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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 30 Nov. - 6 Dec. 2000 Issue No.510 | ||
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 30 Nov. - 6 Dec. 2000 Issue No.510 | ||
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Egypt Region International Economy Opinion Culture Special Travel Living Sports Profile People Time Out Chronicles Cartoons Letters Al-Ahram:
A Diwan of contemporary life (366)
A barren oasis, hundreds of miles from nowhere, Al-Jaghbub was, nevertheless, the site of a major power struggle in the 1920s between Egypt, where it was located, and Italy and Britain who thought the area should be elsewhere. Al-Ahram was, like all Egyptians, adamant that not one square inch of the oasis be relinquished. Dr Yunan Labib Rizk* explains the significance of this lazy but potentially explosive expanse of land
A deal that was never ratified
During the first quarter of the 20th century Egypt signed several agreements with colonial powers. Perhaps the best known is the Entente Cordiale signed between Britain and France in 1904, in which France agreed to recognise Britain's de facto control over Egypt in exchange for a similar British guarantee with regard to France's control over the Maghreb. Several years later, during the post-World War I peace conference in Paris, London managed to conclude a series of pacts with the participating countries, securing from them the recognition of Britain's protectorate over Egypt.If the 1919 Revolution succeeded in forcing the British to admit that by 1921 the protectorate relationship was no longer satisfactory, then terminated the protectorate in accordance with the Declaration of 28 February 1922, there remained one colonial pact that the British could not or did not wish to back out of. The victim of this pact was the Egyptian oasis of Al-Jaghbub.
The Anglo-Italian pact over this area was sealed by virtue of two separate agreements. The first was contained in the Treaty of London, signed in 1915, in accordance with which Italy agreed to join the Allies in the war against the Central Powers. Article three of this treaty stated that, in the event of an Allied victory, Italy would have the right to modify the borders of its colonies in Cerenaica (Barqa) and Somalia. With regard to Italy's Libyan colony it was evident that the border adjustments would come at the expense of Egyptian territory.
The second component of the pact was an exchange of memorandums between the British secretary of the Colonial Office and the Italian minister for foreign affairs. In the first memorandum, dated 10 April 1920, Rome declared that the Egyptian-Libyan border would extend southwards from a northern point 10 kilometres to the west of Sallum and that "the area located within this border will be perfectly appropriate so long as Al-Jaghbub is included within Italian territory." The response, dated two days later, contains the British assent to Rome's definition of the eastern Libyan boundary.
The origins of this pact date to the Italian-Turkish war over Libya (1911-12), during which the Italians captured the coast of Libya up to the 27th degree longitude. Since the territory captured from one of the former Ottoman provinces in North Africa encompassed Sallum, the British objected in the name of the Egyptian crown, in response to which the Italians withdrew from the contested area and Egyptian forces entered the important port city.
In Al-Ahram of 6 April 1925, Lutfi El-Mandarawi, "chief interpreter for the British forces on Egypt's western front during the Great War," discusses the strategic significance of Sallum. The topography there formed a natural barrier from which "any small, well-equipped force can resist a tremendous army and navy." The author explains, "There are several reasons for this; the most important is that it overlooks the Barqa desert and towers directly over the port, rendering it impossible for a hostile vessel to approach the coast without risk of destruction. In addition, the Sallum Citadel, constructed high on the summit of Mt. Sallum, is virtually invisible to approaching warships and, if they sought to target it, could only strike the uppermost portion of the edifice, causing only negligible damage." British records offer a third reason: the waters in the port were deep enough to serve as a naval base.
Mussolini greets crowds while delivering his speech at Union Square Azzam after retirement with his dog
The British, therefore, had strong reasons to want to hold on to that strategic stronghold and, consequently, to insist that the Egyptian-Libyan border start 15 kilometres to the west of Sallum and to concede to Italy and Libya Al-Jaghbub Oasis in return.
From 1912 to 1920, Italian colonial forces encountered considerable problems in asserting their control over the interior of eastern Libya. According to The Daily Telegraph, Rome was aware that members of the Senussi tribe resided beyond the Libyan frontier in Egypt and suspected that many people of this nomadic tribe infiltrated across the border into Al-Jaghbub, "a sacred site in which they receive religious instruction." The London-based newspaper continues, "Outlawed Senussis generally find a safe haven in Al-Jaghbub. The Italians estimate that the number of guns smuggled into it exceed 3,000 per month, ostensibly for political and military purposes, but also because the oasis is located at the juncture of caravan routes."
Communiqués issued by the Italian Ministry of War corroborate this. On 13 February 1925, for example, it announced, "Necessary military action was taken in southern Barqa between 2 and 9 February leading to the demolition of 16 Senussi bases in nine intensive engagements. Two hundred Senussis died in the battle while the Italians took 14,000 sheep and 400 camels as spoils. Two Italians were killed and 10 were wounded."
Some Egyptians could not understand why the Italians were expending so much energy on Al-Jaghbub. A lengthy Al-Ahram article at the time commented that it took 45 days by camel "through scorching heat, parched and barren desert" to reach the oasis, located hundreds of miles south of the Mediterranean coast. "It is not a military base, there is no agriculture and there is not enough food or drink to sustain hundreds of people. It is a small oasis of no more than 150 people, where a Senussi elder chose to live as a recluse, attracting a number of spiritual adherents and disciples who began to derive their livelihood from this Egyptian oasis. As the tribal chief was a pious and learned man, the Egyptian government in the age of the Khedive Tawfiq had a shrine, mosque and hospice built there and sent a team of engineers to dig wells to serve its small population, actions undertaken because the government considered this small oasis Egyptian and the people who lived there Egyptian citizens."
By 1925 the understanding London and Rome reached in 1920 had not yet been put into effect. In the wake of the 1919 Revolution, British authorities were reluctant to take measures in this direction for fear of fuelling the already heated situation in Egypt. Following the promulgation of the 1922 Declaration of 28 February, the British were once again forced to postpone the implementation of the memorandums. In a letter to the Italian ambassador in London the British Foreign Office wrote, "The termination of the protectorate over Egypt has entirely altered the situation. It is no longer possible for the British government to continue its negotiations [over this matter] without the participation of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and without the cooperation of the Egyptian government." The ball was now in the Egyptian court and the British observed closely how Cairo would react.
When the "people's government" under Saad Zaghlul assumed power in 1924, the Italians thought the time was ripe to make a move. British Foreign Office archives reveal that when the Egyptian prime minister returned to Paris in the summer of that year, following the breakdown in negotiations with his British counterpart, the Italian ambassador to the French capital secured from him a promise to study the question of Al-Jaghbub when he returned to Egypt prior to opening negotiations on the matter. However, the tensions in Egypt that brought down the Zaghlul government in November of that year precluded further talks between the two parties.
The Italians resumed their pressure on Egypt following the rise of the Ziwar government to power, lured by the fact that it was essentially brought into power by King Fouad and easily manipulated by the Egyptian ruler who, in turn, had a special attachment to Italy where he received his education. However, to the Italians' surprise, the situation in Egypt was not as propitious as they had thought for bringing the Anglo-Italian memorandums into effect. The response of the fascist government in Rome was to bring matters to a head.
On 10 February 1925 reports reached Cairo that Italian forces had entered Egyptian territory up to a point called Al-Shaqqa, "located a third of the way between Sallum and Al-Jaghbub and a considerable distance inside our side of the frontier." Simultaneously, the Italian minister plenipotentiary in Cairo demanded that Egypt recognise the Italian claim to Al-Jaghbub. Egyptian Prime Minister Ziwar Pasha responded that Al-Jaghbub was situated within Egyptian territory and the Egyptian minister plenipotentiary in Rome conveyed the same message to the Italian foreign minister. Rome's representative in Egypt then pursued another channel, asking the British high commissioner to prevail upon the Egyptian government to submit a written pledge declaring that Al-Jaghbub belonged to Italy. As the Ziwar government knew that to commit itself to such a pledge would bring the already shaky government down, it declared its refusal to recognise the Anglo-Italian memorandums.
On 20 February 1925, Al-Ahram explained to its readers the Egyptian government's position. Italy may have inherited the Ottoman province of what is now Libya, but "it has no right to territories beyond what Turkey possessed." It continues, "Although there was no official boundary between the Turkish province and Egypt, there was a de facto boundary which was termed the "line of distinction," or dividing line, between the two states. A map containing this line exists in the Istanbul archives and demonstrates that Al-Jaghbub is situated within Egyptian territory."
The Italian press responded with a campaign of its own. "The Al-Jaghbub Oasis never belonged to Egypt at any point in time; not in name and not in practice," declared the newspaper Epoca. "Yet Egypt, ecstatic after its independence, has decided to take it as its own without having the slightest justification to support this claim."
The British high commissioner, meanwhile, refused to lend his good offices to the escalating tension between Egypt and Italy. He informed the Italian minister plenipotentiary in Cairo that he would not comply with the request to have the Egyptian government submit the desired pledge. He asked him to suggest to Rome that it follow a less confrontational policy, particularly in view of the forthcoming elections in Egypt in which the Ziwar government would have to use all its resources to compete with the highly popular Wafd Party.
Rome's answer's came in the form of a personal letter from Mussolini to the British foreign secretary stating that Italy had endured great sacrifices in its quest to bring peace to Cerenaica, a task that could not be fully completed unless it secured control over Al-Jaghbub, the centre for the Senussi faction. Il Duce, nevertheless, took Britain's advice to put off the matter until after the Egyptian elections. In response, the British notified Rome that, after the elections, should the Egyptian government not take a more flexible position with regard to the contested oasis, London would let the matter pass (in the Declaration of 28 February Britain reserved the right to defend Egyptian territory against any foreign aggression). At the same time, the high commissioner, acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, "advised" Ziwar to "bring the Al-Jaghbub matter to an end as quickly as possible," adding that it would be wise for the Egyptian government to resolve the question "rather than let the Italians settle it without us being able to offer any assistance to Egypt."
The Ziwar government was caught between the pressures exerted by Italy and Britain and the weight of Egyptian public opinion, as voiced in the press, which rejected out of hand the notion of handing Al-Jaghbub over to the Italians. Al-Ahram was representative of the many newspapers that called for the Egyptian oasis to be protected, and to this end it solicited articles from experts on the affairs of the Western Desert. One such man, Mohamed Ibrahim Lutfi El-Masri, a former employee in the Senussi government, suggested that from the outset the Italians had designs on Egyptian territory. In their campaign to wrest Libya from the Turks, El-Masri writes, the Italians occupied the port of Tripoli, proceeded eastwards to take Benghazi, Derna and Tobruk, "then advanced towards the border and began to bombard the nearby ports of Dagna and Marisa. Were it not for the natural defences of these ports, the Italians would have struck with greater ferocity in order to secure their ambitions at both ends." Later, in 1914, El-Masri writes, the Italians opened negotiations with the Khedive Abbas II over the purchase of the Mariout railway line, which he owned. They were ready to pay an outlandish price for the railway, writes El-Masri, "however, Egyptian newspapers got wind of the matter and argued that while the khedive might own the tracks and trains, the ground on which they ran was the property of the Egyptian government. Having found himself in an uncomfortable situation, the former khedive decided not to sell at all."
On 10 April, Al-Ahram reported that the specialists whom the government consulted on the western border were of one mind. The government "should not squander one inch of Egyptian land which the Egyptian military commission, appointed in the summer of 1922 to survey the western borders, regarded as vital for technical military reasons."
Following the elections in March 1925, which led to a Wafd majority in parliament and the consequent dissolution of parliament for a second time in less than a year, the British no longer had any pretext to put the Italians off again. Once again, the British pressured the Egyptian government to begin negotiations over the contested territory and Ziwar agreed. To be fair to the government, it could have easily delayed the issue. When, on 31 March, Italian representatives in Cairo approached Egyptian officials on the subject, Ziwar said he had to dispatch a commission to the borders to prepare a report on the strategic considerations of the subject. Although the Italians countered that the Egyptian government had already done so in 1922, the Egyptian government maintained its position and succeeded in gaining a two-month reprieve.
By mid-April the border commission had returned to Cairo and the Egyptian government finished its study of the report. It was now time to resume business with the Italians. Rome had placed considerable confidence in the British ability to prevail upon the Egyptians to recognise the Anglo-Italian understanding over Al-Jaghbub. The Italian negotiators were, thus, surprised to hear from their Egyptian counterparts that they knew nothing of such an agreement and were only aware that "there had been preliminary negotiations between the Italian and British ministers of foreign affairs over Egypt's western borders at a time when Egypt was still under the British protectorate. The British government had asked the opinion of the Egyptian government on the subject, to which Cairo never responded."
On 23 May Al-Ahram reported that Mussolini declared his government had insisted on more than one occasion that Al-Jaghbub must be included within Libya's eastern border and that it was preparing to enter decisive negotiations that would conclude the dispute by political means. The implied threat, in view of earlier British commitments to the Italians, was not lost on the Egyptians and on 8 July, in response to more British pressure, the Egyptian cabinet appointed Minister of Interior Ismail Sidqi to head the negotiating team.
Thus, in mid-August, the "tiger of Egyptian politics," as Sidqi was dubbed, travelled to Rome to meet Mussolini, after which he announced in a press statement that an Egyptian-Italian committee would be formed to study the border question in the second half of October. The summer holiday season was the reason he gave for the two-month delay.
In Egypt's Western Border, Fatma Alameddin Abdel-Wahid discusses the negotiations, which did begin in October, in considerable detail. It becomes clear that Sidqi was not only a tiger but a fox. When he realised he had no alternative but to accept the British-Italian agreement over Al-Jaghbub, the cunning Egyptian statesman countered with several demands: the border was to be pushed seven kilometres westward; certain places were to be respected as sites of religious worship with free access to Muslims from Libya and Egypt and into which Italians would not be permitted to enter; and Italy would guarantee the security of the Egyptian frontier against possible Bedouin raids from Al-Jaghbub.
Although the Italians agreed to the last two demands, as did Ziwar under British pressure, Sidqi refused to put his name to an agreement that did not meet the first demand as well. His stand, however, was overruled. On 6 December, the prime minister met with senior foreign affairs officials, then held a cabinet meeting, after which he made his way to the royal palace. Just before 8.00pm, the Italian representative in Cairo arrived. Precisely 20 minutes later, at 8.20, the two sides signed the agreement over Egypt's western border. Shortly afterwards, the first secretary of the high commissioner's office stopped by to make sure things were going smoothly, then returned to Dubara Palace to inform his superior that all had proceeded according to plan.
If the high commissioner was pleased with the outcome, the same cannot be said of Egyptian public opinion which protested this surrender to a pact concluded by colonial powers. Under the headline, "On Al-Jaghbub Oasis," Abdel-Rahman Azzam, who was to become secretary-general of the Arab League and a close friend of the Senussis, wrote, "With the disappearance of Al-Jaghbub from the map of Egypt gone, too, is Egyptian peace and security. Now more than ever before we must rely on British assistance. Can the Egyptians understand that? Did British politicians plan this? Did our current ministry really salvage what it could? Now is the time for the nation to wake up!"
No less incensed was Mohamed Shawqi El-Khatib, a parliamentary delegate from Al-Santa, who proclaimed that the oasis would "remain Egyptian spiritually, morally and physically." He continues, "While it may have been severed from Egypt by force, the hearts of its populace will continue to be bound to their country and there will come a day when the colonialists will return to their lairs and the vanquished nations will enjoy their freedom and independence."
Indeed, even the well-known satirist Fikri Abaza found himself unable to inject his customary levity into the subject. "Adieu Al-Jaghbub," Abaza wrote. "Farewell to the trust Islam had put in Muslim Egypt's hands. Farewell to the meeting point for neighbours and brothers, to the refuge for visitors and pilgrims. Good-bye, may you rest in peace."
The popular outcry extended beyond the pages of the press and onto the street. Students from the College of Education, Dar Al-Ulum, the School of Commerce, Saadiya and Giza Secondary Schools, the Coptic, Ismailia and Al-Rashad schools and the Faculty of Fine Arts staged big and angry demonstrations against the agreement. The demonstrations did not mark the end of the affair. The agreement signed on 6 December 1925 has never been ratified by an Egyptian parliament.
* The author is a professor of history and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre.
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