Al-Ahram Weekly
17 - 23 August 2000
Issue No. 495
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 Issues navigation Current Issue Previous Issue Back Issues

 
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Questions of justice and expediency

By Sherine Bahaa

Ashrawi, most recently in the public eye as spokeswoman and negotiator for the Palestinian team at Camp David II, has long struggled for the Palestinian cause. A former minister of education for the Palestinian Authority, and currently a human rights activist in Ramallah, Ashrawi emphasised the need for "internal empowerment" in Palestine as Arafat continues to work for the rights of his people in an international arena that she characterised as putting expediency before justice.

What is your assessment of the international reaction to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's world tour during the last 25 days?

Since the failure of Camp David, most Arab countries have adopted a "spectator" position, a sort of "wait-and-see" stance. Other [Arab] countries have tried to exert pressure on the Palestinians or tried to justify or explain the American position, while a few others have been supportive of the Palestinian position.

Unfortunately the Europeans -- even though they issued the Berlin Declaration [in support of the declaration of a Palestinian state] have used the utmost persuasion to try to get a postponement of the declaration of a state -- and are now asking for a further delay, saying they cannot recognise the state given the current situation. For them a state should be a result of an agreement.

It is thus clear that intensive American diplomatic pressure, threats and inducements are actually working in a way which is adverse to the realisation of Palestinian rights and which undermine the peace process.

Some observers claim Arafat gave an inaccurate version of the negotiations process at Camp David, and this is why world leaders were reluctant to help. What are your views on this matter?

The Palestinian presentation of events at Camp David was entirely consistent. The problem was that from the very beginning, there were constant attempts to blame the Palestinians.

Added to this, they were pressured to accept the Israeli version of the permanent status issues, that is, to adopt a position that would in fact be in violation of international law. Both the Israelis and the Americans want an agreement that would violate international law and negate UN resolutions. Such an agreement would undermine Palestinian rights. This is dangerous because it means that the ground is being prepared for future conflict.

What we need is a peace process and an agreement that take into account the scope of peace -- a long term peace -- not a short term accommodation of immediate pressures.

What exactly has Arafat asked of the countries he visited?

Each country has a different role. For example Russia is a co-sponsor [of the peace process]; it is still officially and legally a co-sponsor. So Arafat briefed the Russian president on what happened at Camp David and to see what the Palestinians and Russians might do jointly. In fact, he wanted to activate the Russian role in the peace process because it is a sponsor in name, but absent in effect, while the process has been monopolised by the Americans for a long time.

For Iran, the issue is clearly Jerusalem and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference [Iran is the current president of the OIC]. Iran is concerned that Jerusalem is not viewed as solely a bilateral issue and that the Israelis realise they cannot annex parts of East Jerusalem, try to fragment the city or maintain exclusive sovereignty over it.

In this regard, we do need the input and the positions of Arabs, and Muslims and Christians throughout the world who claim Jerusalem as central and focal point [of their religions].

The failure of the tour, it would seem, came as no surprise to Arafat. The outcome could be guessed following his first stop in France, from which there was not a single public statement, so why did he continue?

I think President Arafat owes people who have been supportive, and are interested; those who have invested in the peace process through direct contact with him, to get his assessment of events and to understand the Palestinian point of view on the requirements for a just peace.

So it is not a formal, symbolic gesture, it is a question of getting people engaged in the process and giving them a first hand account of what's happening.

After the failure of Arafat's last ditch effort to drum up support for his people, do the Palestinians have any more cards to play?

We have to work more on internal empowerment. This is absolutely essential. We have to hold elections for a legislature and the presidency. We have to adopt a constitution, we have to upgrade [diplomatic] relations, we have to build institutions.

This work is absolutely crucial. Even now our main card is that we are able to say "No" because there is a Palestinian public opinion, there is an Arab public opinion and there is a global public opinion. These [public opinions] are in favour of a Palestinian state and they are also in favour of international legitimacy.

Israeli and the American electoral considerations were used to bring pressure to bear on the Palestinians. Why can't the Palestinians play the same card?

We also have elections, and although we have a national consensus, we also have an active opposition. However, you cannot self-negate or self-destruct [by granting major concessions] in order to cater to the Barak coalition especially regarding issues that are crucial for domestic stability [ie, statehood, Jerusalem, the return of refugees] and we are working on these.

We had elections in January 1996 and we should have another round soon. Although there is political pluralism -- different voices and different parties in Palestine -- we do have a minimal national consensus that is against even the slightest undermining of Palestinian rights and international law.

Why, in your own point of view, did this tour fail?

I believe that there are certain countries that give a high priority to American advice and even American instructions. At the same time, the US always uses the carrot and the stick. Right now decision-making in the US is motivated by domestic issues and the goal of saving Barak's coalition and political career.

Both the US domestic situation and Barak's future have been linked to the peace process. So, [for the US] it is not a question of justice and legality, it is the question of expediency; of exploiting any relationship they have with any regime in the area as well as any kind of relationship they have with the Europeans.


Related stories:
Back to the wall 10 - 16 August 2000
No deal is a good deal 3 - 9 August 2000
Staying put, for now 3 - 9 August 2000

 

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