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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 July - 2 August 2000 Issue No. 492 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 July - 2 August 2000 Issue No. 492
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Final status negotiations
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
One of the main reasons the Camp David talks collapsed is that they were conducted more in the spirit of intermediary negotiations than final negotiations. They were seen as final only from the perspective of their sponsor, who will not have the chance to orchestrate another round of talks between the parties in the few weeks left to him before he is edged out of the forefront of the political stage. For although it is technically true that Clinton will remain in office until 20 January 2001, once the presidential campaign begins the limelight will shift to the new contenders for his post.
In a way, the Camp David summit was Clinton's last chance to redeem himself in the eyes of history. If he succeeds in coaxing the parties to work out what he can pass off as a final agreement, this would go far towards silencing his detractors. Clinton believes that, despite his scandal-riddled presidency, he was a successful US president who deserves to be honoured by posterity. The Middle East is one of the files he is most familiar with and which could, if a breakthrough is achieved, earn him the Nobel peace prize. This is why Clinton will fight on to reach an agreement on the Middle East up to the very last moment.
It seems that one of the proposals advanced by the Israeli side in Camp David was to remove Jerusalem from the agenda of this round and defer it to another round to be held in a couple of years, as this was the only way any kind of agreement could be worked out. Not surprisingly, Clinton, and not only Arafat, turned down the proposal. Obviously an agreement that makes no provision for the status of Jerusalem cannot qualify as a final agreement that is worthy of a Nobel prize.
Actually, objective considerations stemming from the very nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict stand in the way of a final agreement that cannot be overcome simply because Clinton has his own subjective reasons for wrapping up a deal before leaving office. Contrary to the Syrian track, where Damascus can claim that it is pressing for the restoration of territory that was actually in its possession prior to 4 June 1967, in exchange for an all-encompassing peace, the Palestinian Authority cannot call for a similar type of package deal. Because the Arabs rejected the UN Partition Plan in 1949, the Palestinians cannot claim that they already had a state with an established configuration. They have to hammer out that configuration through a step-by-step approach, that is, by a process of successive intermediary stages. Actually, the PA may find it more convenient at this time to resist striking a final deal that would deprive it of rights which have not materialised in the present but could be validated more easily in future.
It was believed that the parties at the Camp David summit had a common interest in averting an outright breakdown, even if they were unable to achieve a total success. Indeed, there was no question of total success as long as the Syrian and Lebanese tracks remained frozen. But then, neither was total failure an option. A worst case scenario that had to be avoided at all cost, its implications were not limited to the Camp David summit alone, nor, for that matter, to the Oslo process only, but extended to the whole Madrid framework and, eventually, to the very idea that a peaceful settlement of the dispute is possible. Despite the high stakes involved, the parties came close to conceding failure on the eve of Clinton's departure for Okinawa. However, at the eleventh hour they decided to pursue negotiations, at least until their host returned from the G-8 summit. But, then again, a minimum agreement proved unreachable.
The real question is whether the collapse of the talks reflects the objective reality that the gap between the Israeli and Palestinian positions is too wide to cross or whether, as some suspect, reports are deliberately put out by the parties themselves as a tactical ploy designed to have their respective constituencies swallow the bitter pill of greater concessions.
Clinton and Barak are said to have reached an agreement on what Barak considered the maximum concessions he is ready to make and to have presented the deal to Arafat as an ultimatum: either to take or to leave. Apparently Arafat refused to play along, knowing that even if he will have to assume the consequences of his refusal he will not be the only loser. Now that the Camp David summit has ended in failure, Barak may see his coalition government collapse and Clinton may not get his Noble prize.
Moreover, whether Clinton likes it or not, his position is closer to Arafat's than it is to Barak's. On the core issues of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees and the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, Clinton, like Arafat, is for an overall, final, approach, while Barak is still for the gradual, step-by-step approach.
The step-by-step approach differs fundamentally from the final stage approach. In intermediary stage negotiations, the outcome of agreements is determined by the balance of power between the protagonists at each specific moment of the negotiation process. The frame of reference is the relationship between them in the present and in the short term. In final negotiations, it is long-term considerations that should determine the outcome. The frame of reference becomes the balance of the long-term interests of the parties, not the balance of power between them.
It is no longer possible to focus discussions between the protagonists on whether the territory to be passed over to the PA should reach the ratio of 15 per cent rather than 13 per cent of the West Bank. Talks focused on whether the total land to be passed over to the Palestinians is 90 per cent or even 94 per cent, if Israel is to maintain its sovereignty over most of the West Bank territory now occupied by Jewish settlers.
As to the future status of Jerusalem, any discussion of this most critical issue of all was postponed time and again, the Camp David summit being the first time the issue of Jerusalem was the subject of direct negotiations. It was the main stumbling block in the way of a breakthrough, with Israeli negotiators refusing to consider anything less than a unified Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital and under its sole sovereignty, and the Palestinians insisting on Palestinian sovereignty over East (Arab) Jerusalem, which is to become the capital of the Palestinian state.
According to informed sources, the Americans proposed a formula of "shared sovereignty" over East Jerusalem without the town being divided once again. The Israelis were amenable to the idea, but the Palestinians wanted to study whether the proposal could be an acceptable frame of reference. In the meantime, international parties stepped in to remind the summiteers that the status of Jerusalem cannot be determined by them alone. Pope John Paul II, speaking for Christians all over the world, has called for the internationalisation of the city, while President Mubarak and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, speaking for the Muslims, have issued a joint statement to the effect that East Jerusalem must remain Arab and Muslim.
The PA may eventually accept the shared sovereignty proposal in principle and make it the point of departure for overcoming the deadlock and ensuring an agreement. But difficulties did arise over how the principle is to be put into practice and what it actually means for the protagonists. The Camp David summit might reconvene in a number of weeks, the time necessary to probe how the various protagonists can sell such an agreement. There is also the possibility that the PA definitely refuses the proposal. This can bring us to the 13 September deadline set by Arafat for unilaterally declaring a Palestinian state, basing his move on the precedent of Israel's unilateral pullout from Lebanon.
It is difficult to predict the outcome of the current situation with any degree of accuracy at the time of writing. The only certainty is that using an intermediary approach to address issues that can only be determined through final negotiations has now proved to be an exercise in futility.
Related stories:
Beyond Camp David- 3 - 9 June 1999
Camp David II- 13 - 19 July 2000
On compromise solutions- 20 - 26 July 2000
