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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 12 - 18 October 2000 Issue No. 503 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 12 - 18 October 2000 Issue No. 503
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Elections Palestine International Economy Opinion Culture Books Interview Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Stuck in the middle
By Gamil Mattar
Many in the Arab world were optimistic that the call for an emergency meeting to explore ways of supporting the Intifada in Jerusalem would yield positive results. Immediately, however, "differences of opinion" arose and the focus of the conference was changed. Soon it was no longer a one-issue meeting.
Of course, observers of Arab politics and Arab summit politics in particular wondered how Washington would react. Would it approve of a summit, particularly at this time, in view of the possible resolutions Arab leaders would be negotiating even before the meeting began? Every Arab official knows that consultations are taking place with Washington, most likely at its request, over every point concerning the summit. By no means does this imply that Washington has any right to veto Arab policies; nor does it mean that the question of whether to hold a summit in the first place is ultimately a joint Arab-US decision. Recent events, at the level of the anger in the Arab street or the diversity of opinion reflected in the statements of some Arab leaders, demonstrate the maze of considerations the US must deal with when influencing Arab policies and decisions.
Arab summits are unique, firstly because Arab governments are unlike other governments. They do not resemble the governments that make up the EU, or those that take part in the G-7 (or G-8) summits. Holding a summit, like any activity involving some organisation, requires thorough preparation and established rules and conventions. These conditions do not obtain in the Arab world, for two reasons at least.
First, Arab affairs are still directly subject to the head of state, which means that inter-Arab relations are determined more by individual idiosyncrasies than by objective criteria, or even by the conditions that apply to relations with other foreign governments, with the exception, perhaps, of Washington.
The second reason is that a summit is a framework allowing for decisions to be issued, then acted upon. These decisions may be the product of discussions during or prior to the summit and they may be unanimous. However, there always remains a sense that somehow they detract from a nation's sovereignty, which, understandably, holds a very elevated place in the heart of most Arab leaders. However, in Arab relations, the concept has acquired a ring so strident that a term used simply to denote international legal status has been elevated to a creed, one we could term "sovereignism."
Therefore, it was hardly surprising that certain Arab heads of state declared their opinions about the forthcoming summit not only before it had taken place, but even before the preparatory meeting for an event that is supposedly the business of their ministers of foreign affairs. These leaders are eager to impress public opinion at a time when the streets are in turmoil, and all eyes are upon them. Now is the time for them to make their mark, for they will not be able to do so behind closed doors at the summit. If Arab leaders are politically accountable for what they say during the summit, their popularity depends on the stances they take beforehand. Arab leaders now are especially concerned with this point, for now, after a long lull due to domestic concerns and crises, the people have risen again and taken to the streets over a cause located outside their national boundaries.
The reaction of the Arab people has caused consternation in many decision-making centres. Some intellectuals, proud of their level-headedness, have attributed this reaction to demagoguery. Yet these same intellectuals expressed their admiration for the far more violent uprisings against Suharto in Indonesia and Milosevic in Serbia. In neither of these cases did we hear such terms as rabble-rousing or demagoguery. On the contrary: these revolts were extolled as symbols of democratic progress, signs of political maturity. Across the world, thousands took to the streets to protest the excesses of globalisation. Should they not, too, like the Arabs, be called firebrands and agitators, even if they succeeded in forcing the IMF and World Bank to take a second look at their policies?
Still, one can understand the disarray within Arab ruling circles. The anger on the Arab street will exert a powerful influence on the summit and this, in turn, will intensify tensions among Arab leaders.
To my knowledge, very few Arab governments like popular opinion to affect them this way, and even fewer will confess to holding a different opinion from that of their people. Many of these governments are surely devising strategies to ensure that their populaces revert to the long silence they had maintained until now.
But this will not be the last Intifada. And if the summit fails, it will not be the last such failure. Without the framework to enable regular meetings, Arab summits will never be effective. Moreover, scrambling to convene a summit aimed at quelling an Intifada can only detract from the meeting's credibility. Therefore, if Arab governments want the summit truly to impress all these onlookers, they should stick to the idea of a one-point agenda. They should focus on Jerusalem and support for the Palestinians; and they should reaffirm all resolutions holding Israel responsible for the failure to reach a just and comprehensive peace and depriving it of the benefits of normalisation until it meets the conditions for such a peace.
The participants should also commit themselves to convening at the proposed date and to holding summits at the same time every year. This will accomplish much. It will deprive foreign powers of an opportunity to intervene, compel Arab governments to function effectively at this high level, and, finally, it will encourage the "sovereignists" to accept the idea of communal Arab action.
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