28 Dec. 2000 - 3 Jan. 2001
Issue No.514
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 28 Dec. 2000 - 3 Jan. 2001 Issue No.514 |
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| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Current issue | Previous issue | Site map | ||
Will Bush make a difference?
United States-Arab relations are currently under serious strain. This is born of the US bias toward Israel, anger over the mounting Palestinian death toll and frustration with what appears to be a dead-end policy towards Iraq.
In this context, some Arabs harbour the feeling that a Bush administration might be more responsive to Arab concerns than the previous government. This attitude is based not so much on conviction or evidence as on assumption. Neither the Republican Party platform nor the Middle East policy positions expressed by George W Bush during the campaign can justify a belief that a Bush presidency will be better for the Arab world.
To put it quite simply, the sense that a Bush presidency will be more pro-Arab derives from the assumption that the Texas Governor and his vice-presidential running mate, Dick Cheney, are the heirs of the George Herbert Walker Bush legacy.
Gore, on the other hand, was not seen as continuing a Clinton legacy. President Clinton had developed a positive image in some quarters in the Arab world. In the aftermath of the failed Camp David summit, however, the president lost some of his lustre. But even those who once held Clinton in a positive light did not extend that to Al Gore. The vice president was defined more by his earlier speeches promoting US-Israeli relations than by his partnership with Bill Clinton in the search for a Middle East peace.
During the long presidential campaign, both candidates made interesting moves to reposition themselves on Middle East issues. George W Bush initially sought to distance himself from his father's legacy. Most of his early advisers were either hard core neo-conservatives or former Reagan officials. In his initial policy speeches, the Texas Governor struck a fairly consistent pro-Israel tone. In appearances before Jewish audiences he promised to move the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and even criticised the Clinton administration for putting too much pressure on Israel.
Later in the campaign, however, Bush moved his views more towards the centre, downplaying the embassy issue and expressing more support for Clinton's efforts. After the outbreak of Israeli violence against the Palestinian people, both Bush and Cheney made near identical statements blaming the Palestinians for the violence and pledging support for Israel, but on one occasion Bush acknowledged the importance of US ties to a number of Arab allies. This was grasped by some in the Arab world as evidence of Bush's sense of balance.
Gore, on the other hand, sought to move ever so slightly in the opposite direction. He maintained that he would not move the US embassy to Jerusalem unless it was agreed to by both Israelis and Palestinians (although he acknowledged he believed that such an agreement and move would ultimately take place). And he startled an American Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobby) conference by concluding his address before them with a long appeal for the US to reach out to the broader Arab and Muslim world to achieve greater understanding. When Gore met Arab Americans, he affirmed his friendship with Israel but noted, as well, that during the past eight years he had developed friendships with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Authority.
Governor Bush's appointment of fellow Texas oilman and former Bush Cabinet member Dick Cheney as his running mate reinforced the view of some Arabs that, despite his words, he would be a friend. In a similar vein, Gore's appointment of Senator Joseph Lieberman only reinforced Arab fears of Gore's pro-Israel leanings.
An Arab friend recently defined one Arab view of this contest as not so much a race between the Republican Texas governor and the Democratic vice-president as one between "Daddy Bush and Joe Lieberman".
Even as both Gore and Lieberman attempted to reach out to Arab Americans, they had difficulties convincing some people of their good intentions. In the end, Bush's efforts were praised, while Gore's were dismissed as insignificant. The events of the post-election period only served to play out similar perceptions. Bush's appointment of former Bush Secretary of State James Baker to head his team in Florida and his discussion with the former Bush administration Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell brought comfort to those Arabs who saw these moves as validating their hopes that a George W Bush administration would be a reincarnation of his father's White House.
Al Gore, on the other hand, became even more suspect to those who expressed concern that the uncounted votes Gore wanted to add to his tally came from Jewish areas of Florida, and also included an unknown number of absentee ballots from US citizens living in Israel.
These are perceptions, and are not necessarily based on fact. Indeed, most US analysts believe there would be little difference in the actual Middle East policies pursued by either a Bush or Gore administration. The Clinton administration inherited from the Bush administration both a flawed Middle East peace process that included separate Israel-centered tracks with no PLO participation, and an unforgiving sanctions policy against Iraq. They managed both situations by adhering to a bipartisan set of tactics and goals -- doing very little that was different from the policies set by their predecessors.
So, too, the next administration, for better or worse, will inherit the same two conflicts and the same failed bipartisan approach on how to deal with them. Unless there is a dramatic reassessment of American Middle East policy and a strong leadership push from the Bush administration to challenge both Congress and the failed bipartisan approach to the region, they will end up dealing with Middle East issues in much the same way as the previous two administrations.
The reality is that Bush will not be the Arab saviour, nor was Gore going to be the demon. But in foreign policy as in domestic politics, perception is reality.
And so Bush will now most likely be given a short honeymoon in the Arab world. Given the crisis in US-Arab relations and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he will need to carve out a new policy. He will, however, be given, for a time, the benefit of the doubt as he finds his way.
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