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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 July - 2 August 2000 Issue No. 492 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 July - 2 August 2000 Issue No. 492
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Shattered on impact
By Mustafa Kamel El-Sayed *
No matter how the talks in Camp David between Palestinians and Israelis eventually end -- assuming, of course, that they resume in the near future -- it is quite evident that they were little more than an occasion for a clash between two logics. The Palestinian delegation, led by Yasser Arafat, presented a position based on principles of international law, which should be the criteria guiding states in the conduct of their foreign policies, while the Israeli delegation, led by Ehud Barak, insisted that it was defending Israel's security, regardless of international law. It is clear to any fair-minded observer that the Israeli position not only does not contribute to Israel's security in the long term, it expresses in fact an attitude that US Senator Fulbright, a longtime president of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, described as the "arrogance of power."
At the outset, Prime Minister Ehud Barak made his by now famous declaration: No to the June 1967 borders; no to the partition of Jerusalem; no to the return of refugees; no to the stationing of a foreign army west of the Jordan River; no to the dismantling of settlements. To these positions, totally unacceptable to the Palestinians, Barak should have added a sixth -- namely, no to negotiations with the Palestinians. Why not? With these five refusals, the Palestinians have nothing left to negotiate about.
The Palestinians, on the other hand, base their negotiating position on UN resolutions, disregarding the founding resolution of 1947, which called for the partition of Palestine into two states, with Jerusalem as an international city. They argue that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible in international law, which further dictates that, since the Palestinians are a people under occupation, they are entitled to the right to self-determination.
Some might argue that Barak's refusals are only his starting position, and that the talks in Camp David, notwithstanding the news blackout enforced by the Americans, initially suggested that the Israelis had moved away from these positions. Their positions, however, are still inspired by this arrogance of power rather than by principles of justice, or even by a broader and a longer-term view of Israeli security.
On the question of Jerusalem, the Israelis will not budge from their claim that the whole city, including of course Arab East Jerusalem, should remain under their exclusive and absolute control. Some reports suggested that they accepted the principle of "shared sovereignty" -- but only over Arab East Jerusalem. In other words, the Palestinians would have no say over West Jerusalem. "Shared sovereignty" means that the Israelis would share sovereignty over the part inhabited by Arabs, but might allow the Palestinians "full sovereignty" over some quarters -- probably those parts lying outside the city proper, like the Arab village of Abu Dis, which the Israelis are trying to persuade the Palestinians to accept as their future capital. Even if we assume the Israelis were actually planning to make such a so-called "concession" -- termed a breakthrough in some news reports -- it is not clear who would have the authority to issue construction permits, since the Israelis have insisted that they must monopolise this "authority." Nor it is clear that Palestinian "sovereignty" would entail a Palestinian "armed presence" in the Arab part of the city. Thus, if the Israelis are to maintain their authority to issue construction permits and the monopoly of the use of force (in the name of public security, of course), "shared sovereignty" cannot halt the Judaisation of Arab East Jerusalem, and the future Palestinian state will be incapable of maintaining that area's Arab character.
On the question of borders, the clash of the two logics is no less clear. While the Israelis are not opposed to the declaration of a Palestinian state, they would like to continue to police its borders. This must surely be a first in international law. Were Israel to do as it likes, it would give itself the right to keep the borders between the future Palestinian state and Jordan not just under its control, but as part of Israel proper. Only the arrogance of power could drive the Israelis to formulate such a demand, in line with a plan suggested decades ago by Yigal Allon, a former Israeli deputy prime minister.
The Israeli position on the question of settlements constitutes no less of an innovation in terms of international law. Quite simply, it demands that the existing "major settlements" remain under complete Israeli sovereignty. Such settlements are built on land acquired by force. Therefore, there is absolutely no legal basis for their presence. In fact, Israel should pay proper compensation to the former owners of this land, whether they are individual Palestinian peasants, or the future Palestinian state if such settlements are built on public (amiri) land. Furthermore, does the Israeli government imagine that the presence of the settlements will contribute to friendly relations between the settlers and the former owners of their land?
The question of settlements is closely tied with the question of access to water, another thorny issue. With their present control over water sources, the Israelis would like to provide the settlers (less than 15 per cent of the total population of the West Bank) with the major part of the water supply, to fill their large swimming pools and water their gardens, while all Palestinians, including peasants (85 per cent of the population) will be forced to satisfy all their irrigation needs with less than 20 per cent of the water supply. The Israeli government knows very well that maintaining the settlements is a grave security risk. It believes, however, that it can continue to defend them in the West Bank, if not near Gaza, which is both small and overpopulated. For this reason, it has offered to dismantle Israeli settlements near Gaza.
It is also difficult for Israel to recognise its moral responsibility for the plight of the Palestinian refugees. They will receive no compensation, although even in Israel, the fact that they were forcefully evicted from their land has been documented extensively (notably by the "New Historians"). Jews must be compensated for the crimes of the Nazis; but Israel will not even brook mention of its own responsibility for the tragic plight of the Palestinian refugees. Israel could claim to be demonstrating great flexibility if it were to accept the possible return, over a period of ten years, of 100,000 of those who left after 1948, within a family reunification plan. Of course, the Israeli bureaucracy can only be expected to do its best in denying future Palestinian applicants the right of return, by claiming that they do not meet the eligibility requirements.
Which logic wins? It is not difficult to predict the outcome of this clash, given the power relations between the parties. The Palestinian delegation went to Camp David armed with the moral superiority of its position and the support of the Palestinian people. Its members hoped that the US would play the role of an honest broker. One incident, however, reportedly convinced Arafat that the US was not abiding by the rules. He threatened to leave Camp David. President Clinton, eager to reach a settlement that will ensure his place in posterity, ordered that the American proposals be withdrawn, and persuaded Arafat to stay on.
The Israelis know that they hold all the cards. They control the territories. They are the most powerful military force in the entire Middle East. They also know that the US administration, particularly under Bill Clinton, will not place any pressure on them in an election year. The Israelis have even tried to marshal the support of some Arab governments, but were unable to persuade Egypt to talk Arafat into dropping his demand for Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem. Saudi Arabia and Jordan adopted the same stance.
The Palestinian delegation went to Camp David, therefore, armed only with justice, the support of the Palestinian people and moral backing from some Arab governments. Which logic could possibly prevail in the short term, even if the negotiators had come to an immediate agreement? The arrogance of power is no guarantee for peace. It is highly unlikely that any settlement not based on justice can serve as a solid foundation for a durable peace in the Middle East.
* The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
