31 May - 6 June 2001
Issue No.536
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 31 May - 6 June 2001 Issue No.536 |
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Between quagmire and quandary
No matter how brutal, Sharon, it is now clear, cannot deliver on his promise. Ahmed Abdel-Halim contemplates his next move
Perhaps the Israelis are beginning to realise that what is happening on the ground is their own doing. They placed Sharon at the helm, and they must bear the consequences, which threaten to embroil the region in a new round of hostilities, more complex and devastating than ever before. It must be clear to them by now that Sharon is not about to choose the road to peace and security. The Arabs, on the other hand, are beyond being disillusioned. Regardless of who they must deal with, the Arabs know their rights: Jerusalem, repatriation, settlements, borders, and water. They have negotiated with Begin, Shamir, Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu, Barak and now Sharon. They know what the Israelis are willing to offer; they have long been prepared for the final status talks, which they know will be difficult.
Further analysis requires that we define a few concepts frequently bandied about in political circles. The idea of a "peaceful settlement" to the Arab-Israeli conflict seems to fluctuate between peace and settlement. This is not just a question of terminology; vague concepts often underlie an uncertain approach, which fact is paramount to an understanding of the structural obstacles to a settlement of the conflict today.
Peace, a priori, implies the elimination of causes of war. It generates approaches that transcend many details, and result in decisions that can virtually redefine the identity of a political community and its relation to the other. Once that has occurred, the process develops positively, overflowing into all other aspects of life.
Settlement, on the other hand, means to relinquish, if only temporarily, the option of war, and to deal with the given parameters in the conflict. This requires partial adjustment and the acceptance of some of the other party's demands in an attempt to improve on the present. A settlement may develop within the available space, and can serve to expand and capitalise on common interests. On the other hand, a settlement can also come up against obstacles if issues are left unresolved. If one party threatens to impose its terms by force, it could trigger an armed conflict that will sweep away the settlement's very foundations.
There are limits to the use of force, just as there are limits to the use of deterrence. Israel's deterrence tactics were elaborated for use in situations of total belligerence. They are therefore unsuitable in addressing localised tension like the Intifada or Hizbullah operations in southern Lebanon. The "erosion" of its deterrence capability, and the consequent damage to its prestige, have not gone unnoticed in Israel. In fact, they have driven Sharon quite around the bend. By attempting to restore his deterrence capability and the state's image, he resorted to extreme force; his colleagues chimed in with threats to blow up the High Dam and reoccupy Sinai.
Using a massive and extremely sophisticated arsenal against a popular uprising is not the same as using it in situations of armed conflict or total war; indeed, Israel's readiness to bring out the heavy artillery could tip the conflict into open or total regional warfare -- precisely Sharon's dilemma. If he decides to expand operations, the military and political situation will explode and spiral out of control following the domino theory. New regional and international parties could be dragged into the conflict, which will expand in volume and intensity, defying all efforts at control.
Sharon is seeking a way out of his dilemma by staging a series of explosions interspersed by attempts to settle partial issues. In this manner, he believes, negotiations can be held as a continuum of disproportionate strikes and crises -- in other words, as an incoherent and continually disrupted process that neither restores peace nor leads to total war. The end result, however, is ever sharper polarisation, further erosion of Israel's credibility, and the weakening of the Palestinian Authority's influence over popular reactions to Israeli provocation. If the scenario Sharon has put in place prevails, in other words, both the conflict and any possibility of settlement will disintegrate, and further political endeavours will be stripped of the structure painstakingly put in place by various agreements. Sharon and his government will be responsible for this failure.
Sharon certainly knows that if war breaks out today, it will bear no resemblance to any conflict between Arabs and Israelis in the past. New forms of warfare exist; advances in technology and information strategy have come about. The conflict would be limited in space and time, but would inflict extremely heavy losses, since the Israelis' political and military objective is to wreak as much destruction in as short a time as possible.
These factors multiply the intensity and scope of military power deployed to realise political objectives (which could be achieved through other means). On the other hand, weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical) as well as information warfare are now used in many countries. Sharon, who is well aware of the limits to the use of military power, should consider such matters before voicing his threats and those of his friends at random.
The Israeli prime minister is facing a number of problems and he must sort them out pragmatically and realistically. He must shun slogans, which have a brief shelf life. Plans for the annexation of more land in the West Bank, the declaration of Jerusalem as the eternal united capital of Israel, and opposition to the repatriation of Palestinian refugees are not realistic. How long can Israel survive as a "Jewish state," and how much longer can it afford to pay so much for its existence? The demographic indicators alone have negative implications for Israel. It is the Zionist dream of Greater Israel that betrays the Zionist desire for absolute security.
Sharon and his government must realise that the only way to a settlement runs through an understanding of the conflict's nature, as well as the other states and communities involved.
Israel will never eliminate the Palestinians or the Arabs. Nor will it achieve a decisive and permanent military or political victory over them. The best option for it is to pursue a peaceful settlement. Driving the Palestinians to despair in the hope of achieving temporary results will inflict disasters on Israel and the region as a whole.
The "package deal" Barak offered the Palestinians at Camp David, included in Clinton's proposals, is still in Sharon's mind. The Arabs rejected it, and will reject it again. They are not dealing with individuals, but with inalienable rights and legal demands.
Attempts to make peace by falsifying facts, abandoning previous frames of reference and reneging on signed agreements can only end in disaster, or, at best, in suppression so excessive it cannot be sustained. Ironically, this is the prime ingredient in creating a total lack of security.
The idea that a settlement could be reached that grants Israel all or most of its demands is unrealistic. Only a balanced settlement can pave the way for peace in the region. In other words, a settlement must be sought within the framework of international law as embodied in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, besides other signed agreements.
Sharon was elected because he persuaded his people that he could wave a magic wand and bring peace to Israel. He never tires of trumpeting that he "knows the Arabs," and can force passivity down their throats as he pleases. The Israelis may have been lured into believing in a quick victory, and may have though Sharon was the man to clinch it at this critical juncture. Why else would they continue to adulate a man who has already failed to deliver? He may turn out to be the harbinger of Israel's doomsday. Whatever the case may be, voting for Sharon reflected precisely the degree of extremism prevailing in Israel, and the "ideological" shift that has taken place there. The Israelis are neither politically sensitive nor aware of what Sharon really is. He is still managing the situation with an occupier's mentality, sending the Arabs a message that Zionist dreams of Greater Israel are very much alive today. His verbal support for a political settlement is simply a political manoeuvre -- a respite during which Israel can gather momentum and bounce back with more immigrants imported to populate the legendary state stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates.
This is Sharon's problem. How much longer will he cling tenaciously to his illusions? The coming days will tell.
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