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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 12 - 18 October 2000 Issue No. 503 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 12 - 18 October 2000 Issue No. 503
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Elections Palestine International Economy Opinion Culture Books Interview Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Israel's dilemma
By David Hirst
When, on Saturday afternoon, Israel first confirmed Hizbullah's claim that it had captured three Israeli soldiers in a daring cross-border raid, panic swept Beirut. Not a few immediately fled to their mountain villages; by dusk places of normally bustling weekend night-life were eerily quiet. Embassies phoned their nationals, urging them to stay indoors.
There was, of course, a goodly measure of pride in Hizbullah's seemingly brilliant new exploit, especially among the Shi'ite Muslims who are its natural constituency. And it certainly fitted well into the renewed popular ardour for the Palestine cause that has been manifesting itself in demonstrations in Lebanon as well as the rest Arab world. But there was also deep fear. Fear that the retaliatory onslaught on Lebanese infrastructure would be immediate, and that, given the high level of verbal menace which had accompanied, and compensated for, the ignominy of Israel's scuttle from the south Lebanese "security zone" in May, this would be more devastating than ever. Fear that "here we are again," that, a mere four months on, Lebanon was back to its hapless role as principal arena and
victim of Arab-Israeli military conflict to which other "front-line" states were merely spectators.
But so far, despite the reported massing of troops and armour on the border, there has been no Israeli response. And the feeling grows that, for the time being at least, the Israelis will confine themselves to diplomacy to get their men back; and that, for all sorts of reasons, they really have little choice.
It is true, of course, that the kidnapping has added a dangerous new complication to the new Middle East crisis which, though centred on the bloody street battles in Israel and the occupied territories, is now ramifying in various ways throughout the region -- as well as deepening the aggressive siege mentality which is taking possession of the Israelis.
True, too, that the operation merges, politically and psychologically,
with the strictly Israel-Palestine arena. Its official purpose, of course, is to secure the release of 19 Lebanese held in Israeli prisons, including two Hizbullah chiefs, Sheikhs Abdul-Karim Obeid and Mustafa Dirani, who were kidnapped by Israeli commandos in 1989 and 1994. But Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah's secretary-general, who has regularly urged Palestinians to emulate "the armed struggle" by which his own fighters liberated south Lebanon, said that the operation was deliberated and timed to coincide with, and add encouragement to, the Palestinians' new Intifada; it was named after Mohamed Al-Dorra, the 12-year-old-boy whose televised death
shocked viewers around the world.
Nonetheless, it is argued here, Israel's larger, immediate dilemma -- how to deal with Palestinian violence and the anger which fuels it -- now so dominates official thinking, and is so entwined with domestic politics, that it would be taking an enormous gamble if it acted hastily and belligerently on this essentially secondary front, thereby opening up the risk of a military showdown with Syria.
Furthermore, there is almost no way, short of full-scale invasion, by which the Israelis could secure their soldiers' freedom by force. They are assuredly in the "very safe place" that Nasrallah says they are. And nothing would more endanger their lives than a military onslaught in which Lebanese civilians start dying again in very large numbers. Nor could Barak easily stomach the resumption of the very thing, Katyushas on northern Israel, which, by extricating his army from the Lebanese "mud," he had brought to an end or so, at least, he had gambled. Hizbullah has stated the obvious: the cost to Israel, of any resort to force, would be "very high." Thanks to the withdrawal, Hizbullah is now deployed along the border itself, and, as one of its officials said, "Israel's depth is now within easy reach."
There is a rather obvious solution to the hostage crisis: an exchange of prisoners in each side's hands. Doubtless that would be painful and humiliating for the Israelis. But that is all Hizbullah is aiming at.
Despite the Palestinian aspect of "Operation Martyr Mohamed Al-Dorra" it was strictly Lebanese in purpose. Furthermore, Hizbullah has made it clear that it has no interest in a resumption of generalised war in the south; it knows it would risk great unpopularity, not least among its own Shi'ite constituency, were it seen gratuitously to re-ignite one.
This, then, was a one-time, carefully planned coup de force. Indeed
Hizbullah had given ample warning of its intentions. Since the Israeli withdrawal, it had repeatedly insisted that its struggle would not be
complete till it had brought about the recovery of the last part of claimed Lebanese territory, the "Shebaa farms" still in Israeli hands, and, more importantly, until Israel released those 19 Lebanese hostages. For "hostages" they, too, clearly are; Israel itself has never made any secret of the fact that it holds them as bargaining chips to be exchanged for definitive information on the fate of Israeli combatants who disappeared in Lebanon in the eighties.
The fact that they are hostages was certainly a key
factor in that finely tuned calculation of likely profit and loss that,
throughout the liberation struggle, has generally been a mark of Hizbullah's operations. And the calculation may well have paid off again. The kidnap has, of course, been deplored and condemned internationally, but in notably perfunctory fashion. The feeling among diplomats here is reported to be that Israel has got a taste of its own medicine. More importantly, the international mediators who quickly moved in made it plain from the outset that straightforward swap was in their view a morally acceptable and politically sensible solution. Thus, while the UN coordinator for South Lebanon, Rolf Knutsson, called for "the immediate and unconditional release" of the three soldiers, he also said that the 19 Lebanese should be freed "unconditionally and without further delay."
Things could go awry, and doubtless the negotiations could be tough and protracted, particularly if Hizbullah lends greater weight to the
Palestinian aspect of the affair and heeds a Palestinian plea to demand the release of Palestinian as well as Lebanese prisoners. But, for the moment, the Lebanese are recovering from their initial scare.
Even so, they cannot but see the Hizbullah exploit as part of the
unfolding regional drama which they look upon with deep foreboding and very mixed feelings. The Druse chieftain Walid Junblatt gave voice to some of those when he received followers at his palace in Mukhtara at the weekend: "The clouds of war are gathering again over the Arab region. I myself have never believed in this impossible peace. But war requires a war economy.
Some parties and organisations (he means Hizbullah) are acclimatised to war; they have the means to persevere, and not bad financial resources. But we 'in the mountain' don't. " Turning to the wider horizon, he concluded: "We are for going on with the confrontation, but with the opening of all fronts, from Nakura to Aqaba, and, if possible, to El-Arish (Egypt) too."
Related stories:
Hizbullah on the move
Guerrillas on extended leave 27 July - 2 August 2000
The greater Jihad 8 - 14 June 2000
Making Lebanon whole again 1 - 7 June 2000
Liberation 25 - 31 May 2000
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