Al-Ahram Weekly
27 July - 2 August 2000
Issue No. 492
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 Issues navigation Current Issue Previous Issue Back Issues

 
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Apologies to my son

By Abdel-Jawwad Saleh *

The invitation to the ill-fated Camp David summit was issued by President Clinton, but the idea was Prime Minister Barak's. Both Palestinians and Israelis had made extensive preparations before leaving. First, Arafat criticised the idea, arguing that the third redeployment should be implemented first. Later, he grudgingly agreed to go. In fact, he had gone off to negotiate the final status issues before even the transitional phase was complete.

The Israelis created a lively environment to make it easy for Barak to win the Camp David campaign. One hundred thousand Israeli right-wing activists gathered in Tel Aviv to accuse him of "surrendering." Some of his partners left the government coalition. Heading to Camp David, Barak actually complained that Clinton's stand on most of the final issues favoured the Palestinians, not the Israelis. But Clinton repeatedly stated that both sides would need to compromise over the "profound and wrenching questions" facing them. In other words, he gave hangman and victim equal responsibility.

Camp David was designed to pressure Arafat into reaching an agreement that the Palestinian people could not accept. Barak said as much publicly.

Barak is weak, and needs help to survive; concessions are necessary if he is to toe his red lines. The only person capable of helping is Arafat. The Israelis are asking for concessions on issues that have formed the basic elements of the Palestinian cause. Barak wants to make all Palestinian rights null and void. He also wants international law to endorse his plan.

Should Israel, which dominates 81 per cent of Mandate Palestine, demand concessions from the Palestinians, whose 19 per cent was occupied, confiscated, and dismembered by roads and colonies?

The Palestinian media, however, acquiescent as always, presented Arafat as the stronger of the two parties, a leader who enjoys the full support of his people, including all the PLO factions. Demonstrators roamed the streets to declare their undying support for Arafat -- regardless of the outcome. The Central Council, a PLO-appointed organ, "unanimously" backed Arafat's threat to declare a state unilaterally if the final-status agreement was not reached by 13 September. The majority of Palestinians met the threat with scepticism. That path is fraught with many risks, and the declaration is not sustainable. The shadows of suspicion make it difficult to ascertain the motives prompting this incident, and many others.

Why do we need to declare a state when we have already done so? And why should we declare one now, when the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been busy systematically deinstitutionalising the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), local government and the press? Such institutions are the basis of any modern state. The PLC represents the people's sovereignty. Why must we incite havoc through an empty declaration?

We need to build a real state on the ground: by separating the three branches of the PA (executive, legislative and judiciary) through the promulgation of the Basic Law; by institutionalising the rule of law through the promulgation of the Independent Judiciary Law; by establishing a democratic political system and initiating regular elections for all institutions; and finally, by taking serious anti-graft measures. That is how a nation is built.

I am worried that such a declaration will be perceived as exempting the Israelis from fulfilling their responsibilities: their moral and legal obligation to recognise their victims' rights, the ramifications of Israeli occupation, dispossession, torture, killing, and exile. Yet the Central Council, parroting Arafat, claims that, this time, the declaration will make Palestinian sovereignty manifest.

Why on earth has the PA spent the past seven years watching silently as our land was expropriated and settlements mushroomed? Where was Palestinian sovereignty then? Why have Israeli bulldozers uprooted our olive trees and demolished our homes? What was the Central Council waiting for? I have listened to speeches for days on end, and heard only the discourse of exile. No one has revealed the sufferings of our people or even expressed indignation at the fact that Ramallah and Al-Bireh were occupied for three days, that their businesses were closed down and that the two cities became a battle ground where a handful of hooligans postured, most of them with General Intelligence Agency ID cards securely in their pockets. No precautionary measures were taken until Ahlam, a 25-year-old woman, was shot in cold blood. Two weeks after she died, she was to have been married to a recently freed prisoner of war.

The meeting of the Central Council was a show of support for the boss. How can an attitude of "confrontation" be implanted in the spirit of a frustrated people when these conditions prevail throughout the territories under the PA's jurisdiction?

Admittedly, it is very difficult to understand just what was going on at Camp David before the negotiations broke down. Flurries of proposals and initiatives were leaked every now and then, before silence descended once again.

No matter what the eventual outcome, however, I believe the clue to the negotiations -- and to the ongoing political process -- is to be found in the "Beilin-Abu Mazen" document. This document jeopardises our rights by forsaking issues that form the basis of our people's cause -- Jerusalem, the right of return... As long as the Beilin-Abu Mazen document has not been published, it poses a threat as a viable proposal within the negotiating framework.

Abu Mazen's appointment as head of the final status negotiating team will almost certainly jeopardise the outcome of the negotiations. This is also why Yossi Beilin has been prevented from playing any role in the negotiations.

The Israeli cabinet has studied the complete text of the document. Natan Sharansky could not believe a Palestinian had participated in the formulation of such a document. Beilin retorted: "Take half an hour, drive to Ramallah, and he will tell you himself."

The Beilin-Abu Mazen document forms the basis of negotiations in Camp David. In fact, many of the issues were agreed upon through the secret channel of Stockholm. Barak himself excluded Jerusalem. He felt that, under Clinton's spell, Arafat would make the necessary concessions spontaneously.

When the deliberations began, Barak refused to discuss Jerusalem before Arafat backed down on the right of return. The Israelis claim that the return of Palestinians to the homes and villages from which they were evicted by force constitutes some kind of existential threat. Arafat acquiesced. The Beilin-Abu Mazen document is astonishingly close to Barak's "red lines," which he maintained were not open for discussion at Camp David: no withdrawal to the 1967 borders; Israeli sovereignty over most of the settlers; the imposition of an Israeli "security zone" corresponding to the Jordan Valley; no foreign army across the Jordan River; no concession on Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, no right of return.

This is a catastrophe that will erase a century-old dream, which the Palestinians have paid for in a currency they can never exchange. What must they do with their dead, with those who have been wounded and humiliated? The books that burned in Alexandria are gone forever; in the same way, the Palestinians' suffering can be neither forgotten nor redeemed.

This catastrophe exceeds the Nakba of 1948.

The Holy See and the PLO concluded a basic agreement early this year, limiting the PLO's authority in Jerusalem to cultural and religious activities.

The speaker of the PLC violated procedural rules when he refused to put two draft laws on the agenda: first, that Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian state; second, that Palestinian refugees have the right to return to their homes and villages. Instead of discussing them, the speaker referred them arbitrarily to a committee.

All these are signs that the PA is already committed to accepting Abu Dis as the capital of a Palestinian state. Last but not least, there is the fact that the PLC will be housed there.

Until talks broke down, Camp David was part of the props in a Shakespearean tragedy, designed to show that the heroes have fought courageously to the bitter end. In fact, it signified complete surrender. Barak has made it impossible to conclude a genuine peace. He will achieve a truce, which is another term for war deferred. The Israeli right will be satisfied later, with the racist accusation that Palestinians do not respect agreements they sign.

My profound apologies to my son, Maher, and the others who were martyred for the Palestinian cause.


* The writer is a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and former PA minister.

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