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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 16 - 22 November 2000 Issue No.508 
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Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 16 - 22 November 2000 Issue No.508
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 |
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Focus Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Mediterraneanism and Middle-Easternism
By Mohamed Sid-Ahmed
The Arab-Israeli conflict can be placed in one of two different, occasionally contradictory, frameworks. One makes the Middle East the epicentre and moves from there to the problems of the Mediterranean in general, while the other does the reverse, making the Mediterranean the epicentre and moving from there to the Middle East in particular.
The sometimes fuzzy distinction between the two approaches is now particularly sharp. There are two reasons for this. The first is the exacerbation of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, which has made the Palestinian problem in general, and the issue of Jerusalem in particular, the prism through which all other issues are viewed, including those related to current attempts to build up Euro-Arab and Euro-African partnerships across the Mediterranean.
The second reason is that the fourth meeting of foreign ministers of states involved in the Barcelona process is currently underway in Marseilles. This round in the ongoing Euro-Mediterranean dialogue brings together the 15 European Union member states and 12 other states bordering the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, namely Algeria, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Here the frame of reference is obviously Mediterraneanism, that is, the meeting will proceed from the general, viz., issues of concern for all the countries of the Mediterranean basin, to the particular, viz., the problem of the Middle East.
Each of the two approaches has its champions, and it remains to be seen which will prevail. A test in this regard could be the debate initiated by Syria and Lebanon over whether the Arab countries should accept to take part in any meetings which include Israel after the Arab summit adopted a resolution recommending its boycott by all Arab states for its suspension of the peace process. However, the resolution is not binding, and leaves it to each individual state to implement it or not at its discretion. Thus all the Arab countries having commercial but not diplomatic relations with Israel, namely Tunisia, Morocco, Oman and, at a later stage, Qatar, have severed these relations while those bound by peace treaties and full-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel, namely Egypt and Jordan, have not. As to the Palestinian Authority, its relations with Israel may now be completely ruptured, but all the Arab states would like to see a resumption of negotiations on the Palestinian-Israeli track at the earliest opportunity.
It should be remembered that Syria has so far not boycotted the Barcelona process despite the participation of Israel in all its meetings. However, it has consistently boycotted the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic meetings ever since the process was initiated with the Casablanca conference in 1994. This means that the decisive factor for Syria is not the presence or absence of Israel but the framework in which such meetings are held. The Middle Eastern framework is an Israeli-American mechanism which serves Israel's interests in keeping the peace process under the exclusive sponsorship of its mentor, the United States, without any interference by other international mediators. On the other hand, the Mediterranean framework, which is a purely European initiative, allows for the possibility of a more forceful -- and certainly more even-handed -- European role in the peace process. But the peace process has sunk to such an all-time low that Syria is now calling for an Arab boycott of any meetings attended by Israel, regardless of whether they are held in the Middle Eastern or Mediterranean framework. The clear inference to be drawn from this is that the deteriorating situation in the Middle East favours the logic of the Intifada, of confrontation with Israel, over that of extending bridges all over the Mediterranean.
But whatever the contradictions between an approach centred on Middle Eastern developments and one centred on the Mediterranean, there are also similarities in the structure of the two frames of reference. In a way, the Middle Eastern model is a miniaturised reproduction of the Mediterranean model. The first concentrates on the Middle East, with the Palestinian problem standing at its heart; the second extends to include a strategic area with the Mediterranean standing at its heart (only the Balkans are excluded; the recent decomposition of the Yugoslav state dictated the need for a special approach to the Yugoslav problem).
For all that they often collide, Middle-Easternism and Mediterraneanism share features in common. Both include unequal partners: Israel and the Arabs in one case, the EU and the Arab states in the other. In the context of globalisation, the stronger party can no longer ignore the weaker party, because a main characteristic of globalisation is the downfall of barriers and interpenetration between societies.
Of course, interpenetration has positive aspects. But it also has negative aspects, even for the stronger parties. Developed societies cannot immunise themselves against migrations coming from under-developed parts of the world nor against the epidemics that can sometimes accompany them. In the global village, it is no longer possible for a privileged few to hold the less privileged at bay. Hence the need for some sort of partnership between North and South, including the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, in the aim of restructuring relations and optimising opportunities to the mutual benefit of both parties. That is the objective of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, which is motivated not only by the aspirations of the South to benefit from the opportunities the developed North can offer, but also by the need of the North to shield itself against security threats from the South.
However, it remains to be seen which of the two aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership will determine the nature of the relationship between its parties, the security requirements of Europe or the development needs of the non-European countries of the Mediterranean. If European security is the key concern, then we are up against an updated version of the imperialist project, albeit in a disguised form. Traditional imperialism described itself as an enlightening mission striving to spread civilisation among the backward peoples of the world. But its security concerns transformed it into a repressive project against which the peoples of the world struggled bitterly.
Israel's behaviour in Palestine is reminiscent of the worst excesses of the colonial era, which were justified at the time as dictated by security considerations. The Palestinians, indeed the Arabs as a whole, are regarded by Israel not as subjects of history but as objects representing a threat to its security. It is in this logic that Israel is now talking of the need to separate the Palestinians from the Israelis in order to neutralise the security threat they represent, this logic that shapes its perception of its Arab environment. It is the same logic that governed the relationship between the imperialist powers and their colonial subjects in the colonial age, a relationship which can only heighten tensions and prevent the achievement of genuine peace and security.
Which brings us back to the question of which of the two approaches is more likely to prevail over the other: will the Mediterranean "partnership model" absorb the Middle Eastern (Arab-Israeli) "conflictual model," or the opposite? In other words, can Euro-Mediterranean partnership create links between the European Union and the Arab states bordering the Mediterranean that could contribute to bring about understanding and harmony between the peoples on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, and thus extend this normalisation of relations to include Israel and the Arab states, or will the deterioration in Arab-Israeli relations spread havoc throughout the Mediterranean as a whole? What seems obvious is that, in the short term, the Middle Eastern scenario is more likely to prevail over the Mediterranean scenario than the opposite. But in the age of globalisation, no conflict situation can remain unresolved forever. Peace, as a strategic objective, is unavoidable, even if we admit that it will not come on its own, that is, without a conscious effort on the part of all concerned.
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