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Al-Ahram Weekly 10 - 16 August 2000 Issue No. 494 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 10 - 16 August 2000 Issue No. 494
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Books Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons The ball is in our court
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
The issue of Jerusalem, laden as it is with deep spiritual significance for substantial segments of the international community, is too big for Arafat to handle alone. That is not to say the Palestinian leader should be divested of his prerogatives in this respect, only that the Muslim world in general and the Arabs in particular must assume part of the responsibility when it comes to a decision on the future status of the city. Indeed, since the failure of the Camp David summit, all Arafat's efforts have been directed at getting the Arabs and Muslims involved in helping him solve this most intractable problem in the way of a settlement.
Subtle changes in his recent political discourse reflect his need for support from those whom he considers his natural allies in the quest for a solution of the Jerusalem problem. No longer is he threatening to declare the creation of a Palestinian state on 13 September, with or without an agreement with the Israelis, but is now talking of a declaration of statehood "at the appropriate moment," and "after consulting with friendly states."
The response of "friendly" states has been disappointing to say the least. Some, like France, have stated their position clearly, by openly declaring themselves opposed to a unilateral declaration of statehood by the Palestinians. But the position of many "friendly" Arab and Islamic states remains obscure, not to say ambivalent. Most have chosen to watch and wait rather than come forward with constructive proposals that could help the Palestinians at this critical juncture.
Arafat is entitled to expect, at the very least, a collective Arab stand on Jerusalem. He may have hoped for a collective stand extending to include both Arab and Islamic states, or, better still, for one that included Arab, Islamic and Christian states, that is, all world forces opposed to the all-exclusive Judaization of the Holy City, but a united Arab stand was certainly within reach.
To that end, Arafat pinned his hopes on an Arab summit that would issue a statement reflecting the Arab position on Jerusalem, if not an extended summit of all Arab leaders then at least a limited summit between the leaders of the states directly involved in the peace process. But it is clear that even a limited summit is not on the cards, and that most Arab leaders are unwilling to translate their slogans into concrete action. Actually, when it comes to Jerusalem, the immediate protagonists themselves are unable to move beyond the stage of sloganeering, with the Israelis hypnotised by their mantra that "Jerusalem will forever remain united as Israel's eternal capital," and the various Palestinian factions insisting that "East Jerusalem is the capital of the Arab state of Palestine which will be proclaimed on 13 September, whether Israel likes it or not."
Arafat, for his part, has no choice but to deal with realistic scenarios in the awareness that his failure to come forward with concrete proposals will allow the Israelis to fill the gap with their own proposals which he will be forced to consider, however unacceptable they may be. As none of these proposals are likely to meet minimal Arab demands, the other Arab parties prefer to keep their distance from the entire process. Hence their reluctance to convene a summit meeting.
A notable exception is Egypt, the only Arab country that has so far been willing to shoulder its responsibilities on the issue of Jerusalem. That is why it is the object of a smear campaign in the American press. Amr Moussa was categorical in stating that Egypt had no intention of trying to persuade Arafat to make concessions over Jerusalem. "Are we supposed to pressure President Arafat to make concessions on Jerusalem? That is not our job. Concessions are needed from all parties within the framework of international legitimacy, not outside of it." Moussa added that the Palestinians have a right to an independent state and that the moment they declare an independent state, "we'll recognise it."
This should not be the stand of Egypt alone but the collective stand of all the Arab countries, which should convene a summit to announce their stand on Jerusalem to the world at large, as loudly and clearly as Pope John Paul II announced the stand of the Catholic church worldwide.
In my column last week, I suggested that one way out of the impasse would be to adopt the pope's proposal for the internationalisation of Jerusalem, if only for a transitional period pending a final agreement on the final status of the city. The internationalisation option has a great deal going for it. To begin with, it is based on solid legal grounds, namely, the UN resolution of 1947 to partition Palestine into separate, independent Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem maintained as an international zone under permanent UN trusteeship. While it is true that the partition plan was never implemented because the Arabs refused to recognise the creation of a Zionist state in their midst, it is also true that the idea of internationalising Jerusalem was never officially abandoned. Moreover, it has been given a new lease of life thanks to the pope's proposal, which clearly indicates that the internationalisation of the Holy City -- or at least of the holy sites within it -- still remains a viable option in the eyes of Catholic communities around the world.
True, both the Israelis and the Palestinians in the Camp David negotiations discarded the idea of internationalising Jerusalem. An Israeli foreign ministry spokesman declared that there is no room for a third party on the issue, and that the solution of the Jerusalem problem should be confined to the Camp David negotiators only. But this ignores the fact that there are other parties interested in the fate of Jerusalem, not only the pope but also the kings of Jordan and Morocco, to mention but a few.
More important still is the rule adopted in Camp David that all partial agreements reached become null and void if no overall agreement is achieved, which means that the inability to reach an agreement on Jerusalem necessarily undermines the whole Camp David undertaking. Indeed, no creative solution of the Palestinian problem can be expected in a matter of weeks after failure to resolve that problem over decades. That is why the adoption of the internationalisation proposal is so vital. It alone can guarantee the achievement of an overall agreement within the limited time frame available, even if a more perfect solution of the Jerusalem problem will need extra rounds of negotiations beyond the 13 September deadline. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that an agreement on the internationalisation of Jerusalem should be final. But it will have the advantage of rendering all partial agreements reached between the Israelis and the Palestinians final, thus opening the door for more satisfactory arrangements on Jerusalem in future, instead of having the whole camp David undertaking crumble.
It is clear, however, that Israel will not accept an agreement that delays, even for one minute, making Jerusalem its capital, and that it will vigorously oppose all internationalisation plans, even if temporary. Clinton's threat that he will relocate the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem if the Palestinians declare the creation of their state without previously obtaining Israel's consent is bound to complicate the situation still more. So what can the Arab parties do?
I believe there are at least two initiatives the Arab parties could consider: first, to consult with the pope over a common Christian-Muslim stand on Jerusalem that would establish a united front between all forces worldwide that are opposed to Israel's total hegemony over the Holy City. I think Egypt can play a central role in the promotion of such an initiative.
Second, I do not see how Arafat can adopt a stand in opposition to the internationalisation of Jerusalem that is similar to that of Israel. It is true that Arafat will have to postpone any announcement making East Jerusalem the capital of the Palestinian state, but such a proposal will also compel Israel to postpone making West (if not all) Jerusalem its capital. Moreover, Jerusalem is entirely in the hands of Israel with nothing that could stop it from making the announcement if it wished while the Palestinian state (and not only its capital) is yet to materialise.
I think these ideas deserve serious consideration if we want to see the negotiation process move forward instead of sinking into a total breakdown.
