Al-Ahram Weekly On-line
28 Dec. 2000 - 3 Jan. 2001
Issue No.514
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Picking at the policy details

By Mohamed Hakki

Mohamed Hakki The two major factors that will determine President-elect George W Bush's Middle East policy are his choice of advisors and his capacity to stand up to the domestic Zionist lobby in an attempt to establish a more balanced US perspective.

Bush's choice of advisors augurs well for the future. Vice presidential nominee, Richard Cheney, is an old hand in Middle Eastern politics. A former secretary of defense, he has travelled extensively in the region and is well acquainted with key Arab leaders. He understands the nuts and bolts of this highly volatile conflict.

The nominee for secretary of state, General Colin Powell, also brings considerable experience to the job. Powell served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Bush and Clinton. He is not known to be an ardent supporter of Israel, and it would seem unlikely that he will give Israel the green light to pursue its aggressive policies in the region that has been permanently on for so long under previous administrations.

Bush's choice of Condoleezza Rice as national security advisor has also been warmly received by some Arab analysts, who regard her as relatively well informed and objective. Accordingly, concerned Arab politicians should welcome her appointment as national security advisor, since she may be less likely than others to undermine the validity of the Arab position on Palestine.

It is within this context of incorporating an apparently broad spectrum of opinion that the president-elect's choice of advisors has met with approval in some Arab circles. It is hardly surprising that, following the Clinton Administration's unflinching support of Israel over the past eight years, some Arab analysts believe that the Bush presidency offers the prospect of a light at the end of the tunnel.

A number of prominent Arab commentators, however, disagree that George W Bush should so soon be welcomed as a potentially more even-handed mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and contend that his policies may not be markedly different from those that would have been adopted by Vice President Al Gore. This line of argument stresses that it would be naive of Arabs to expect any American president to alter the foundations of Washington's special relationship with the Israel: any changes, this argument goes, will be merely cosmetic.

As true as this may be, it should nevertheless be noted that Bush did not bend over backwards to satisfy the Jewish lobby during his campaign. In that sense, he distanced himself from Gore, who pledged to turn the US upside down if necessary so that it could continue to see eye-to-eye with Israel.

Of course, Washington's interests in the Middle East go far beyond the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Washington's relations with North African countries, the conflict with Libya, and the unfinished business of the continuing US-imposed embargo on Iraq are all vital US security concerns, as is having unlimited access to oil in the Gulf. However, the Palestinian conflict and Iraq continue to take centre stage.

For instance, in a unprecedented bipartisan plan for national security offered by the prestigious Rand Think Tank, only the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq are listed as vital US strategic concerns in the region. The report states that, should the violence continue, it would be imperative for the US to immediately bring a halt to hostilities. At the diplomatic level, the plan advises the US to thoroughly review alternatives, establish a qualified negotiating team and clarify the US's infallible commitment to defending Israel's security. The report moreover urges Bush to intervene personally on all levels.

Similar advice is dished out regarding Iraq. The report stipulates that if Saddam Hussein continues to provoke the US, the US should continue with its aggressive stance against the Iraqi state and intensify its bombing campaigns against strategic Iraqi targets -- all to demonstrate the US's resolve to deter any further challenges. Persisting with the policy first launched by former President George Bush, the US strategy is basically to continue bombing Iraq into submission or to encourage the overthrow of Saddam Hussein himself.

History tells us a great deal about how to stand up to the Zionist lobby. Senator William Fulbright has told me how in 1975, at the time of a reassessment of Middle Eastern policy, he went to President Ford and asked him to ignore the Zionist lobby in the US and maintain a policy of non-alignment regarding Israel. Fulbright argued that his support for Israel would not guarantee him the Jewish-American vote.

"I told him that, if he stood his ground, he would win the presidency. But if he succumbed to their pressure, he would most probably lose anyway."

Ford, noted Fulbright, ultimately got cold feet, and was clobbered in the election.

"George W Bush does not owe his victory to any ethnic, religious or ideological group for whom the US's Middle East policies are a consuming passion," said John Duke Anthony, president of the National Council on US-Arab relations. Consequently, he can wipe the slate clean, and have a fresh start.

Related stories:
Will Bush make a difference?
In the end 14 - 20 December 2000
Desperate measures 7 -13 December 2000
Keeping the populace entertained 7 -13 December 2000

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