Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 12 - 18 October 2000 Issue No. 503
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875

	Egypt Elections Palestine International Economy Opinion Culture Books Interview Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters

The call of the poll

By Omayma Abdel-Latif

Until the last minute, Sheikh Mohamed Ali Suleiman was hopeful that the government would allow him to contest the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

A devout member of the Salafi group and co-founder of the embryonic Shari'a party, a group that brought together former Jihad and Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya members, the 45-year-old sheikh is the only candidate of the militant-turned-moderate Islamist trend. He wanted to run as an independent in Giza's Imbaba constituency, a one-time hotbed of Islamist militants in the 1990s. To do this, the sheikh had to break ranks with his own "party," which had decided to boycott the elections, and he also acted against a fatwa (religious ruling) issued by Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Al-Gama'a's spiritual leader, who prohibited his followers from contesting the elections.

The decision, said Suleiman, was not an easy one. "I belong to the salafiyun who have always believed in the necessity peaceful change. Prior to taking any action, I consulted with many people, including Montasser El-Zayat, Al-Gama'a lawyer, who blessed my move," Sheikh Suleiman told the Weekly. But it was not smooth sailing for Suleiman, who is a former head of Al-Gamaeyia Al-Shar'eya, one of the oldest Islamic civil society institutions. When he went to register as an independent candidate, he was classified in a different category from what he had requested.

"The authorities knew very well that I would not run as a fi'at [professional]. I described myself in my nomination request as ommal [worker] but the police officer decided to register me as fi'at to discourage me from contesting the elections, because authorities know that the fi'at are very powerful in Imbaba and that they are all my friends and I would not run against my friends," said Suleiman.

"I did not have high hopes of winning; I only wanted to act within the system and be accepted by the state, even if I had a different view and different background from theirs," added Suleiman.

To be able to function within the system is precisely what the Islamists have been seeking for the past few years after they emerged from the turbulent 1990s with the strategic decision to cease acts of violence against the state. Yet, unlike the banned Muslim Brotherhood whose candidates are contesting the elections individually, the three embryonic "parties" of Al-Wassat (centre), Al-Shari'a and Al-Islah (reform), which represent both centrist Islamists and former members of Al-Jihad and Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya, are simply not running. The three groups had applied for political party licences but were turned down.

Until recently, there were signs that the former members of the Jihad and Al-Gama'a, who represent a quasi-moderate trend within the group in their quest for reconciliation with the government, were intent on testing their new image and their ability to function within the system.

In the offices of these "parties," there is hardly any talk of electoral plans, no lists of candidates being discussed, no banners carrying the all-too-common "Islam is the solution" slogan or any other slogan invoking Islamist symbols and political jargon.

The decision by these groups not to contest the elections came as a surprise to many of those observers who had anticipated the emergence of what one academic described as a "neo-Islamist" force representing an alternative view of politics.

Despite their absence, however, the overall Islamist trend, with the Brotherhood and the frozen Labour Party fielding independent candidates, "has a strong presence although they are hemmed in by the threats of the Interior Ministry and its planned clampdowns on the eve of the elections," prominent columnist Salama Ahmed Salama wrote in Al-Ahram.

The last two years had proved crucial in the transformation undergone by the militant groups, which previously resorted to acts of violence against the state. These groups came up with a strategic decision, which was described by many as a fundamental shift in their ideology. The declaration of the cessation of acts of violence against the state was followed, almost immediately, by movement towards non-violent political action through the establishment of political parties.

The state, however, continued to uphold its rejection of religion-based political parties. The reformed militants fared no better in their attempt to establish a legal political presence than that made by the Brotherhood's breakaway group, Al-Wassat. All three "parties" were denied the licences necessary to operate as legally accepted political entities. Their status, if any, remains on hold until further notice.

In assessing the political clout of the new Islamist groups, Salah Eissa, a prominent leftist writer and chief editor of Al-Qahira newspaper, believes that the most serious challenge facing these groups was not the renunciation of violence but the ability to successfully interact with the social and political systems of which they seek to be part. "These groups should be judged in terms of their seriousness and effectiveness in addressing the issues of political participation, identity and legitimacy as well as those of order and stability," said Eissa.

The elections, therefore, could have provided them with the opportunity needed to test their ability to integrate and deal with mainstream politics. However, they chose to abstain from contesting the elections and there seemed to be a consensus among the heads of the three unlicensed Islamist parties on the reasons for doing so. For lawyer Mamdouh Ismail, founder of the Shari'a, and writer Gamal Sultan, co-founder of Al-Islah, "security harassment as well as the very limited margin of freedom that the system allows the Islamists" were the reasons. "If our existence as a legal political party is rejected by the state, how will they accept us as candidates and rivals in the election battle?" asked Sultan.

To lend credence to their fears of a confrontation with security authorities, they cite the situation in which the Brotherhood found itself as a strong indication of the kind of fate that would have befallen them, had they decided to run for election. One of their members told the Weekly that when rumours spread in his constituency that he was running for election, he received a blatant warning from "a security source" to refrain from doing so.

"The state continues to view the Islamist opposition as outsiders. The fact that they are Islamist is equivalent to being against the system, the authority and the state," said Ismail.

But is the abstention from participating in the country's most important political event a tactic for building bridges with the state, a kind of confidence-building measure that would open the way for being politically accommodated by the system? "For the time being, we try to abstain from any act that would provoke the state. We want to prove our good intentions. We want to say that we are willing to play by the rules," Sultan told the Weekly.

Sultan cited other important factors that forced them to stay away, such as the lack of financial resources and time constraints. However, the inability to fashion an electoral programme that would appeal to voters is not one of the reasons since "the easiest thing is to author an electoral programme, particularly a programme invoking Islamic metaphors and symbols."

Another reason which the Islamists refrained from discussing was whether the abstention from contesting the elections was a reflection of a doctrinal commitment. The fatwa of Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman ordering his followers to refrain from participating in any political activity, including elections, lends credence to the view that this was a reason.

In a pamphlet titled A review of the documents of the Islamist movement in Egypt, which explains Islah's ideological orientation, Sultan suggests that Islamists should not attach great importance to parliamentary elections. He argues that Islamists "should understand that the game is well-planned and controlled."

Montasser El-Zayat, the Gama'a lawyer, describes any political participation, let alone in a grand event such as parliamentary elections, as sinful. "We are committed to the fatwa of Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, because even if Islamists were to be voted into the Assembly, they would still be a minority and they might find themselves in a position where they have to participate in passing laws that might contradict the Shari'a," El-Zayat told the Weekly.

El-Zayat's view exposes an unpublicised rift within the ranks of Islamists, with some willing to be part of the system and others determined to shun the current political order. Sultan and Ismail also admit to the fact that some radical rank-and-file elements within their groups were opposed to any participation.

However, El-Zayat was quick to deny that his position was a reflection of the radicalism that was embraced by the groups during their fighting years against the state. "There is no turning back to violence. We have renounced violence once and for all. All we need now is for the state to open up to us. They don't seem to be doing so or even willing to do so in the coming period," he said.

And yet, some analysts believe that during the last two years the Islamists have had the first opportunity since the 1980s to have an open presence in public life.

Therefore, according to one observer, the decision of these groups not to contest the elections represents a symbolic victory by the state over them. "The state wants to keep these elements from engaging in any political activity, let alone in parliamentary elections. And the repressive policies against them in the 1990s have produced a generation which seeks to avoid any confrontation with the state," Seif Abdel-Fattah, a political science professor, told the Weekly.

In the absence of licences, how do Sultan and Ismail perceive the political prospects of their groups in the years to come? "The state will not give me a party, but if a party like Al-Islah has the support of 4,000 followers then I can join any party. The Wafd always had a leftist wing championed by Abdel-Halim Mandour, why not an Islamist wing as well? We can even join the NDP," said Sultan.

He believes, though, that the real challenge ahead is an internal one. "The Islamists have to define their priorities; is it politics through which they seek reform or do they seek social and religious reform as such? Presence as a political entity does not have to be through a political party. One of the important traits of any political force is its ability to mobilise the masses. I believe the Islamists have the tools and the ideology that can mobilise the masses and this in itself is proof of their existence as a political force," added Sultan.

THE TRANSFORMATION: For many observers of Islamist groups, current conditions are largely different from the 1995 situation. The last parliamentary elections were held while the sound of guns was still resounding in Upper Egypt. The state, on the one hand, and both the Al-Gama'a and Jihad, on the other, were engaged in an fierce war. Bloody confrontation in some Upper Egyptian villages was the order of the day. But then came what Diaa Rashwan, a senior researcher with the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, describes as "a most profound transformation." It was not only an intellectual transformation but also one that involved the very nature and strategy of these groups. The most important sign of this transformation was the fact that the groups presented themselves for the first time as political actors that seek to gain legality within the same framework of the state against which they had been fighting for the previous three decades.

Some date the emergence of this new Islamist orientation at January 1996 when Abul-Ela Madi, then a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, broke ranks to seek to establish, along with some other former Brotherhood members, a party by the name of Al-Wassat. The mass defection triggered the wrath of Brotherhood, and yet it marked the first time that a political movement with an Islamist platform had sought legality from the state and applied for a licence for a political party. This was topped, on 5 July 1998, by a number of Al-Gama'a founders calling for an end to all acts of violence against the state. On 22 October of the same year, Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the group's spiritual leader, gave his blessings to the cease-fire declaration. And it was supported afterwards by 10 founding members of Jihad, serving jail terms since 1981.

To many analysts, this declaration marked a clear qualitative transformation of the Al-Gama'a from a militant Islamist group to what they described as a political group with an Islamic ideological platform.

In June 1999, Mamdouh Ismail, a lawyer for Jihad, applied for a licence to establish Al-Shari'a Party. His request was turned down twice. Two months later, Kamal Habib, one of the main ideologues of Jihad, and Gamal Sultan, a writer on Islamic affairs, applied for a licence to establish Al-Islah party. Their request was also turned down.

---

Related stories:
The Brothers' last sigh? 5 - 11 October 2000
Islamists come into the fold of civil society 20 - 26 April 2000
The limits of tolerance 25 Nov. - 1 Dec. 1999
The application is the message 14 - 20 October 1999
Centre II turned down 24-30 September 1998
'Wassat' by any other name... 14 - 20 May 1998
Navigating a centrist course 7 - 13 May, 1998
See Elections 2000, The 1995 Elections

	weeklyweb@ahram.org.eg