview Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Undivided but shared
By John Whitbeck *
In late May, Colette Avital, an official in Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's Labour Party responsible for the party's international relations, uttered words of self-evident common sense that shattered the ultimate taboo among Israeli politicians. She told Israel Public Radio that "one can envisage joint sovereignty over Jerusalem" and that "we must think of formulas enabling us to conceive of shared sovereignty," adding "it's my personal opinion, but I'm not the only one to hold it."
If, as is likely, this was an authorised "trial balloon," it constitutes the most promising development in the search for a permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace with some measure of justice since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993. Indeed, it suggests that Ehud Barak is, at last, serious about trying to achieve such a peace.
There will never be a lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without a solution to the status of Jerusalem acceptable to both most Israelis and most Palestinians. That is a fact. Until now, it has been widely assumed that no such solution exists. That may just have changed.
When Israelis and Palestinians speak about Jerusalem, they are not simply establishing negotiating positions. Jerusalem commands too tight a grip on hearts and minds. Their repeated and virtually unanimous positions must be taken seriously. If one accepts, as one must, that no Israeli government could ever accept a redivision of Jerusalem, and if one accepts, as one must, that no Palestinian leadership could ever accept a permanent status solution which gave the Palestinian state (and, through it, the Arab and Muslim worlds) no share of sovereignty in Jerusalem, then only one solution is conceivable -- joint sovereignty over an undivided city.
In the context of a two-state solution, Jerusalem (perhaps expanded beyond its current municipal boundaries to encompass additional Israeli and Palestinian residential areas) could form an undivided part of both states, constitute the capital of both states and be administered by local district councils, to which as many aspects of municipal governance as possible would be devolved, and an umbrella municipal council, which would coordinate only those major matters which can only be dealt with efficiently at a city-wide level. Since there are currently no integrated neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, assuming that Israelis are subject to Israeli administration, and Palestinians to Palestinian administration, at the district council level would present no practical problems.
In the proper terminology of international law, Jerusalem would be a "condominium" of Israel and Palestine. Condominiums, while rare, are not without precedent. Chandigarhu is the joint undivided capital of two neighbouring Indian states. For half a century prior to its independence in 1958, Sudan was a condominium of Britain and Egypt, officially named "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan." For over 70 years, the Pacific nation of Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides Condominium) was under the joint undivided sovereignty of Britain and France. For over 700 years, until a 1993 constitutional revision, the Principality of Andorra was under the joint undivided sovereignty of French and Spanish "co-princes." In March 1999, the arbitrator appointed by the International Court of Justice ruled that the contested Bosnian municipality of Broko should be a condominium shared by Bosnia's Serb Republic and its Muslim-Croat Federation, with its own local administration.
In a sense, Jerusalem can be viewed as a cake that could be sliced either vertically or horizontally. Either way, the Palestinians would get a share of the cake, but, while most Israelis could never voluntarily swallow a vertical slice, they might just be able to swallow a horizontal slice. Indeed, by doing so, Israel would finally achieve international recognition of Jerusalem as its capital.
Jerusalem is both a municipality on the ground and a symbol in hearts and minds. Undivided but shared in this way, Jerusalem could be a symbol of reconciliation and hope for Jews, Muslims, Christians and the world as a whole.
Perhaps, paradoxically, the concept of "joint undivided sovereignty" is too simple to be understood easily. While sovereignty is commonly viewed as the state-level equivalent of ownership, joint undivided ownership of land or a house (between husband and wife or, through inheritance, among distant cousins) is scarcely uncommon. Such joint undivided ownership is clear as a matter of law and comprehensible as a matter of practice. Joint owners must determine how their common property is to be administered.
In seeking a solution to the status of Jerusalem, it is essential to distinguish between sovereignty and municipal administration. While municipal administration involves numerous practical questions, sovereignty over Jerusalem is fundamentally a symbolic, psychological and virtually theological question. Symbolism, psychology and theology are extraordinarily important in connection with Jerusalem (more so than with any other city on earth), but it is important to recognise that this is the nature of the question.
Assigning sovereignty over an undivided city to both Israel and Palestine should satisfy to the maximum degree possible the symbolic and psychological needs of both Israelis and Palestinians. It could also generate profound positive psychological benefits for the quality of "life after peace" by requiring in spirit and in practice a sharing of the city and cooperation with "the other" rather than a new partitioning of the city and mere toleration of "the other" or the continuing domination of one people over another, with all the poisonous friction that such domination inevitably provokes.
There is a widespread misconception among Israelis that, under the status quo, Israel possesses sovereignty over expanded East Jerusalem. It does not. It possesses administrative control. A country can acquire administrative control by force of arms. It can acquire sovereignty only with the consent of the international community. Israel has possessed and exercised administrative control over expanded east Jerusalem for more than three decades. To this day, not one of the world's 192 other sovereign states has recognised its claim to sovereignty.
Israel could retain administrative control over expanded East Jerusalem indefinitely. That is a question of military strength and political will. However, it is most unlikely that it will ever acquire sovereignty over expanded East Jerusalem unless it agrees to a permanent solution to the status of Jerusalem based on joint undivided sovereignty over the entire city. That is a question of law. Indeed, since the right of a country to declare any part of its territory as its capital is not contested, the refusal of virtually all countries to recognise Jerusalem as Israel's capital and the maintenance of virtually all embassies to Israel (even the American embassy) in Tel Aviv is striking evidence of the international community's refusal to concede that any part of the city is Israel's sovereign territory, pending an agreed permanent solution to the status of Jerusalem.
A vivid example of the firm and unequivocal position of the international community is provided by UN General Assembly Resolution 53/37, adopted on 2 December 1998 by a vote of 149-1, in which "The General Assembly... determines that the decision of Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the Holy City of Jerusalem is illegal and therefore null and void and has no validity whatsoever." In May 1996, the world's view of the legal status of Jerusalem was concisely summarised by then Britain Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind: "Britain made clear many years ago, as did the international community, that it considered Israel to be in military occupation of East Jerusalem and to have only de facto authority over west Jerusalem."
A clearer understanding of what the legal status quo regarding Jerusalem really is could make Israeli public opinion less reflexively resistant to contemplating any modification of that status quo, even in return for peace.
Realistically, there are only three alternative endings to the search for Israeli-Palestinian peace: (1) Israel and Palestine agree on a basis for dividing Jerusalem, and peace is achieved on that basis; (2) Israel and Palestine agree to share an undivided Jerusalem, and peace is achieved on that basis, or (3) Israel and Palestine fail to agree on Jerusalem's status, and there is no peace.
All the major Israeli political parties, as well as Ehud Barak personally, have ruled out dividing Jerusalem in the most categorical conceivable terms. That leaves only the second and third alternatives -- sharing and no peace -- a sobering reality that should, logically, stimulate interest among peace-seekers in exploring the potential of the "condominium" solution and in trying to convince Israeli public opinion that the Holy City so central to the lives of both Israelis and Palestinians (as well as to believers in the three great monotheistic religions throughout the world) can be shared, that a winner-take-all approach produces only losers and that both Israelis and Palestinians must be winners or both will continue to be losers.
A century after the first Zionist Congress was held in 1897 and half a century after Israel was established in 1948, Israelis concerned about their future might well look back at the vision for Jerusalem of Theodor Herzl, the founding father of political Zionism: "We'll simply extraterritorialise Jerusalem, which will then belong to nobody and yet to everybody, the holy place common to the adherents of all faiths, the great condominium of culture and morality." Herzl's dream of a Jewish state was wildly impractical at the time, but it existed half a century later. Whether its people ever enjoy peace and security may well depend on whether they can grasp Herzl's own recognition that what neither people of the Holy Land could ever relinquish or renounce must therefore be shared.
President Arafat clearly recognised this principle when, in a speech delivered at Harvard University in 1995, he asked: "Why not Jerusalem as the capital of two states, with no Berlin Wall? United, open, coexistence, living together." The audience rose for a standing ovation.
If Israelis and Palestinians can agree -- soon -- that a mutually acceptable solution for the status of Jerusalem does exist, all the other pieces in the delicate peace puzzle could still fall into place before the rapidly approaching September 13 deadline. Without a mutually acceptable solution for the status of Jerusalem, everything will fall apart.
Perhaps, as intensive, top-level negotiations begin at Camp David, Ehud Barak has finally grasped this fundamental fact. All of who sincerely seek peace must hope so.
* The author is an international lawyer who writes frequently on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Related stories:
A question of sovereignty- 6 - 12 July 2000
Joint undivided sovereignty- 9 - 15 July 1998
A crime by any name- 2 - 8 July 1998
For a shared Jerusalem- 1-7 October 1998
