22 - 28 February 2001
Issue No.522
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 22 - 28 February 2001 Issue No.522 |
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Governing paralysis
Israel's system of government has been eroded by the failure of the politico-military establishment to provide real leadership and the refusal of the electorate to insist that politicians must be accountable for their actions.
An opinion article published last weekend in the right-wing Jerusalem Post was headed, "Left, Right, no hope in sight," while another in Ha'aretz called upon the public to demand of problematic politicians: "Did you fail? Did you screw up our lives? Did you shatter our dreams? Then go! Scoot! Scram! Don't call us. And we won't call you."
The elevation of Likud leader Ariel Sharon to the prime ministry demonstrates just how far democracy has deteriorated in the country which takes pride in being "the only democracy" in the Middle East.
Sharon "won" the 6 February poll by securing the votes of 1.6 million of Israel's 4.5 million voters, 35 per cent of the electorate. This was the lowest number of votes ever cast for a prime minister or his party. Only 60 per cent of the electorate voted instead of the 79-80 per cent which normally participate in Israeli national elections. The 40 per cent which abstained did so out of apathy or rejection of both candidates. A substantial number of those who voted for Labour's Ehud Barak in 1999 cast their ballots for Sharon this time round. They did so because they were completely disgusted and disillusioned with Barak, the man who promised peace and brought war. This hardly constitutes a ringing endorsement of Sharon or his policies.
Aware of the weakness of his mandate, Sharon opted to form a "national unity government" and invited the Labour party to participate. This amounted to a negation of democracy, which cannot function properly without a credible opposition. If successful in forming a unity coalition, Sharon would transform the Knesset, which is supposed to assess the programmes of the government, into a rubber stamp for its policies.
The early acceptance of Sharon's offer by key politicians in the Labour Party, an unnatural ally of the right-wing Likud, signified that Labour had abandoned its ideology, policies and, indeed, its very raison d'être.
The national unity formula demonstrated to Israel's voters that their political leaders operate within a enchanted circle and are more interested in holding on to power than in implementing specific programmes. This creates popular contempt not only for the political caste but also for the democratic system of governance.
Sharon's elevation, in itself, violates the intention of the 1996 law for the direct election of the prime minister. The purpose of this law was to strengthen the hand of the prime minister as head of the ruling party vis-à-vis small parliamentary factions, particularly ultra-nationalist and religious groupings on which coalition governments are compelled to depend for a majority in the 120-seat Knesset. Sharon should not have been in a position to stand because he is not the leader of the largest Knesset faction; the Likud has only 19 seats in the house while Labour has 24.
To make matters worse, instead of opting for a unity government of four groupings -- Likud, Labour, the Sephardi Shas party and one of the religious parties -- Sharon tried to construct a broad coalition. While Likud, Labour and Shas were to be the foundation, one seat each had been reserved to reward half a dozen small factions which supported Sharon's bid for the top job. Such a coalition would be unwieldy and unstable, held hostage by these disparate and demanding factions.
Once the voters' verdict was in, Barak, who captured only 37 per cent of the votes cast, did the democratic thing and announced his resignation from the leadership of his party and from his seat in parliament. Ignoring the electorate's repudiation of Barak, Sharon promptly offered him the defence portfolio. As Chemi Shalev of Israel's mass circulation daily Ma'ariv quipped: "The voters rejected Barak as prime minister and got him as defence minister." But the quip does not quite tell the whole story because Barak held the defence portfolio in the outgoing government as well as the prime ministry. One of the electorate's main reasons for rejecting Barak was his failure, as defence minister, to provide security from Palestinian insurgents.
Sharon rebuffed the electorate a second time by offering the foreign ministry to former Labour Prime Minister Shimon Peres, a politician who never won an election.
Like Sharon, Barak did not draw the logical conclusions from his stunning defeat. He suspended his resignation, in what one Israeli commentator called a dramatic "back flip with a double twist," capping his usual behaviour of zigzagging between one policy and another. While in a state of suspended resignation, Barak not only accepted the proffered defence portfolio but also committed Labour to a unity government without consulting the party bureau. Adding insult to injury, Barak conducted direct coalition negotiations with Sharon, sidelining the team the party set up for this purpose.
Sharon took the decisions to form a coalition with Labour and to offer Barak and Peres a choice of defence, foreign affairs and finance without consulting colleagues in the Likud. Consequently, Sharon has been accused by angry Likudniks of adhering to the practice of "one man rule" adopted by his two predecessors, Binyamin Netanyahu and Barak. This contradicts Israel's parliamentary system of government. Although elected directly by the populace rather than on a party list, the prime minister remains answerable to his party and should consult both its hierarchy and Knesset faction before taking decisions.
In a flagrant display of contempt for the rule of law, Sharon also decided to appoint 28-30 ministers, in violation of the current limit of 24 in the cabinet. Eighteen months ago Sharon castigated Barak for expanding the government from 18 to 24 ministers.
Sharon decreed that Likud and Labour should each have seven portfolios and the third largest grouping, the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox Shas party, should have four. High-ranking Likudniks, Sharon's rivals in the party, were furious: they wanted senior portfolios for themselves. But he preferred to exclude his colleagues and secure the loyalty of coalition partners by giving them influential positions.
Nehemia Strasler, writing in Ha'aretz on 15 February, said that Sharon, like Netanyahu and Barak, suffers from an ailment called the "prime minister syndrome." Its symptoms include a ballooning ego and belief that a premier can do what he pleases because he has been chosen directly by the people on the basis of "personal merits and not because [a] rival... failed... [P]arties have become a burden, the Knesset an irritation." This is the way, Plato said, "democracy passes into despotism."
So far Sharon has been able to placate leading figures from his own party but right-wing allies express the fear that if he forms a coalition with Labour, he will renege on pledges to maintain his hard-line positions on Jerusalem, Jewish settlements and the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees.
Barak faced a bitter revolt by left-wing members of his party. Outgoing Justice Minister Yossi Beilin, the leading Labour "dove" and architect of the Oslo accords, accused those who support a unity coalition of being ready to "sell their souls and kill off the peace process." Outgoing Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami, another "dove," also opposed the unity option. They were backed up by the "Young Guard," idealistic youth who have campaigned vigorously for the peace process. While mainstream and right-wing Labourites supported a unity coalition, they were divided over whether the defeated Barak should have a role in the new government.
Ironically, Sharon and Barak argued that Israel would achieve strength through unity in spite of the fact that previous unity coalitions have been "governments of national paralysis" unable to take decisions. A new unity coalition would conform to this pattern: Likud and Labour adopted vague policy guidelines which could be interpreted to suit either or both sides. The main point on which they agreed is that the quest for a final settlement with the Palestinians would be abandoned and that the objective of negotiations should be long-term "interim arrangements." The sensitive issues of Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, borders and resources would be shelved while the two sides would move towards implementing outstanding provisions of agreements ratified by the Knesset. These guidelines constitute a formula for deciding nothing of importance. If the unity option fails and Sharon is compelled to form a right-wing coalition, he has said he would adopt similar policy guidelines. Whether he forms a unity or right-wing coalition, Sharon has made it clear he will crack down harder than ever on the Palestinian Intifada. Therefore, whatever happens, his government is unlikely to bring an end to Palestinian unrest and could, instead, escalate and widen the circle of conflict.
* Michael Jansen is a Nicosia, Cyprus-based British journalist who writes extensively on Middle East politics. Her latest book, Dissonance in Zion, was published in London and Beirut.
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