4 - 10 January 2001
Issue No.515
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 4 - 10 January 2001 Issue No.515 |
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The Brothers strike back
The past year was highly significant for the Muslim Brotherhood. The parliamentary elections had an impact greater than any other development of the past year, if not the past decade, while the republication of Haydar Haydar's A Banquet for Seaweed was the most formidable crisis to confront the Islamist trend in general, and the Brotherhood in particular.
The wave of protest over the novel, in which the Brotherhood played a prominent role, erupted precisely as the largest Islamist grouping in Egypt had announced that it intended to take part in the parliamentary elections. Government and certain political elite circles were already uneasy about the Brotherhood's decision to participate in the polls. Further augmenting these apprehensions was the Brotherhood spokesman's statement that the organisation, still illegal in Egypt, was determined to assert its presence as the country's largest and most influential opposition force, even if it did not win seats in parliament. Indeed, this objective may have been one of the main reasons why the Brotherhood, alongside the Labour Party, its main political ally, engaged so energetically in the campaign against the novel. Here, it seemed, was an opening for its campaign, especially other sectors of public opinion found the novel deeply offensive to Islam and Islamic sensibilities.
The Brotherhood leadership, however, had not anticipated that the crisis would escalate as it did, leading to the closure of the Labour Party's newspaper, Al-Shaab, not to mention the dissolution of the party itself, and, consequently, to the loss of a public forum the Brotherhood would find it almost impossible to replace.
Despite this setback, the Brotherhood entered the elections with such vitality that seven of its 80 candidates won parliamentary seats. This was a remarkable feat by any standards. Not only has the organisation been under considerable pressure; in 1995, and more so last year, it became the target of a concerted security and media strategy to undermine its performance at the polls. Arrests and trials hampered its prospects in at least two respects. The pressure placed it so on the defensive that it lost much of its ability to manoeuvre; simultaneously, prison terms took many of its most promising candidates out of the race.
Still, the fact that the Brotherhood won only one seat in 1995, in contrast to the extraordinary outcome of the most recent elections, suggests that several other factors were at work. I believe that there were at least five such factors, three strategic and two pertaining to the new circumstances surrounding these past elections. Of the first set, there were the Brotherhood's nomination criteria. Apart from a few nationally reputed figures, this time around most of the organisation's candidates were carefully selected for their potential appeal at the local level. Not only did these candidates enjoy a reasonable degree of local popularity, the fact that they were not national Brotherhood symbols alleviated the attention that would normally have been brought to bear on more widely-known candidates.
Also working in the candidates' favour was the Brotherhood's effort to allay the impression that it was conducting a single, nation-wide campaign. It never officially announced an electoral list or adopted a party platform or slogan, as it had done in the previous elections. The impression that its candidates were running independently was reinforced by the absence of official campaign headquarters. Again, this strategy helped to alleviate government pressure; the candidates appeared to be conducting independent campaigns, as though their only common factor was their ideological position, rather than their organisational affiliation.
The third internal factor was the Brotherhood's media strategy. The campaign began without fanfare, so as not to provoke the government. It was then built up gradually, in a way calculated to convey the impression that there was no centralised direction, thus buffering candidates from potential interference immediately before and during the voting process. Simultaneously, the candidates made extensive use of all available media, particularly the foreign-based press, and put out information that would ensure the greatest coverage possible.
As for the general circumstances surrounding last year's elections, full judicial supervision of the polls was a major determinant of the Brotherhood's success. Voter turnout rates returned to normal levels, which in turn enhanced the prospects of the candidates best able to mobilise their supporters. The Brotherhood proved adept at exploiting these new circumstances. Its candidates also had the advantage of considerable organisational expertise and cohesion, furnishing them close and sustained contact with fellow MPs and their supporters.
The second external factor was the voting pattern. It is clear that the NDP lost many seats because a significant proportion of voters had decided to cast their ballot for any candidate not affiliated with the ruling party. The Brotherhood candidates were certain to reap at least some of the spill-over from this "punitive vote" -- a phenomenon that may have been a direct outcome of the general impartiality and integrity that characterised the elections.
*The writer is managing editor of the annual State of Religion in Egypt Report, issued by the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
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