26 April - 2 May 2001
Issue No.531
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Al-Ahram Weekly On-line 26 April - 2 May 2001 Issue No.531 |
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A Middle East perspective
Plural identities and common values
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed was asked to deliver a paper this week on the issue of "Plural identities and common values" at the Vilnius UNESCO conference on the Dialogue of Civilisations. Here are excerpts from his paper
If the dichotomy plural identities/common values is to be used as a system of reference, three models are worth comparing:
(1) A stable model, that of the United States of America, the one remaining superpower, which has not been subject to change from the structural and institutional points of view throughout modern history.
(2) A model undergoing change in the positive direction, namely, that of the European Union, with the United States of Europe as its ultimate goal. It is a process still in the making, moving from the level of the individual state as the basic unit to a level transcending states as independent identities, but without a clear vision yet of how far integration can go, and what meaning integration will have.
(3) A model undergoing change in the negative direction, i.e., in the opposite direction of model 2, namely, that of the Soviet Union, disintegrating into what has come to be described as a looser constellation of states, the Commonwealth of Independent States, representing the decomposition of a given identity, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, into a mesh of states whose common denominator is mainly a common past (the Chechen episode proves that we are not at the end of the process of disintegration yet).
These three models reveal a continuum that extends from purely negative experiments to what promise to be positive ones. Of course, more models could be mentioned. China and India are closer to model 1. Extended to Canada (including Quebec) northwards, and to Mexico southwards, an integrated North/Central America could become a special variant of model 2.
It is worth noting that the construction process underway in model 2 is somehow related to the deconstruction process underway in model 3. Eastern Europe is being detached from the former Warsaw Pact camp to become part of the European Union and NATO. The breakdown of the Soviet Union brought to an end the bipolar world order and has apparently replaced it with a unipolar world order under US leadership. But to what extent do contemporary developments confirm that we are moving from bipolarity to unipolarity, from a world of plural identities to a world of common values?
The bipolar world order was marked by deep polarisation between two sets of values: those bred by capitalism and those bred by communism. As both sets of values belong to the two victorious forces against fascism in World War II, both enjoyed legitimacy despite their mutually-exclusive nature. That was what peaceful coexistence was all about.
But today it is not only fascism that has been vanquished but also communism, giving rise to the "end of history" theory. Yet, as long as deep discrepancies divide the world into rich and poor, privileged and deprived, developed and underdeveloped, it is difficult to talk about a uniform, unipolar, world order devoid of contradictions. The West portrays the states opposed to a unipolar capitalist system, which it accuses of rejecting the values of democracy, human rights and a market economy, as rogue states which resort to violence and shelter terrorists. One can hence conclude that a counter-pole has emerged, reminding us that bipolarity has not vanished, even if bipolarity based on equal legitimacy for two mutually hostile poles has disappeared.
If bipolarity continues to dominate the human condition, how can we agree on a universal value system acceptable to the whole of humankind? Neither the "terrorist-illegitimate," nor, for that matter, the "legitimate," pole, satisfy the necessary conditions. A Bin-Laden-like terrorist International would certainly not satisfy values that humankind's mainstream can identify with. But this applies just as much to the "legitimate" world pole, which engenders frustration, alienation, marginalisation and exploitation. A critical threshold still separates a happy few who make their breakthrough into the ranks of the privileged of our world, those who identify with present values and ideals and for whom these values are in fact created, from the vast majority who never reach that threshold and are indefinitely kept below it.
A "third way" needs to be devised. Although the term Third Way has often been used, every Third Way scenario so far has been more concerned with procedure than substance. One characteristic of the desired Third Way would be its ability to eliminate terrorism, as well as reasons for frustration and alienation which eventually lead to violence. Full-fledged democracy is an unavoidable ingredient, a necessary if not sufficient condition, for a genuine implementation of a Third Way.
Moreover, a Third Way should not only be a "compromise," even a "historical compromise," but should be some form of dépassement, a "non-zero sum game plus" where all parties win, not a "zero sum game" (with winners and losers), nor, a fortiori, a "non-zero sum game minus" (with only losers). The plurality of parties, of identities, should find themselves integrated into common values, i.e., into values which strengthen the bonds between humankind in all its diversity. Common values should be all-encompassing, all-inclusive, for the welfare of the human species as a whole.
All humankind should get an opportunity to cross the critical threshold. This will require a new type of relationship between subjects and objects of history. Conditions that make a human being an object, a commodity, should not be allowed to stand in the way of his promotion into the status of a subject, of a citizen, of a maker of history. We all are, each with a specific mix of his own, both subjects and objects of history. The mix gets more and more complex as we add new factors to the equation: the ecological, the bio-ethical, cloning, the threat of self-annihilation, etc. The Third Way we envisage would create conditions to guarantee that the status of every individual as a subject of history will always take precedence over his/her status as an object of history. The implementation of such a momentous project stands at the heart of human emancipation as we move into the third millennium.
How does all this apply to the Middle East situation? Where does the Middle East stand along the scale of the previously-mentioned models? With the peace process currently in shambles, are we witnessing in the Middle East some specific form of model 3, or is it a model of its own that cannot be integrated into any of the previous ones?
The Middle East conflict was triggered by the creation of a state, Israel, peopled largely by immigrants from other regions of the world. The new state was established in the aim of solving the Jewish problem, as represented in the persecution of Jews in Europe (first in Eastern Europe, then in Germany under Hitler). Israel is still perceived by the Arab inhabitants of the region as an alien body, which denies any solution to the Palestinian problem, despite a peace process that has been underway for decades.
Israelis proceed from two fundamental, premises: according to a first school of thought, advocated by Sharon and Netanyahu, peace is impossible. The survival of Israel depends on its crushing military and technological superiority over all the Arab states taken together. According to the second school of thought, this approach is not equipped to face unforeseeable eventualities and, therefore, a peace alternative is indispensable for Israel's survival. Peres, the main advocate of the second school, calls for offsetting antagonism due to two conflicting "nationalisms" (Zionism versus pan-Arabism) by developing complementarity through a Middle East market. The progress or regression of the peace process determines which of these two schools has the upper hand at every specific moment.
A mirror image of these two scenarios has developed on the Arab side. Because peace is impossible, a strong constituency in the Arab world is for delaying the final outcome of the conflict to a future time when the balance of power will be more to the Arabs' advantage. But there is no guarantee that the situation will improve rather than deteriorate still further. Especially in a globalised unipolar world that will not tolerate conflicts emanating from critical hot spots that threaten world peace and security. Neither Israelis nor Arabs (including Palestinians) can afford to see the Other as an object of history. So a dépassement is necessary, i.e., just the opposite of what Sharon is now doing.
What applies to the world at large applies to the Middle East as well.
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