Al-Ahram Weekly On-line
4 - 10 January 2001
Issue No.515
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 Current issue | Previous issue | Site map

In pursuit of clarity

By Ibrahim Nafie

Ibrahim NafieUS proposals for a settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are disturbingly ambiguous on all the final status issues. One would have thought that the Clinton administration, in its last days of power, would have made a bolder attempt to bring the parties closer to a solution in order to end the violence between them and to improve Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's electoral prospects. It is also disturbing that neither the US or Israel appears to have comprehended the significance of the Palestinian Intifada.

The "Clinton proposals" are consistent with neither the frame of reference established in Madrid nor international resolutions pertaining to this conflict. Indeed, they are little more than a fine-tuning of ideas the US and Israel presented at Camp David II, and blithely ignore what the Intifada has made clear: that the Palestinians refuse to let Israel's overwhelming military might dictate the terms of any settlement and that Palestinian rights are not a gift that Israel may or may not withhold subject to electoral considerations in Israel or the US.

The recent US proposals fall far short of the principles that should govern a final and lasting settlement. Although the proposals on Jerusalem reflect a keener awareness of the sensitivity of this central issue to Palestinians and to Muslim and Christian Arabs in general, they nevertheless fail to fully recognise the Palestinians' sacred and non-negotiable rights. In Camp David II, Barak insisted on retaining Israeli sovereignty over Old Jerusalem, conceding to the Palestinians only a safe corridor to the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Under the recent proposals the Palestinians would be accorded sovereignty over East Jerusalem, with the exception of the Jewish quarter, the Western Wall and the Jewish neighbourhoods built in East Jerusalem since 1967. East Jerusalem would become the capital of the Palestinian state and an international peace-keeping force would supervise the city. But if the proposal represents an important qualitative shift on the issue, it still remains far too vague, not least over the demarcation of areas which would be outside Palestinian authority.

Clinton's proposals on the refugee issue remain remarkably close to the Israeli position, which refuses the Palestinians any right of return. The US president suggested that the question could be resolved by allowing first generation refugees to return to areas near their original homes in Israel on the condition that they recognise Israeli sovereignty and live peacefully, while the offspring of these refugees would be permitted to return to the Palestinian state and live in the settlements relinquished by Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. Clinton also made some vague references to compensation for the refugees from the IMF.

While the US holds that this solution would be a feasible implementation of UN resolution 181, it is still too ambiguous on the question of compensation and, more importantly, it represents a very loose reading of a UN General Assembly resolution that stipulates the right of all -- not just "first generation" -- refugees to return to their homes and properties or to obtain appropriate compensation. Moreover, Israel must ultimately assume the full moral onus for expelling the Palestinians. Resolving the refugee problem is not merely a compelling humanitarian issue, it is crucial to a comprehensive, lasting peace.

On security the Clinton proposals focused almost exclusively on Israel's requirements, calling for the disarmament of the nascent Palestinian state with the exception of a civilian police force and national guard to preserve public order, continued security cooperation between the two sides in order to combat terrorism, and the need to promote peaceful coexistence and to prevent all forms of provocation to violence and hatred in schools and the media. The emphasis on Israel's security needs is most ironic. With its enormous military and nuclear arsenal it is difficult to lend credence to its fears of a weak and newly formed Palestinian state, all the more so as Israel has always been the aggressor, usurping Palestinian and Arab land, brutally suppressing the Intifada, relentlessly meting out collective punishment to the Palestinian people through economic blockades.

Not only should the Clinton proposals be more balanced on security issues, any agreement that stands a hope of promoting peaceful coexistence must provide for the prosecution of Israeli criminals of war responsible for the countless atrocities perpetrated against the Palestinian people.

Clinton was particularly elusive on the question of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, suggesting only "some minor modifications to the borders between the two sides" and "the possibility of exchanges in land." No details were given, although some reports indicate that Israel would withdraw from 95 per cent of the occupied territories.

It is odd that the US and Israel imagine that the PA is so eager to reach a settlement before Clinton leaves office, and bank on such an eagerness rather than assessing the extent to which their proposals meet the conditions of UN resolutions. Nothing could be more indicative of gross negligence and lack of earnestness than to subject such crucial negotiations to domestic political considerations inside Israel. The fate of millions depends upon an appropriate settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is the primary issue, one that should never be subordinated to Barak's electoral concerns and popularity ratings. Indeed, the way in which Israel and the US handle it is a test of Israel's commitment to peace with the Palestinians and the Arabs and of the US's dedication to peace and security in the Middle East.

For these reasons, it is perfectly understandable that Arafat should ask the US administration to clarify its proposals, while the US's demand that the PA should agree in principle first before asking for clarifications must be one of the most absurd stances in the history of diplomacy. But most important of all, the US and Israel must recognise the new realities engendered by the Intifada. Failure to do so will mean it is virtually impossible to reach a just and lasting end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

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