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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 12 - 18 October 2000 Issue No. 503 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 12 - 18 October 2000 Issue No. 503
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Elections Palestine International Economy Opinion Culture Books Interview Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Why, finally, a summit is possible
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
Ten years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait, setting into motion a political earthquake that rocked the Arab world. A hastily convened Arab summit was unable to come up with a unified response to the event, and the Arab world split down the middle, with some states siding with Kuwait, the victim, and others with Iraq. The then US secretary of state, James Baker, took advantage of this unprecedentedly deep rift in Arab ranks to convince the Gulf states that their worst enemy was not necessarily Israel but, rather, a fellow Arab state. This paved the way to the Madrid conference and the Middle East peace process by which a majority of Arab states believed they could "neutralise" Israel as an enemy in order to focus on an even worse enemy, Saddam Hussein.
For many, however, the insistence of the United States and Britain to maintain the sanctions against Iraq indefinitely was a punishment that did not fit the crime, and that, moreover, was directed at innocent parties. The suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of the sanctions soon became a subject of concern worldwide. As the United States and Britain gradually became increasingly isolated from the other permanent members of the UN Security Council in regard to the policy towards Iraq, it became increasingly difficult to convince international public opinion that the harsh sanctions imposed on the Iraqi people were in conformity with international law. Many Arab states, including Gulf states, recently challenged the blockade -- and, with it, the assumption that Iraq is their worst enemy -- by airlifting medical and other forms of assistance to Baghdad. At the same time, the brutal suppression of the Palestinian people by the Israeli occupation forces highlighted the absurdity of the argument that sought to justify the impossibility of holding an Arab summit because of enmity towards a specific Arab state.
Today it is Jerusalem, not Iraq, that is the key element in determining Arab politics. Unlike other aspects of the Palestinian problem, the issue of Jerusalem is a minefield of religious sensibilities that exceeds the mandate of the Palestinian Authority. At the same time, matters have reached such a critical point that nothing short of a final settlement of the Jerusalem problem is possible. Until recently, it was possible to skirt this particularly volatile issue until all the other points in dispute had been settled, but Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to the Haram Al-Sharif has changed the dynamics on the ground. The spiral of violence his visit sparked off has made it clear that unless and until agreement is reached on the final status of Jerusalem there can be no final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Until the last Camp David summit, the parties avoided dealing with the issue of Jerusalem. At the first Camp David summit between Carter, Sadat and Begin, the parties agreed to sidestep the explosive issue of Jerusalem by deferring it to a later stage. In what amounted to an agreement to disagree, Sadat and Begin set down their respective positions on the issue in two separate letters addressed to Carter, which became an integral part of the Camp David accords.
Israel occupied all of Jerusalem in the 1967 War. It expanded the municipality of the city until it has now become twice as big as it originally was. In 1980, a Knesset resolution was passed annexing Arab East Jerusalem and declaring a unified Jerusalem Israel's eternal capital. this is, of course, totally unacceptable to the Arabs, who cannot conceive of a final solution that would invest Israel with sovereignty over the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem. So far, not one single state, including the US, has accepted the idea of exclusive Israeli sovereignty over the whole of Jerusalem. Although many US presidential candidates promised, during their electoral campaign, to relocate the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, none acted on that promise after his election, knowing that while such a move would be welcomed by America's powerful Jewish lobby, it would damage Arab-American relations beyond repair.
So wide the gap between the claims of the protagonists, so irreconcilable their positions on the Holy City, that both sides assiduously avoided addressing the issue of Jerusalem head on. And so it remained a taboo subject in all negotiations between the two sides. It was not addressed in the Oslo agreements nor in any of the agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority and Israel after Oslo. Nevertheless, it remained a hot issue thanks to Israel's systematic efforts to Judaise Arab East Jerusalem through a campaign of structural alterations and demolitions designed to gradually drive out its Arab population.
Camp David II was the first time the question of the final status of Jerusalem was openly discussed by the parties, soberly and without resorting to hackneyed clichés. For the first time, Barak did not hide behind Israel's traditional slogan that Jerusalem would remain its eternal and undivided capital to avoid any serious discussion, and displayed readiness to engage in a more realistic dialogue with his Palestinian interlocutor. This in itself was portrayed as a concession that had not been met by a reciprocal concession from Arafat. Indeed, blame for the failure of the summit was laid squarely on the Palestinian leader's shoulders by Clinton, who praised Barak for displaying "flexibility" and criticised Arafat for not "walk[ing] the last mile."
However, this was a deliberate distortion of the facts. Arafat displayed at least as much flexibility when he expressed readiness to waive Palestinian sovereignty over specific sites in Arab East Jerusalem, namely, the Wailing Wall and the Jewish quarter in the Old City. But Arafat's authority is temporal and does not extend to sites of spiritual significance to Muslims worldwide, like the Haram Al-Sharif (what the Israelis call Temple Mount). He had no option therefore but to reject Clinton's proposal to divide sovereignty over the Haram vertically, with Palestinians exercising sovereignty over what stands above ground and Israelis over what lies beneath it. The Israelis insist on retaining control over the area below Al-Aqsa Mosque because legend has it that it contains the ruins of Solomon's Temple, even though excavations have not revealed any evidence to confirm this.
Before the current Intifada, it was possible to envisage some kind of arrangement that would enable the parties to push forward with the peace process without sinking into the Jerusalem quagmire. For example, they could have worked out an agreement on procedure which, by skirting the parties' substantive conflicting claims, would allow for the deferment of a final agreement on Jerusalem without adversely affecting any other agreement produced by the final status talks. A formula that could have served this purpose was the Vatican's proposal to make Jerusalem an international city. I personally supported the proposal, provided internationalisation apply to both West and East Jerusalem, and provided also that it was adopted as an interim measure until a better solution could be worked out without the pressure of a previously established calendar and without jeopardising any overall agreement.
But after the provocative visit by Ariel Sharon to Al-Aqsa Mosque, a temporary agreement on Jerusalem is no longer a viable option. Moreover, one is entitled to ask whether Sharon acted alone or in collusion with Barak. While it may have appeared at first that Sharon made his move in the aim of embarrassing Barak and exploiting his weakness after the failure of the Camp David summit, the latter's reaction belies this assumption. Instead of rebuking the Likud opposition leader, Barak provided him with a two thousand-strong police guard to protect him while he undertook his provocation. We now hear that Barak might form a coalition government with the Likud. Has Barak's fear of being accused of capitulation to the Arabs driven him into capitulating to the Likud, as prominent Israeli peace activist Uri Avnery put it?
One thing is certain, and that is that Jerusalem can no longer be removed as an obstacle in the way of a settlement through some agreement of an intermediary character. Does this mean that a final settlement is once again put back? Is a final settlement possible before Clinton leaves the White House? American diplomacy has failed to come forward with a formula that would ensure a cease-fire. How then can it succeed in coming forward with a solution to end the conflict, let alone resuming the negotiations?
The Intifada that Sharon (or Barak-Sharon) triggered has restored to the conflict its polarised character. It is no longer possible to exploit the contradictions within Arab ranks (including the contentious issue of Iraq) to divide the Arabs when it comes to the issue of Jerusalem. Barak's refusal to respond to Mubarak's invitation to come to Sharm Al-Sheikh has driven the Arab states to convene their summit not next January, but in ten days.
The Arab conditions for a Palestinian-Israel settlement, that will now be supported by an Arab summit, cannot be anything less than a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, side by side with the state of Israel with West Jerusalem as its capital. If access to the Wailing Wall should be guaranteed to the Israelis, sovereignty over the Haram Al-Sharif should be guaranteed to the Palestinians.
As to the myths related to Solomon's Temple the Arabs cannot be required to relinquish their sovereignty over holy places that actually exist in favour of hypothetical Jewish holy places with no physical proof of existence. If one day the existence of the Temple is scientifically established in a manner that no one can contest, then a new situation will have arisen which can, in a spirit of peace, find an appropriate solution.
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