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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 August 2000 Issue No. 495 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly 17 - 23 August 2000 Issue No. 495
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Features Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The art of illusion
By Salama Ahmed Salama
When I left Cairo for my annual vacation a few weeks ago summer temperatures were soaring, both literally and in terms of the political situation. Yet when I returned several days ago, a situation that had seemed on the point of overheating had cooled considerably. The weather had become a little milder and, though all the factors that might lead to a reignition remained present, the political temperature had nonetheless cooled.
When I left the eyes of the world were turned to Washington, to the Camp David II summit. For the American president, around whose term of office unprecedented storms have raged, this was a final chance to secure an historic achievement, to establish himself as an adroit politician and in doing so underwrite his future as grandee of the political establishment. To this end, the American administration has donned all the diplomatic armoury, utilised all the space for political manoeuvering, at its command, carefully positioning Barak and Arafat with the intention of extracting from the latter the few, impossible concessions he has yet to make. These were to be Clinton's parting gift to Israel and to the next Democratic candidate for the presidency, Al Gore. In this way Clinton hoped to compensate the Democrats for the harm he had caused them through the scandals surrounding his personal life, and to guarantee that his deputy would be elected president.
In the European capitals through which I passed hopes for the success of Camp David II were not high; most, in fact, expected failure. And over at the presidential retreat Clinton -- at one point patting Arafat's shoulder, at another reclining next to Barak -- looked like the popular American magician David Copperfield, a man who has excelled in the art of illusion. Any minute now, it seemed, Clinton would dip his hand into a top hat and nonchalantly produce not a rabbit, but the ultimate solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet all the early evidence was consistent, clearly suggesting that, for as long as he was playing so eagerly on Barak's side, the desired progress would remain impossible.
For reasons that seem incomprehensible, Clinton repeated, with Arafat, the mistake he had made with the late Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad, when he lured him on to Geneva on the pretext that he had convincing answers to resolving the question of the Golan Heights, whereas in fact he was simply talking in Israel's name and expressing the Israeli point of view. The same scenario took place throughout Camp David II: and even with the slight variations in time, venue, circumstances and issues it was almost impossible to avoid a sense of déjà vu.
And just as the outcome of Geneva was a collapse in negotiations concerning the Golan Heights, Clinton's ambitions for Camp David were similarly deflated. Rather than securing his place in history, the aftermath of Camp David II has called into question the trustworthiness of President Clinton. And after the American administration turned, in its rage and frustration, on Egypt, launching a silly and thoroughly unjustified attack on Cairo for the support it has given to Palestinian, Arab and Muslim rights, it becomes a moot point whether or not anyone will feel that they can trust Bill Clinton again.
The rights in support of which Egyptian support has been so resolute, it should also be added, arise from historical conditions that neither Barak, nor Clinton, nor anybody else for that matter, can pretend to ignore if they are, in good faith, seeking to resolve the problems that have grown out of their denial.
