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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 August 2000 Issue No. 495 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 August 2000 Issue No. 495
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Bigger, but better?
By Dominic ColdwellFederalism, wrote Montesquieu, combines the domestic advantages of a republican government with the external strength of a monarchy. To Eurosceptics across the Channel, however, the term has acquired the ring of a political expletive -- which is why Germany's Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer apologised tongue-in-cheek to Britons for using the slogan in a speech last May. Calling for the "full parliamentarisation of a European federation," Fischer proposed creating a bicameral European assembly with representatives for the lower house elected on a direct ballot -- much like the present members of the European Parliament (EP) -- and those for the upper house hailing from national legislatures. The Council of Ministers, the European Union's (EU) intergovernmental executive, or the Commission, the EU's administrative wing, could then evolve into a cabinet headed by a directly-elected president. To speed up the process, the 11 countries sharing Europe's single currency would form a "centre of gravity" federalising at a faster pace than the rest.
Not surprisingly, Britain, which remains outside the monetary union, has rejected the idea of a two-speed Europe for fear of being sidelined permanently. Italy also dreads marginalisation by a strong Franco-German axis.
The French response has been more ambiguous. A recent poll revealed that 59 per cent of Frenchmen are either entirely or reasonably sympathetic to Fischer's proposals. French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine has welcomed the suggestions of his German counterpart warmly. Not to be outdone, French President Jacques Chirac echoed Fischer's idea of a pioneer group of European states in a speech to the German Parliament a few weeks later. At the Franco-German summit of Rambouillet in May, both countries also agreed to wrap up a year-long conference on institutional reform of the EU by December's EU summit in Nice.
But while Berlin and Paris favour closer integration, the French government also sympathises with Britain's desire to save the nation-state from rabid German federalism. Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement, for one, has accused Fischer of wanting to re-establish the Holy Roman Empire under Teutonic tutelage. The government swiftly disowned the crudity, but Chirac no less explicitly dismissed Fischer's federal fantasies as a pipe dream. For all his pro-European speech-making, Chirac could hardly afford to let Berlin dominate discussions on Europe after France assumed the rotating presidency of the Council earlier this month.
Since then, Paris has used the intergovernmental Council to claw back political power from the supranational Commission. French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has already proposed turning the "Euro 11" -- an informal grouping of finance ministers from the countries in the monetary union -- into a council of the Union with wide-ranging economic authority over the euro-zone. As a result, the Commission would not only lose control over such fields as agricultural and regional policy, but also over taxation and the single market, to the member states.
Irrespective of these differences, France and Germany concur that the impending EU enlargement makes institutional reform inevitable. The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have all lined up to receive target dates for entry by 2001. Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia also began negotiations on the terms of accession in February 1999, with Turkey following suit last December.
This is not to say that there is wide-spread enthusiasm for expanding the EU. Germany and Austria particularly fear increased competition after Eastern Europe's accession to the Common Market. Rumour has it that the EU will defer the first date of entry from 2003 until 2005 or 2006. But to overcome the continent's Cold War divisions once and for all, there is no alternative to giving Eastern Europe a slice of the economic pie.
Nor do economic worries hold water. In a recent study, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) predicted a 3.5 per cent growth rate for the euro-zone this year -- the best figure in over a decade. What is more, unemployment across the continent has declined drastically. For the first time since 1991, joblessness in France has dropped below 10 per cent. In Spain, it also plunged below the chronic high of 20 per cent, settling at 14.9 per cent. And if one is to believe the rosy forecasts of economists at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, unemployment across the euro-zone could fall to 5.5 per cent by 2005.
The European economies therefore look well-prepared to meet the costs of enlargement. Of course, there will be problems in the short term. None of the applicants will have mastered all of the Union's Byzantine economic and industrial regulations by 2005, but then, neither have all the current member states. Nor will Eastern Europe's membership in the Common Market provide heavy competition for western Europe. Already, there is talk of restricting the free movement of labour and withholding agricultural subsidies until 10 years after the accession of the first Eastern European states. A majority of candidates already enjoy free trade with the Union in most manufactured goods. And although the applicants will struggle to meet EU standards, the effects of economic restructuring will be confined to their own borders.
A far more vexing issue, therefore, is hammering out the details of institutional reform ahead of enlargement. Existing requirements for unanimity on certain votes in the Council will be a recipe for political paralysis after the number of member states rises from 15 to 27.
The question of political representation is an even thornier issue. With re-unification in 1990, Germany's population rose from 60 million to 80 million. But since then Berlin has obtained no additional votes in the Council. As a result, 12 million Bavarians enjoy less influence on EU decisions than 429,000 Luxembourgers.
Recognising demographic realities, Italy has recently proposed to increase the vote of the biggest countries -- France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom -- from 10 to 33, while limiting the weight of the smallest to two.
Needless to say, smaller countries resist such plans tooth and nail. What matters to them is not so much putting together a qualified majority of 62 seats (out of 87), but cementing a blocking minority of 26 seats. So far, three big countries with 10 seats each can jointly veto any decision. The Mediterranean countries -- Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain -- however, have formed a no less formidable opposition with a total of 28 seats.
Reform of the Commission, which currently sports two representatives from each of the bigger countries and one from the rest, will be no easy task either. Since the number of portfolios cannot be divided further without bloating the EU bureaucracy, France has insisted on a ceiling of 20 commissioners. Big countries would sacrifice their second commissioner, while the smaller ones would have none for half of the time.
Spain insists that it will only accept losing a commissioner if it receives as many votes as the four big countries in the Council. And Spanish President José Mar’a Aznar is certainly a force to be reckoned with. In 1996, he defied predictions by former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that Madrid would fail to meet requirements for introducing the euro. At last year's EU summit in Berlin, he also imposed his wishes in discussions on the financial and social reform package of the Agenda 2000.
"It was already late at night, when [German Chancellor Gerhard] Schröder told me, 'Look, this is what's on the table,'" Aznar recalled in a recent interview, "And I said I would not agree to the proposals as they stood. Later on, in the small hours of the morning, Chirac said, 'So you still disagree. What do you propose to do?', I told him, 'I will light a cigar and then I will smoke it slowly.'" At 5.00am, he dumped the stub in the ashtray, having obtained the modifications he wanted.
This time, however, Aznar will run into stiff resistance from the likes of Schröder -- himself an aficionado of the choicest Cuban Cohibas. Increasing Madrid's weight in the Council would give Poland -- with a population roughly the size of Spain -- an equal number of seats and threaten to dilute the clout of the other big countries.
As Europe's politicians smoke out the technicalities of eastward expansion, there is a danger that institutional reform will exacerbate the wide-spread political apathy toward the EU. Two months ahead of a national referendum on Europe's single currency, a survey revealed that 50 per cent of Danes are opposed to their country's entry into monetary union. Sixty-nine per cent of Britons also reject the euro, while 34 per cent favour a full withdrawal from the EU. One year before the next general elections, Prime Minister Tony Blair has stressed that his government would only introduce the single currency following approval in a national referendum. Both Robin Cook, the foreign secretary, and Peter Mandelson, the chief minister for Northern Ireland, have recently backtracked on their support for British entry into monetary union.
Current attempts to increase the EU's efficiency by replacing requirements for unanimity with more qualified majority voting could easily boomerang, should a sizeable minority of Europeans no longer feel represented by Brussels. Nor is a reform of voting rights in the Council necessarily a panacea. While a qualified majority still represented 70 per cent of EU citizens in 1973, today it only accounts for 58 per cent. After enlargement, the figure could plummet well below 47 per cent. And so might Europhoria.
