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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 July - 2 August 2000 Issue No. 492 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 July - 2 August 2000 Issue No. 492
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Bringing Sudan together
By Al-Tijani Al-TayebMany Egyptian intellectuals and politicians are concerned about the self-determination slogans being raised in the Sudan. Those I met and talked to, many of them Marxists whose position on the national cause is well known, are concerned that the exercise of the right to self-determination could destroy the Sudan's unity. Their concerns are not assuaged by the fact that all the parties in Sudan accept this slogan. They are not even dispelled by the statements issued by John Garang, the leader of the Sudanese Popular Liberation Movement (SPLM), that Sudanese unity -- extending from Nimoli in the far south to Alexandria! -- would be his first choice. Most observers remember the events that took place 45 years ago when, in response to the right to self-determination prescribed in the February 1953 agreement, the Sudanese people chose to establish a state independent from Egypt, although the pro-unity movement was strong at the time and although the prime minister, elected by a decisive majority, was Ismail Al-Azhari, a pro-unity leader.
It would be easy, even legitimate, to respond to those who are concerned that if all Sudanese, northerners and southerners, government and opposition, accept this slogan, Egyptians cannot deny them this right. Of course, the Sudanese would never advise the Egyptians to mind their own business. They are fully aware that their future is not isolated from their regional surroundings. They are also aware that, at this historical juncture, they must take their next-door neighbours, particularly Egypt, into account.
Sudanese public opinion understands why Egyptians are so keen to preserve Sudan's unity, and so opposed to separation and separatist slogans. Egyptian declarations, however, do not take into consideration the various factors that influence the Sudanese political arena and have provided separatists with the courage to raise their voices once again. Moreover, Egypt's strategic, water, economic and cultural security is not under threat, as it was following the Islamic Front coup and the infamous terrorist programme adopted by the regime at that time. The only way to guard against the dangers of terrorism and separatism, therefore, is for Egypt to throw its weight behind a peaceful, democratic solution to the Sudanese crisis.
Until a decade ago, the idea of self-determination was not familiar in Sudan, despite the long years of injustice. It emerged in the context of fluctuating international and regional conditions, a vicious civil war that depleted the nation's human and material resources and a fascist government that destroyed any opportunity for peace and a democratic solution.
The slogan emerged following the split in the separatist SPLM. At a meeting held in Washington in October 1993, the two parties agreed on the right to self-determination for the south and the Nubian mountains, whether under the existing regime or any future government. The slogan immediately gained acceptance. It was no longer possible to ignore it or avoid dealing with its implications.
This slogan, and the force and sympathy it gained among all southern political players, were a direct result of the Islamic Front regime and the pressure exerted by African and Western countries to stop the war in the south. The popularity of self-determination was also a result of these countries' efforts to unify the SPLM and reach an agreement, no matter how superficial, between the SPLM's call for unity and the separatist calls of those who had left the movement.
This slogan, however, also means that the southern political powers and the international community in general have lost confidence in the northern political powers -- their position since independence, the way they dealt with the south, and their failure to fulfil their promises or to work to end the civil war despite the efforts exerted by various political parties after the fall of the Numeiri regime. These efforts resulted in the Kukadam Declaration (March 1986), and the Mirghani-Garang Initiative (November 1988). Thus, the south saw self-determination as a safety valve that could prove useful in the future.
Self-determination is a basic democratic right. As is the case with all democratic human rights, however, it is characterised by historical relativity. The way it is put into practice, and the results thereof, are subject to time and place.
Although the exercise of this right can have more than one consequence, granting it to a region within a unified state basically means granting that region the right to secede. In Sudan, given the religious dictatorship and the civil war, self-determination necessarily leads to separation.
The exercise of self-determination as a democratic value requires a real democracy that creates a climate free of oppression, a climate of peace and democracy, a climate where real freedom of choice prevails without material or moral pressure in favour of either side.
This is the concept adopted by the National Democratic Gathering in the conference held in Asmara, Eritrea's capital, in June 1995. The gathering is the largest political coalition known to Sudan apart from the Islamic Front. Its map is similar to that of Sudan, and expresses the country's unity.
In accordance with this concept, the conference approved a programme aiming to create a climate based on the following priorities: reinstating democracy, eliminating the religious state and ending the civil war; initiating a four-year transitional period of democratic respect for political, ethnic, religious and cultural plurality, the rule of law, complete equality between citizens, fair division of power and wealth, and the implementation of a programme to remedy damages done by both the Front and the war; holding a national constitutional conference, in which all political powers will participate; conducting a referendum on unity or secession prior to the end of the transitional period.
The conference unanimously agreed that during the transitional period, the central authority would implement confidence-building measures to ensure that self-determination would result in unity.
The Sudanese communists believe that the bridge to the future lies in eliminating the Islamic Front dictatorship, whether it is pulled out by the roots or dissolved by peaceful political means. They accept the right to self-determination as a human democratic right. They deal with it as an open political slogan that can bring about unity or separation, support calls for unity in the south and north, and relentlessly fight separatists wherever they are. The communists object to the narrow option: either war or separation. They choose unity in the interest of the Sudanese people, a unity that rejects both war and separation, a unity to eliminate dictatorship and reinstate democracy, to eliminate war from Sudanese life, a unity that exists under a steadfast, just peace.
Egypt and the Egyptians have a vital role to play against separation and in favor of unity. Egypt should favour the elimination of the dictatorship and the Islamicised state. It should reject the continuation of the civil war in the south and other areas, the policy of bombing civilians and wasting the Sudan's scarce resources on war. It should fight the policies of ethnic and religious supremacy practiced by the Islamic Front, and help reduce famine and disease. It can also encourage other Arab countries to contribute to these noble efforts.
