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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 26 Oct. - 1 Nov. 2000 Issue No. 505 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 26 Oct. - 1 Nov. 2000 Issue No. 505
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Palestine International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Disposing of the dead
By Hassan Nafaa *
Not long ago the "peace process" entered intensive care and soon afterwards was declared clinically dead. It was clear that attempts to resuscitate it were futile for the simple reason that these efforts were not focused on the structural deficiencies inherent in the peace process from the outset. Yet all possible attempts were made to artificially prolong its life. As a result, when the final seizure occurred, it was too late and there was no choice but to declare the patient deceased and move ahead with the burial.
The peace process entered its final throes last July when Barak and Arafat accepted Clinton's invitation to a summit in Camp David. As the negotiating parties set off to the US presidential retreat, they knew it was a time to show all their cards and make difficult decisions. It is telling that Barak, as he departed, announced that he had a final deal to offer the Palestinians and that this time he would accept no less than a written declaration that their conflict with the Israelis was over and that they no longer had outstanding demands to exact from Israel outside the scope of the deal. Barak, it seemed, was fully convinced that Camp David II offered the appropriate time and place to stage the spectacular finale to the century-long Middle East conflict, after which the curtain would be drawn, to a standing ovation.
In order to augment the dramatic suspense, Clinton sealed Camp David off behind an impenetrable screen of secrecy so that the protagonists would not be distracted from the task of ironing out all the details and hammering together an agreement. The Arab people, as they watched this scene unfold, knew that Arafat had been caught between Clinton and Barak, and for 15 days, during which the Palestinian president was cut off from all contact with the outside world. In the end, Arafat surprised supporters and observers alike by emerging from this diabolical trap, head high, after having refused to be cornered into putting his signature to an agreement that could only be described as a surrender pact. The Palestinian people cheered his steadfastness under tremendous pressures and united behind him as never before since Oslo. Once again Arafat was the spokesman for the entire Palestinian people and not merely one of the Palestinian factions.
Although the details of what transpired in Camp David remain unknown, Palestinian and Arab public opinion was stunned by two facts that emerged with glaring clarity from the summit and its aftermath. First, they realised that Israel is not prepared under any circumstances to restore full sovereignty over Al-Aqsa Mosque to the Palestinians. The second reality to strike home was that the US will never compel Israel to act against its will, no matter how much Israeli intransigence and arrogance jeopardises the peace process.
Israel's final positions in Camp David II, not only on Jerusalem, but on the Palestinian refugee and the Israeli settlement issues, made it patently obvious that Israel has no intention of allowing the creation of a fully independent and sovereign Palestinian state. For the Palestinians and the Arabs in general, therefore, Camp David demonstrated incontrovertibly the final bankruptcy of the Oslo formula, while the success achieved by the Hizbullah-led resistance in Lebanon seemed to emerge as the only viable means of restoring hope. It was against this explosive backdrop that Sharon made his visit to the Haram Al-Sharif, thereby setting the match to the powder keg.
When Barak returned empty-handed from Camp David, it was clear that his policy had reached a dead end. His fragile coalition had collapsed, and only the fact that the Knesset was in summer recess prevented the downfall of his government. Had Barak been a statesman, not a military officer wearing the prime minister's coat, he might have succeeded in mobilising the support of the doves in Israeli society in favour of an equitable agreement with the Palestinians. By stopping midway, Barak fell prey to Israeli right-wing extortionism, and in his bid to appease the fanatical right he not only approved Sharon's visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque, he detailed 1,500 of the Israeli "defence" forces to accompany him.
Barak's message to the Palestinians was clear -- submit, or else. The Palestinians refused; the Intifada was the envelope in which they sent their answer. When Barak attempted to show his determination to break the will of the Palestinian people by using the most brutal violence at his disposal, he only revealed the truly hideous face that the Oslo peace process had persistently, albeit unsuccessfully, tried to hide. Perhaps the last thing he expected was to be caught with his finger on the trigger of the gun that put the comatose "peace process" out of its misery.
For the Arabs, events began to move in a different direction. After a much extended period of seeming torpor, the Arab world appears to be recovering its vigour, inspired by the resistance of the Palestinian people. The unspeakable brutality unleashed against Palestinian civilians abruptly put everything back into perspective. The inherently racist nature of the Zionist enterprise has surfaced once again, and demonstrations of solidarity have transcended divisive political barriers. The Islamic world has emerged to furnish a strategic depth to the Arab struggle. In short, older terms of reference for our geo-political realities are relevant once again; the notions of unity, Arab nationalism and independence have reasserted themselves over the Middle Eastern order, normalisation and globalisation.
However, it is also true that popular outrage has put Arab governments in a predicament. When the Intifada erupted, Arab governments welcomed it, not only as a legitimate form of resistance, but also because it seemed possible that it would shake Israel's complacent intransigence. However, by so dangerously escalating the onslaught against the Palestinians to the degree of a virtual open declaration of war against the Palestinian Authority, Israel precipitated a climate of war, and revived the very real prospect of renewed belligerence.
As a result, Arab governments find themselves at a crossroads. Either they can attempt to channel popular anger, a course which entails many perils; or they can back down and bear the consequences of their weakness, as manifested in the growing gap between what they are able to do and what public opinion wants. The Arab governments, it seems, have opted for the latter course, but in a calculated manner.
*The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
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