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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 26 Oct. - 1 Nov. 2000 Issue No. 505 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 26 Oct. - 1 Nov. 2000 Issue No. 505
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Palestine International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters The other option is war
By Mohamed El-Sayed Said *
Behind the massive rally of support to the Intifada in the occupied territories, several interpretations -- some defensive and others offensive -- are contending for public acceptance.
The defensive approaches present the Intifada as a reaction to the atrocities Israel is perpetrating against the Palestinian people. The offensive approach portrays the Intifada as a popular intervention aimed at reclaiming the initiative from the politicians who have negotiated with Israel to no avail for the past seven years. In this sense, the Intifada's aim is a radical restructuring of the balance of power and the imposition of a new strategy for the liberation of the occupied territories.
Each of these approaches implies a different course of action on the Arab side. And both were represented at the Arab summit last week.
The defensive approach calls for an immediate end to Israeli atrocities, the formation of an international commission of inquiry into the massacres, a commitment from the Israeli forces not to repeat these massacres and the trial of Israeli war criminals by an international tribunal. The Sharm Al-Sheikh conference was devoted to this agenda.
The package President Clinton announced, however, was far inferior to the Arab side's demands. The meeting, according to this view, should have been devoted to guaranteeing a measure of protection to the Palestinian people against the brutality of the Israeli colonial regime.
The offensive approach, as indicated above, sees the Intifada as an expression of total frustration at the negotiations, and as an alternative to that process. Clearly, however, the continuation of the Intifada without international protection or material support from the Arab states will make the Palestinians cannon fodder -- simply victims of the Israeli killing machine. Simply supporting the Intifada is no strategy at all. A radical, offensive approach essentially relies on the Intifada as a practical mechanism for dragging the Arab states into a confrontation with Israel.
At this stage, the Intifada has taken the form of large-scale demonstrations that face Israel's colonial army with stones. It signifies the highest will to resistance and liberation, but in itself cannot serve as a tool for liberation. The continuation of both the Intifada and the massacres will impose one of two solutions. Either the international community dictates terms to Israel, which is hardly likely; or neighbouring Arab states intervene by practical means on behalf of the Palestinians, a scenario which implies possible military confrontation.
Confrontation in the occupied territories will continue. The Israelis are determined to crush the Palestinian resistance, and to break the will of both Palestinian leaders and masses. But even if we assume that Israel, under extreme pressure, agrees to show temporary self-restraint, the Palestinians will continue to resist, because they want full independence and their full, legitimate rights. The volatility of the situation on the ground renders it extremely vulnerable to escalation, simply because the Palestinians cannot see a light at the end of the tunnel.
In this perspective, the Arab summit was faced with the task of formulating ideas, if not an alternative strategy, to meet the challenge posed by the possibility of escalation. The conference witnessed yet another confrontation between moderate and radical Arab leaders. Under the pressure of public opinion and debates within the summit itself, resolutions were marked by a militant discourse -- but nothing that deserves to be called a strategy of action capable of breaking the impasse.
Three different courses of action suggested themselves as responses to the gauntlet Israel has thrown down. In addition to repeating their commitment to the Arab position on final status, Arab leaders demanded international protection for the Palestinian people. The implementation of this demand will require considerable political investments and diplomatic activity. A second option was to go beyond the resolution of the 1996 summit, which merely froze normalisation with Israel. Indeed, the present summit alluded to the possibility of freezing or abrogating agreements between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and the PLO unless violence against the Palestinians is stopped and credible advance in the peace process is made; but it stopped short of immediate implementation of this option. A third option involved one form or another of coordination for a military showdown. This last option was not deemed realistic, but it may be wise not to rule it out entirely, especially if Israel goes so far as to reoccupy Palestinian territories with the purpose of destroying self-rule institutions and infrastructure.
The deterioration of the situation means that anything is possible, however -- including an option made unthinkable during the Oslo process: i.e., a regional war.
It is such horrifying prospects that made the international community work hard in Sharm Al-Sheikh, in the hope of restoring normalcy. But we still lack a good definition of normalcy. One thing is clear: the occupation is both abnormal and intolerable. Arab leaders will find themselves dragged into an open conflict with Israel again, unless the international community imposes on Israel the imperative need to end the occupation and recognise the rights of the Palestinian people.
The Arab summit, in essence, proved a total disappointment to the Arab masses, especially in the occupied territories. Bitterness and frustration will force Arab leaders to escalate the confrontation in the near future. Material escalation will inevitably drag the region into war -- unless the international community comes to understand that what needs to be ended is not violence, but occupation.
*The writer is deputy director of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
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