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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 28 Sep. - 4 Oct. 2000 Issue No. 501 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 28 Sep. - 4 Oct. 2000 Issue No. 501
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Elections Region International Economy Opinion Culture Special Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Breakdown or breakthrough?
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
If there is one certainty in the erratic course of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, it is that if no breakthrough is achieved in the coming weeks the entire process will be placed on the back burner for a long time to come. The sense of urgency is not lost on the protagonists, who are only too well aware that President Clinton's ability to affect developments in the Middle East will be considerably diminished once his successor is elected next November.
A few days ago, the International Herald Tribune published an optimistic article by Norwegian foreign Minister Thorbjorn Jagland entitled "However hard the road, Middle East peace is still in sight." According to Mr Jagland, influential parties on the world scene believe that the extensive efforts furnished to reach a settlement cannot be allowed to go to waste. The gains already made can be built on, and the protagonists must be made to realise that any deal, whatever the sacrifices it entails and the costs it exacts, is better than no deal at all. Unless a forward momentum is sustained, the situation could disintegrate to the detriment of all concerned.
Despite its failure, the Camp David summit succeeded in breaking taboos that had for long prevented any real discussion of a number of thorny issues. In a last-ditch attempt to breathe new life into the process, the Clinton administration has come forward with a working paper that seeks to reconcile Israeli and Palestinian views on these issues.
Although the situation has never seemed bleaker, the fact that the parties are still betting on Clinton's ability to intervene energetically and that they realise they cannot afford to let this last chance slip through their fingers, the possibility of a dramatic breakthrough in the coming weeks cannot be discounted altogether.
In this context, it is no accident that Newsweek should suddenly "remember" a document that was the fruit of arduous negotiations between Yossi Beilin (a close associate of Rabin's) and Abu Mazen. Entitled "Framework for the conclusion of a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation," the document appeared on 31 October 1995. It is true that Rabin, who was assassinated four days later, never had the opportunity to approve it, or even to study it closely. It is also true that Abu Mazen is now downplaying the importance of the document, which was never endorsed by the PLO, dismissing it as nothing more than an "intellectual exercise," the brainchild of teams of academics drawn from the two sides. Nevertheless, it is rumoured that the American working paper used some of the recommendations of the document -- which proposed solutions to some of the thorniest issues in dispute -- to overcome the stumbling blocks that prevented a breakthrough at Camp David, notably, the issue of Jerusalem.
It is clear that the Camp David formula does not work for Jerusalem which, unlike the other points of contention, is of concern not only to Palestinians and Israelis, but to Muslims, Christians and Jews worldwide. A satisfactory resolution of the problem can not be left to a triumvirate of leaders. On the other hand, the participation of extra parties might further complicate the negotiations -- or perhaps, by expanding the scope of responsibility, make them less laborious.
Article 1 of the Beilin-Abu Mazen document stipulates that "the Government of Israel shall extend its recognition of the independent State of Palestine within agreed and secure borders with its capital al-Quds upon its coming into being," and "simultaneously, the State of Palestine shall extend its recognition to the State of Israel within agreed and secure borders with its capital Yerushalayim."
The document tackles the issue of Jerusalem in a manner which, though not comprehensive, is definitely more ambitious than any approach used so far. it declares that "Jerusalem shall remain an open and undivided city with free and unimpeded access for people of all faiths and nationalities," to be run by one municipality, in the form of a "Joint Higher Municipal Authority." Within the "City of Jerusalem," both parties recognise the Western part of the city to be "Yerushalayim" and the Arab Eastern part of the city, under Palestinian sovereignty, to be "Al-Quds." As to the Old City Area, the parties agree to grant this area a "special status." The document recommends that the Palestinian state "shall have extra-territorial sovereignty over the Haram-Al-Sharif under the administration of the Al-Quds Awqaf, and a similar arrangement was suggested for the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. In case of dispute over matters related to the Old City Area, the issue shall be referred for a decision at a Joint Parity Committee, whose prerogatives are not clearly defined.
On the other thorny issue of Palestinian refugees, the document asserts that "whereas the Palestinian side considers that the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes is enshrined in international law and natural justice, it recognises that the prerequisites of the new era of peace and coexistence, as well as the realities that have been created on the ground since 1948 have rendered the implementation of this right impracticable. The Palestinian side thus declares its readiness to accept and implement policies and measures that will ensure, insofar as this is possible, the welfare and well-being of these refugees." At the same time, however, the document states that "the Israeli side acknowledges the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the war of 1947-1949; it further acknowledges the Palestinian refugees' right of return to the Palestinian state and their right to compensation and rehabilitation for moral and material losses." The document further states that "the parties agree on the establishment of an International Commission for the Palestinian Refugees (ICPR)..." and "welcome the intention of the Government of Sweden to lead the ICPR and to contribute financially to its activities." In other words, the Palestinians recognise that the refugees' right of return is "impractical" and accept as de facto that they would not be allowed back to Israel proper.
It is worth noting that Rabin's name is invoked whenever negotiations hit a particularly bumpy patch, whether on the Palestinian track, with the Beilin-Abu Mazen document, or the Syrian track where much has been made of the so-called "Rabin deposit." In this document, which is said to be in the hands of President Clinton, Rabin approved an Israeli pullout from the Golan up to the 4 June 1967 borders. Although Rabin did not authorise its disclosure before his death, it has found its way into the culture of the negotiations, much as the also unofficial Beilin-Abu Mazen document has done.
Rabin has become a frame of reference because he is seen as embodying both Israel's past and its future. As the arrogant general who had no qualms about breaking the bones of the Intifada children, he is very much a part of Israel's past. But he has also come to symbolise its future, if only by the manner of his death. The fact that he was assassinated not by an Arab but by a Jewish fanatic opposed to peace has made him a martyr to the cause of peace in the eyes of those Israelis who see peace with their Arab neighbours as a prerequisite for their future survival in the region..
Indeed, not only key figures but key words are acquiring new connotations. For example, Arafat's decision not to make a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood on 13 September need not necessarily be seen as a negative development. It can of course be read as a volte face under pressure, but it can also be seen as an affirmation of statehood, in the sense that if the Palestinian state is not yet recognised by Israel, it is to one extent or another "recognised" by the rest of the world. At Camp David, Arafat dealt with the president of the most powerful state on earth on an equal footing, proving that even if Palestine is not yet fully-fledged state, the Palestinian Authority is, without doubt, the embryo of a state in the making.
The new connotations acquired by key words makes the task of moving forward particularly difficult at this stage. Which documents are regarded as frames of reference and which should just be seen as test balloons? How to explain that on the face of it the situation is completely static, when in actual fact there is a great deal of activity going on behind the scenes?
Everything points to the likelihood that the next few weeks will witness enormous efforts to come up with a framework for a final status agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, including, of course, the issue of Jerusalem. Here I would like to emphasise that the internationalisation option that I upheld in previous articles can only be valid if it is extended to the entire city, that is, to the Jewish West as well as the Arab East sectors of Jerusalem. With the changes now occurring in the connotations of words, this needs to be underlined, because we are not talking of a recipe to pave the way for the internationalisation of East Jerusalem alone, or more specifically, of the Old City Area alone, which is part and parcel of Arab Jerusalem. This would mean that Israel will relinquish sovereignty over the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, while also depriving the Arab parties of sovereignty over Al-Quds -- an unacceptable proposition that will not further the cause of peace.
