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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 July - 2 August 2000 Issue No. 492 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 27 July - 2 August 2000 Issue No. 492
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The paradoxical society
By Mohamed El-Sayed Said *
Will the arrest of Saadeddin Ibrahim dash the hopes of those who hoped a vibrant civil society was being born? Ibrahim was arrested on charges that apply to many other organisations, some closely connected to the government. More importantly, Ibrahim has been subjected to vicious media attacks on his integrity, identity and works, from quarters belonging, in theory, to civil society itself. The few who defended him in principle failed to make a strong case; foreign funding was the main stumbling block.
The debate in the Egyptian press offers very little by way of concrete information. The extreme polarisation on this and other issues related to civil society also indicates a reluctance to review previous fixed positions. In that sense, the intellectual foundations of civil society in Egypt remain very shaky.
Foreign funding was already the biggest bone of contention in the civil society controversy. It was already at stake when Hafez Abu Se'da, secretary-general of the EOHR, was arrested last winter. I believe it will remain on the national agenda for years to come. But why is it so central to the whole debate?
There are two main camps. The first argues its case essentially in terms of national security. Official charges against Saadeddin Ibrahim fell short of this accusation -- but just barely. This perspective rejects foreign funding of civil society institutions in principle. Certainly, some of those who reject foreign funding also reject it for government institutions, since they believe it breeds dependency and political clientelism. But most reject funding for civil society alone. Both sides see no need to distinguish between donor agencies or institutions, since they are all considered to be engaged in some sort of espionage.
This argument rests on the assumption that the government knows best and can always protect itself against donors' alleged attempts to undermine our national security. The government itself has never made its position clear. On one hand, it cannot possibly agree that all funding agencies are espionage organisations, since it will have to answer the question why it allows them to operate in the country. Otherwise, the state has insisted that civil society organisations obtain its approval on every grant they apply for. This at least makes clear what it sees as objectionable. But what guarantee is there that the government will not abuse its self-declared mandate for political purposes?
National security arguments were widely used by totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe and authoritarian regimes in Latin America and parts of Asia. Unfortunately, Egyptian intellectuals and academics themselves expanded the term to include just about every aspect of life, from detonators to detergent. Still, it is possible to sympathise with the extensive use of the national security argument in the Arab world. American support for Israel has deeply, and justifiably, implanted in Arab society an acute sense of fear that has gathered momentum inexorably, and created a sub-culture of fear.
The press's opposition to foreign funding was never detailed (in fact, ignorance of the specific issues at stake is the norm), but the media is always ready to claim that donors dictate the agenda and use the activities of civil society organisations for their own purposes (implying, of course, a threat to national security), and that civil society organisations are powerless to oppose the donors' dictates. For example, the EOHR report on the Kosheh incident in Upper Egypt was "explained" by reference to a cheque from the British embassy, which supposedly wanted the EOHR to unearth evidence of religious discrimination. The cheque was actually made out to a project benefiting women, and the report in fact ruled out religious oppression as a cause of the incident. Women's rights advocacy is also denounced, as in the case of FGM (female genital mutilation). Detractors claim that FGM is not an issue and that it should not be placed on the national agenda. Obviously, all these arguments are based on opinions hostile to the purposes declared by the civil society institutions in question.
Some commentators have also had the "courage" to condemn public opinion polls as detrimental to national security. This argument betrays totalitarian political motives, not to mention its total lack of understanding of rudimentary research tools.
Many civil society activists have tried in vain to explain the funding paradox. When the government took over the institution of the Awqaf (religious endowments), starting in the early 19th century, the only substructure in our tradition specifically designed to fund non-governmental activities vanished. With the destruction of the upper classes in the 1950s and 1960s, charity work was reduced. And Law 32 on NGOs made contributions from wealthy individuals illegal or contingent on government approval, effectively eliminating all institutions whose aims are not perceived favourably. This situation has persisted despite claims of political liberalisation.
By definition, civil society work imposes transparency. Activists could not possibly have access to classified information. Furthermore, a single incident of espionage -- indeed, any suspect activity -- would not only scandalise the donors, it would lead to their destruction. For this reason, stringent safeguards exist to prevent abuse of funds by either donor or recipient.
All this does not mean, however, that foreign (or, for that matter, local) funding is necessarily innocent. Indeed, civil society activists themselves suspect certain institutions or individuals of corruption. But they argue that the real guarantee against abuse is the robust development of civil society itself. For this reason, global traditions of civil society activity should be followed vigourously in Egypt. Funding should be subject to general rules of civic accountability. It should not be attached to unusual conditions or interference by funding agencies. Human rights activists in Egypt have also suggested that budgets be monitored by a public auditing agency.
On the other hand, there is a strong argument to be made against foreign funding. First, we have made very little use of funds available to civil society institutions. Actual progress made through foreign funding, while hard to measure, seems meagre. Yet one fact is clear: the lack of progress is not the donors' fault, but the inevitable outcome of the extreme fragility of civil society after half a century of restrictions and hostility on the part of government.
Another related issue is that of dependency, in the broad sense. If civil society in Egypt relies for its very existence on foreign funding, what will happen if the funds dry up? Would the relative ease with which certain civil society institutions mobilise foreign funds be conducive to stronger ties with local communities? If the state comes to rely on foreign funds rather than taxes, its reliance on society will be reduced, implying a lack of accountability to the public. NGOs whose life and death depend on foreign funds, of course, will show the symptoms of the same condition.
In this same point, however, lies the insoluble puzzle. Political or cultural Islamists claim they can easily generate funds from within, through charity or by evoking highly charged political issues, with the charge coming from a certain interpretation of religion. They overlook the fact that such emotionally charged issues fall far short of the agenda for social and political purposes. Would local funding be possible for environmental preservation, women's issues, or any cause that is not strictly religious? Highly unlikely.
In fact, Egyptian human rights organisations have tried every potential source of local funding, in vain. Civil advocacy in the narrow sense, therefore, will either have to rely on foreign funding (at least until society and legal practice allow systematic fund-raising), or simply accept an early death. The former option fails to root civic NGOs organically in their local communities. Isolation will inevitably ensue, leading to corruption. The latter option means relinquishing civic responsibility and yielding to the general spirit of apathy.
What is a sound option for civil society activists? The solution will have to develop on the ground, through the revival of society. But it is certainly important to have a credible strategy.
There are two options. The first is the professionalisation of civil society activism. This strategy corresponds to international practice. Almost 75 per cent of research centres world-wide are registered as private non-profit institutions, with the rest either public or governmental. NGOs in the West and other parts of the world have developed into professional bodies. Broadly speaking, this strategy entails the building of institutions with highly trained permanent staff and clear rules of operation. This strategy requires relatively large funds, which means again that foreign funding is a matter of life and death.
The second strategy is based on voluntarism, and makes NGOs reliant on non-professional volunteers across the board. Such organisations are assumed to keep organic ties with local communities, which provide the funds. In most cases, these funds are very limited, and activities are restricted to small-scale projects.
Every society must combine both patterns. The real question is whether our country is undergoing a possible evolution toward the second type of organised action. Apathy, weak civic culture and long traditions of state hegemony make the likelihood of an active social movement limited.
We need to encourage all possible alternatives simultaneously. When it comes to professional NGOs, however, we need a high level of militancy with regard to the substance of social action, but also its discipline in matters of transparency and accountability.
* The writer is deputy director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
Related Stories:
Piling up the charges 20 - 26 July 2000
No need for panic? 20-26 July 2000
Off the books 20 - 26 July 2000
The burden of proof 13 - 19 July 2000
Prominent NGO figure arrested 6 - 12 July 2000
A snag in the national fabric 22 - 28 June 2000Relates sites:
Ibn Khaldoun Centre for Developmental Studies
