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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 August 2000 Issue No. 495 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 August 2000 Issue No. 495
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters A case of histrionics
By Abdel-Moneim Said *
Thomas Friedman's article, "The Egypt Game", which appeared in the New York Times on 1 August, stirred angry criticism in the Egyptian press against the author and against US policy in the Middle East. The article soon caught the attention of the Arab press, which described it as part of a US media assault against Egypt and referred to the exchange of fire between US and Egyptian newspapers as a "crisis" in Egyptian-US relations.
The arrest of Saadeddin Ibrahim, a professor of sociology at the American University in Cairo and head of the Ibn Khaldun Centre for Developmental Studies, on 30 June and his release ten days after Friedman's article appeared seemed only to fuel the flames between Cairo and Washington. The issue at stake appeared to be how much pressure the US could exert on Egypt and Egypt's capacity to resist that pressure.
Yet even as such shrill terms as "campaign", "crisis", "confrontation" and "pressure" were being bandied about, a number of other developments pointed clearly to how solid all dimensions of Egyptian-US relations actually are. Testifying to the health of our mutual economic relations was a letter sent by 26 prominent US senators to President Clinton urging him to begin negotiations with Egypt over the creation of a free trade zone. The closeness of bilateral political relations was reaffirmed when Edward Walker, under secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, initiated his drive to persuade Arab countries to discuss the results of the Camp David summit in Cairo, which he referred to as a fundamental partner in the peace process. Attesting to the strategic dimension of Egyptian-US relations was the recent visit to Cairo undertaken by the Commander of US Central Forces, to begin preparations for the Bright Star manoeuvres scheduled to take place in 15 months.
The considerable, and increasingly visible discrepancy between how commentators portray Egyptian-US relations and the reality of these relations requires some explanation. Since they resumed following the October 1973 War, Egyptian-US relations have strengthened to the extent that they have been described as "strategic," "special," and, on occasion, as an "alliance." This tightly knit partnership has manifested itself in the peace process, in the build up and participation in the defence of the security of the Gulf, and in a lengthy list of activities related to the preservation of security and stability in the Middle East and the world. It has also manifested itself in the realm of economic cooperation, in the forms of aid, commerce and investment.
Nevertheless, it seems that a full six months cannot go by without some sort of "crisis" erupting, developing into a battle in the press, and on occasion escalating into a locking of horns between the respective leaderships of the two countries. Within less than a year, three "crises" of this nature surfaced. The first concerned the US stance towards the Egyptian NGO law, the second involved the altercation over the crash of the EgyptAir Flight 990 from New York to Cairo and the third, and most recent, occurred in the wake of the aborted Camp David summit.
An examination of these crises as they unfolded over the past quarter of a century suggests that they conform to a pattern. Generally they involve a disagreement over a position Egypt has adopted with regard to the peace process, the security of the Gulf, stability in the Middle East or the internal situation in Egypt. The US opens with expressions of concern over the Egyptian position, issued in statements by White House or Secretary of State spokesmen. Soon afterwards, the New York Times or Washington Post come out with articles criticising the Egyptian position, attributing it to domestic factors pertaining to the political regime or to foreign policy factors related to Egypt's fear of losing its regional position. Suddenly there appears a study produced by one of Washington's many research centres, suggesting that Egypt is in the throes of a fundamental change that threatens to revive the Nasserist spirit of the sixties or that the Nasserist lobby is acquiring an increasing influence in decision-making circles in Egypt. Then, some sub-committee from the many Senate or House of Representatives committees holds a session to deliberate on the Egyptian situation. The lengthy discussions, in which Egypt is the butt of extensive criticism, are broadcast widely and always, at some point, some senator or representative is bound to step in to remind everyone of how much financial aid the US gives to Egypt.
The reaction in Egypt follows a different pattern. Generally, an official statement is issued, usually by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reaffirming Egypt's sovereign rights and denouncing all attempts to intervene in Egypt's domestic affairs. Immediately afterwards the national press enters the fray with extensive space given over to attacking US hegemony and the influence of the Zionist lobby on the US administration, rendering it a toy in Israeli hands. Quickly, the opposition press seizes the opportunity to deliver a broadside against the nature of American imperialism, and soon the other parties, certain political groupings and, perhaps, the Peoples Assembly, step on board to rant against US double standards. Before you know it, all opinion pundits are claiming that the issue at heart has its origins in the Americans' extermination of the Indians, which has transformed itself today into the desire to exterminate the Arabs, since the concept of "genocide" is latent in American culture. Then, everyone begins to clamor for an Arab summit in order to take serious and immediate steps towards establishing an Arab Common Market. At this juncture, the Arab press and, nowadays, Arab satellite stations, make their appearance in the form of earnest discussions over "the crux of the crisis" in Egyptian-US relations and ask whether the crisis has reached the point of no return.
Generally, the American and Egyptian scenarios play themselves out within the space of two weeks. There have been, perhaps, two exceptions to the general rule, involving, firstly, the Achile Lauro incident and, secondly, the controversy over extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Apart from these two occasions, however, the "confrontations" were quickly smoothed over by a phone call between the presidents of the two countries, by an official visit to one of the two capitals, or by an important development affecting US interests and demanding close consultations between the two sides. Then, the verbal guns fall silent. Meanwhile, US-Egyptian relations have continued to advance to higher and more extensive levels of cooperation in the various political, strategic and economic domains, leaving these relations far closer than many of the countries' other bilateral ties.
There have been numerous attempts to explain the regular outbursts of anger and dismay in this otherwise strong and steady relationship. Some argue that such disputes are simply a natural feature in the relations of any two nations whose interests and policies do not fully overlap. Even the unique relations between the US and Great Britain have had their moments of tension, as have Egyptian-Arab relations, they say.
Others take this argument a step further to contend that the political differences emanate from their respective standings in international politics. The US, they say, is a superpower and Egypt is a regional power, with all the diverse geopolitical and strategic considerations their respective standings entail. The US is a wealthy, capitalist, heavily industrialised and technologically advanced nation, whereas Egypt belongs to the developing world and is still making the transformation to a market economy, which arouses many sensitivities and differing expectations. The US has a democratic government regulating a complex array of divergent interests in a highly heterogeneous society. Egypt, by contrast, is still in the process of democratic transformation in a relatively homogeneous society, a difference that affects the speed and methods of responding to change. The political culture in Washington is that of a modern nation with little historical accretion, unlike Egypt in which ancient historical legacy and identity are closely intertwined. Because of such cultural differences, the two sides may frequently speak on different wavelengths, which in turn is conducive to misunderstanding.
Finally, a third body of opinion attributes all the angry gales to Israel, the invisible if ever present barometer in Egyptian-US relations. According to this argument, the source of differences between the US and Egypt resides outside the immediate scope of their bilateral relations and in the differences between Egypt and Israel.
All these explanations have some validity and, perhaps, account for one or more aspects of the periodic flare-ups in US-Egyptian relations. However, together they are still insufficient as an explanation. Diverging opinions between nations do not necessarily grow as heated as they have in US-Egyptian relations, but are kept in check through various political and diplomatic mechanisms. Rarely, for example, have US-Indian relations, which have been quite tense until recently, experienced such flare-ups. Nor is it the case that disparities in international standing, levels of development or political culture, which happens to be the rule rather than the exception in international relationships, are inherently conducive to bouts of temper. Rarely have Washington's relations with Jakarta, Paris or Morocco experienced the histrionics we have seen in US-Egyptian relations. Finally, in spite of the importance of the Israeli factor in US-Egyptian relations, we have not found the US-Egyptian pattern repeating itself in US-Saudi relations, for example, in spite of the fact that Saudi Arabia's stance towards Israel is very similar to that of Egypt.
Naturally, every bilateral international relationship, like any relationship between two people, is unique and cannot necessarily serve as a standard by which to judge other relationships. However, it seems that the missing link in US-Egyptian relations is that neither of the countries' political elites has dedicated sufficient effort to comprehending in what ways these relations are unique, the result being an almost spontaneous reversion to a cold war mindset for the US and to an anti-colonialist gut reaction from Egypt. Frequently, many on both sides do not have sufficient information about what is actually taking place in the relationship.
Thomas Friedman, for example, does not know how much aid his country has given Egypt. He mentions $30 billion, a figure $7 billion higher than the actual amount. In addition, in spite of his considerable knowledge of the Middle East, he seems almost spitefully determined to refuse to acknowledge the political plurality, open press and autonomy of the courts in Egypt with regard to the case involving Dr Saadeddin Ibrahim. For Egypt's part, describing "The Egypt Game" as a "media campaign" against Egypt is nothing short of a gross overstatement, even if we add the articles by Hoagland, Saphire and the New York Times editorial on the subject. The US media machine is far bigger than this handful of individuals. Then, too, to totally ignore everything that occurred a week before and after Friedman's article makes it seem as though one or two US editorials about a country as important and influential as Egypt are sufficient to so inflame passions as to cause us to lose sight of the reality that governs bilateral relations.
In addition, neither side has made sufficient attempts to study the history, political system and sensitivities of the other. While the US has a number of scholars who have studied Egypt, they are few compared to the number of specialists on Turkey, India or even Nigeria. In Egypt, there is not a single book in Arabic devoted in its entirety to a study of the American political system. The first doctorate thesis on the US Congress had its viva at the University of Cairo only a month ago, more than a quarter of a century after the US and Egypt resumed diplomatic relations.
In short, there is an enormous gap in knowledge about the other. The strategic dialogue sessions between the US and Egyptian foreign ministers have sought to overcome this gap in matters pertaining to bureaucratic red tape in Egypt and the US. However, the political and intellectual elite in both countries are not engaged in such a dialogue and, as long as this continues, each side will continue to believe that it gives more than it takes, however much that notion flies in the face of all norms of international relations. As long as the missing link remains missing, the Thomas Friedman affair will not be the last of its sort.
* The writer is the director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
