![]() |
Al-Ahram Weekly Online 21 - 27 June 2001 Issue No.539 |
||
| Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875 | Current issue | Previous issue | Site map | ||
Trade-offs and concrete
USAID has had several mission directors. Willard J Pearson, the current incumbent, took over his post in July 2000. Before coming to Egypt he served as USAID Mission Director to Cambodia, in which position he was responsible for programme activities in Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Burma. From 1994 to 1998 he served as Regional Director for West and Central Africa, and between 1988 to 1993 was Mission Director in Ethiopia. He spoke to Aziza Sami about the mechanics of the economic assistance programme, how Egypt and the US reconcile tensions over its implementation, and whether it is ever really possible to assess USAID activities in Egypt outside their political context
photo: Barry Iverson
To what extent can each USAID director bring his vision to the programme and have an impact on it?
The imprint of individual directors tends to be incremental in nature, rather than dramatic. It is not appropriate, permitted, or wise for an individual director to come in and in a short period of time dramatically reshape programmes that have been under way for a long period of time. Any process that happens does so gradually but persistently, and change becomes apparent over time.
How are directors appointed?
In USAID we tend to have an assignment for two years, and normally two such tours, though my predecessor, Richard Brown, was here for two years and then returned to the US; John Wesley before him remained for four years.
Are USAID's directors subject to assessment?
All of us who are in career service in the State Department, like myself, are subject to an annual evaluation process. We are required at the beginning of each year to set out specific work objectives, which we are evaluated against over the course of the year, as is the US ambassador himself. Every single officer is evaluated in this manner.
There was a move under the Clinton administration to bring USAID under the US State Department's jurisdiction. What was the reason for this initiative and how did it evolve?
The US Agency for International Development is a separate US government agency in the sense that it has its own existence as an agency apart from the State Department. However, USAID's administrator takes his policy guidance from the Secretary of State, because what we do as an agency involves administering US economic assistance as part of US foreign policy.
It is obvious that we cannot carry out this economic assistance separate and apart form American foreign policy. Senator Jesse Helmes, who has headed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since 1994 proposed that USAID be dissolved as a separate free-standing agency and be incorporated fully within the State Department. But the previous administration argued that this was not necessary, and that current arrangements were sufficient for the administrator to receive any necessary policy guidance needed from the Secretary of State. The current Secretary, Colin Powell, has reiterated that, and has said that the Bush administration is satisfied with the current arrangement and that it has no plans to formally absorb USAID into the State Department.
USAID resources disbursed to Egypt proceed from Economic Support funds, as opposed to Development Assistance. Could you clarify the distinction between these two categories?
Both these funding sources are used to carry out the same kinds of economic assistance programmes by USAID worldwide. The difference is that the money allocated under the Development Assistance (DA) category is done so, mostly on the basis of development needs, and AID takes the lead role in determining how that large world-wide budget is allocated. The money flowing from the Economic Support Fund's (ESF) account, on the other hand, is allocated on the basis of the priorities of American foreign policy. The State Department takes the lead in determining the countries to which the money is to be allocated. After the allocations in both accounts are made, there is essentially no difference in how the money is utilised. Both flow into USAID for the administering of its programmes. As it happens, the Egypt budget is from the ESF account. Money, on the other hand, going into a country like Mali or Namibia, would probably come from the DA account.
Are you saying then, that the foreign policy rationale for disbursing USAID to Egypt has not in any way impacted upon the nature of the programme?
That's right. Egypt's peace with Israel was the context upon which USAID to Egypt was justified to Congress.
Does USAID, in assessing its programmes in Egypt, submit classified reports not made available to the Egyptian government?
To the best of my knowledge, I am not aware of it. This does not mean that at sometime in the past, or possibly at sometime in the future there may not be some confidential assessments made. But I have not seen one, at least not one that has been shared with me.
Why is USAID structured to depend on US imports? Why is there no recourse to Egyptian products or experts in instances when this would favour the programme?
We do in some circumstances try to find ways to incorporate Egyptian experts and partners in the actual programme. But realistically, there are certain trade-offs involved in American foreign assistance. In order to get the broad congressional support required to fund foreign assistance, Congress has imposed certain requirements on us, and one of those is that we broadly use American contractors, and take advantage of American products.
The simple reality is that we do not, under the American foreign aid programme, operate with the same kind of worldwide procurement that international organisations like the United Nations or the World Bank might.
Cash transfer is a pivotal USAID programme aimed at encouraging economic liberalisation. How do USAID and the Egyptian government consult on the execution and progress of this programme?
The cash transfer programme has made $200 million available this year, linked to a range of policy reforms that the Egyptian government is working on. These reforms are associated with the broad economic reform agenda that the government has announced and which the prime minister discusses in his major address each year, when he delineates his government's plan. Each year, then, we sit down with the Egyptian government and identify those reform measures and actions that the government is going to be working towards. We link a certain amount of money to steps on the way to achieving the action. When those substantial policy actions are carried out, the money is released. So it is pretty simple and straightforward in that respect.
How do you assess the sector policy reform programme, which is more narrowly focused on liberalising sectors such as agriculture, maritime transport etc?
It works in somewhat the same fashion as cash transfer. Money is released as sectoral reforms are accomplished. I believe we have a successful history of agriculture sector policy reform programmes. We have worked with Minister of Agriculture Youssef Wali for a number of years on a range of reform activities in the agricultural sector. In the same way we have a health sector policy programme and one in environmental policy.
We are doing some policy reform as well in infrastructure, so that we are not just building things out of concrete but moving more towards a regulatory reform process.
In pursuing its reform policies, the Egyptian government is sometimes not able to push through liberalisation at the pace USAID would like. How are possible tensions resolved when they arise?
We try to talk about such issues as frankly as possible. To some extent, though, this begins to push the dialogue from the purely developmental area into discussions that are more diplomatic in nature. Now you are leading into the agenda where the US ambassador tends to insert himself into the discussion. You may define for yourself why it is appropriate for the ambassador to interest himself in the development agenda as well. There are times when issues become sensitive between our two countries, when policy issues are involved and it is more than just a question of dealing with technical development issues. These are issues that are associated with the relationship between our two countries. This is where the ambassador and his team, myself, and my senior team members come together to discuss some of these points.
Over the past four years, the Gore-Mubarak Partnership furnished the framework for setting the priorities for USAID. With the Bush administration's advent, the Partnership is no longer functioning in the manner that it was. What will be the alternative venues for deciding on new directions for USAID?
I think we will evolve a new framework under the Bush administration through which the consultation process between the US and Egyptian sides will continue to be formalised. We're discussing this with the new (US) government right now.
Will there be any slowdown in the initiation of new programmes or the current pace of work?
No. We are continuing to move ahead without any changes and modifications, on the basis of the multi-year strategic framework for 2001-2009 that sets out the broad plan, emphasising ways to help Egypt become a more competitive player in the international trade arena and strengthening the competitiveness of Egypt's exports, as well as trying to find ways to create jobs for Egypt's developing work force. Those are the key needs associated with the strategic USAID plan, and these are unchanged.
Why, do you think, USAID in Egypt has been unpopular, in the political sense of the word?
Concerning USAID's being unpopular, I don't feel that at all. I recognise, though, that I am in a little bit of a cocoon when I travel or attend ceremonial events. But I also go out and see various projects and activities in a much more low-key kind of way. All of the feedback which I get from people then is that they appreciate, at one level or other, what we are doing. People may have advice or criticism about some aspect of what we are doing, but I do not feel that people are critical of USAID for its own sake. If there is feedback which is critical of USAID, it does not come through. I would be pleased if I could respond to it, though. Maybe I could do things differently then, or better. I can see and understand, nevertheless, how people may be critical of the US. I realise that there is ideological concern about US policy and what it represents. Yet, I think that there should be a distinction made between that and what USAID is actually doing on the ground.
F o c u s: USAID in Egypt: 25 years Perspective
Opinion
Trade-offs and concrete
No rubber stamp
The big facelift
Buying American
Time for self-reliance?
Reluctant grassroots
Learning priorities
Greenbacks for a greener Egypt
On the block
A mechanised pastoral
Pushing privatisation
Small, but promising
Charts
Galal Amin:
The price to pay
Shafiq Gabr:
Give and take
Ray Bush:
Time to go
Mustafa Kamel El-Sayed:
What have we done with US aid?
Adel Beshai:
Eye on the future
Gouda Abdel-Khalek:
Untangling the strings of aid
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved
![]() |
|
|||||||||||||||||
| ARCHIVES Letter from the Editor Editorial Board Subscription Advertise! |
WEEKLY ONLINE: www.ahram.org.eg/weekly Updated every Saturday at 11.00 GMT, 2pm local time weeklyweb@ahram.org.eg |
Al-Ahram Organisation |