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Al-Ahram Weekly 20 - 26 July 2000 Issue No. 491 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 20 - 26 July 2000 Issue No. 491
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters On compromise solutions
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
Game playing is a theory often used in strategic studies to determine who, in a given conflict situation, emerges the winner and who the loser. According to this theory, a conflict situation does not necessarily have to end with winners and losers, a situation described in game playing jargon as a "zero sum game," in the sense that both parties could be winners (a "non-zero sum game plus") or losers (a "non-zero sum game minus"). But conflict situations can sometimes be tricky. For instance, passing from a state of war to a state of peace could be perceived as a "non-zero sum game plus," in which both parties benefit from ending the hostilities and building peace. But if the peace reached satisfies 90 per cent of the demands of one party and only 10 per cent of the demands of the other, the benefits peace brings to one party will greatly outweigh those it brings to the other. Would this be a "non-zero sum game," with a plus for both parties, or a "zero sum game," where the plus for one party is actually a minus for the other?
The question acquires particular relevance when, in the conflict situation being addressed, all the issues in contention require compromise solutions. This is the case in the talks between Arafat and Barak, under the sponsorship of President Clinton. Although the talks are still shrouded in secrecy, some of the key "compromise" ideas are not denied by the protagonists.
Let us begin with the issue of the Palestinian refugees. According to a news report which appeared in Ha'aretz on 14 July, Barak will present the following plan at Camp David for solving the refugee problem: "Israel will give a 'substantial' contribution to a new international organisation which will be set up to compensate and rehabilitate Palestinian refugees, and will absorb tens of thousands of them as part of a 'family reunification' programme on a humanitarian basis; Israel will not object to the Palestinians referring to these moves as a 'realisation of the right of return', so long as no further demands on Israel are made in this context." Ha'aretz added that Barak will stress that Israel refuses to recognise the Palestinians' right of return, and will not accept legal or moral responsibility for creating the refugee problem, beyond expressing sorrow for their suffering.
The number of Palestinian refugees presently stands at four and a half million. Israel is ready to absorb tens of thousands, and estimates that the Palestinian state will be able to accommodate half a million. In Israel's version of a "solution" of the refugee problem, nearly four million Palestinian refugees will be deprived of the right of return. In flagrant violation of UN resolution 194, the right of return is reduced to a "family reunification" programme -- within given limits. That is, a token number of Palestinians will be allowed to return while the bulk will be deprived of the right to make any further claims in this respect. In other words, the right of return will no longer be regarded as an issue of principle, only as a humanitarian gesture.
Then comes the problem of borders. One of the compromise solutions proposed is to swap territory between Israel and the future Palestinian state (an alleged "non-zero sum game plus") as a way to solve the dispute over the settlement clusters that Israel wants to annex. An earlier proposal by Barak's government was that in exchange for recognising the Palestinian state, it would retain sovereignty over one tenth of the territory of the West Bank, a percentage that does not take into account Jerusalem's expanded municipality. Does this mean that Israel is ready to cede one tenth of its own territory to the Palestinians? Not according to Ha'aretz, which explains the proposal thus: "The option currently under discussion is not based on swapping equal size territories, but rather on a transfer of 'symbolic' territories to the Palestinians in return for the West Bank settlement clusters to be annexed to Israel."
Closely related to the issue of borders is the question of checkpoints and early warning stations. Another compromise solution, involving another swap, is likely to be considered in this connection. Clinton is expected to propose the stationing of international, mainly American, forces between the protagonists in exchange for Israel's recognition of Palestinian sovereignty over the checkpoints. But with sophisticated US technology and personnel manning controls at the checkpoints and early warning stations, and with the undisputed American sympathies for the Israeli side, Palestinian sovereignty will be more illusory than real.
Israel's interest in swapping territory with the future Palestinian state is not limited to its commitment to the integrity of Israeli settlements, but extends to the vital issue of ensuring its water needs. Central to the new draft proposal outlining the border between Israel and the Palestinians presented by the Israeli delegation at Camp David is Israel's demand for continued rule of the areas above the mountain aquifer -- the country's main water reservoir situated on the slopes of the Samarian Hills. Barak views the mountain aquifer as a "red line" he cannot give up on at a time the entire region is facing a looming water crisis.
Actually, the idea of swapping land has extended to Jerusalem. According to Ha'aretz, Barak is proposing a "relatively high degree of autonomy for the Palestinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, as well as an exchange of territory in which Jewish neighbourhoods will be incorporated into Jerusalem in exchange for the transfer of some of the Palestinian neighbourhoods to the area of the Palestinian state." Joseph Alpher, Barak's special adviser on media relations and former head of Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, said on the eve of the Camp David summit that "everything related to Jerusalem is on the table, but the Jerusalem issue is the hardest in the negotiations and it is not certain that agreement will be reached."
This announcement followed President Mubarak's statement after he met separately with Arafat and Barak before they left for Camp David that "however difficult the Jerusalem problem, it cannot be delayed, dismissed or frozen." Dr Osama El-Baz, the president's adviser, added that "Arafat is not free to decide alone the future of the Holy City which involves, Arab, Muslim, Christian, and not only Palestinian rights."
In his speech to a stormy session of the Knesset delivered just before he left for Camp David, Barak repeatedly insisted that Jerusalem will remain united and Israel's eternal capital. Thanks to that statement, Barak was able to defeat a no-confidence vote which, if passed, would have cancelled the summit meeting. In Camp David, Alpher declared that while Barak continues to believe in "united Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital," he nevertheless understands the importance of Jerusalem for the three religions and for the Palestinian people.
But however difficult the problem of Jerusalem, the central problem at Camp David is that of the Palestinian state. Do any of the compromise solutions under consideration guarantee sovereign prerogatives for that state or do they all contribute, rather, to the erosion of that sovereignty to the advantage of Israel? Are we dealing with a "non-zero sum game plus" or with a "zero-sum game" -- with a state that would embody Palestinian aspirations or with an arrangement to immunise Israelis against the threat of a future intifada and hence to consolidate Israel's security? In the light of the deep disparities between the protagonists, can any more balanced agreement be worked out?
Related stories:
Beyond Camp David- 3 - 9 June 1999
Camp David II- 13 - 19 July 2000
