5 - 11 July 2001
Issue No.541
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 5 - 11 July 2001 Issue No.541 |
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Conflict engineering
Neither conflict resolution nor conflict management has so far succeeded in halting the growing deterioration in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed suggests conflict engineering
Earlier this week, I attended a conference at Wilton Park on "Stability and Instability in the Middle East: Consequences for the Region and Beyond." An executive agency of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Wilton Park is based in a 15th-century castle in Sussex where experts from different parts of the world meet to discuss international dilemmas in a beautiful setting far from the distractions of the big city.
It seemed to me, however, that the organisers of the conference I attended were somewhat off the mark when they chose the notion of "stability" as the key element in the discussions. It is questionable whether stability is the proper notion from which to launch a serious exchange of views on the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Middle East, given the very different interpretations of the word adopted by the actors. On one hand, we have Sharon insisting that the key to stability is Israel's security, even if it is achieved at the expense of Palestinian security; on the other, we have the Palestinians insisting that the Intifada, which is perceived by the Israelis as the greatest threat to their security, will not stop as long as Israel does not take steps to respond to their legitimate political demands, such as halting the expansion of settlements. But if the notion of stability is a non sequitur, what should be the starting point of a discussion on this most intractable of conflicts?
At the moment, the only frame of reference accepted by the parties -- if only in words, not in deeds -- is the report put out by the fact-finding committee headed by former US senator Dick Mitchell. But the Mitchell report is a very fragile document that is unlikely to stand the test of time, largely because it sacrificed credibility on the altar of expediency. To earn Sharon's approval, the report made several unacceptable concessions, such as omitting any reference to Security Council Resolution 242, the universally accepted basis for any peace settlement, and absolving Sharon of any blame for the incident most observers believe triggered the Intifada, which is his provocative visit to Al-Haram Al-Sharif on 28 September last year. Moreover, the report had to overcome the reluctance of the Bush administration to endorse an initiative taken by the former Democratic administration.
Complicating matters still further is Bush's insistence on regarding the beleaguered and greatly enfeebled Saddam Hussein, and not the hard-line Ariel Sharon, as the main threat to regional peace. For Bush, Iraq is the "mother" of all rogue states. Indeed, the demonisation of Iraq is an essential component of his global strategy. The American president has based his entire policy, both domestic and international, on the idea of designing a missile shield capable of deflecting enemy missiles launched by rogue states. While acknowledging that US technology has not reached the required degree of accuracy that would make such a shield operative, Bush believes his $60 billion pet project will boost the American military-industrial complex and help overcome the looming recession threatening the US economy. The huge cost of the project can only be justified if there is a dangerous enemy out there. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the role has been assigned to a motley array of so-called "rogue states," most prominent among which is Iraq. Indeed, if it had not existed, it would have had to be invented.
The failure of the Camp David summit last July signalled the collapse of the peace process, at least as far as the Palestinian-Israeli track was concerned. The Palestinians reacted to the collapse by launching the Intifada, the Israelis by electing Sharon as prime minister and the Bush administration by turning away from the Arab-Israeli conflict and focusing its Middle East policy on Iraq.
The collapse of the peace process has unleashed a spiral of violence that many fear will plunge the region into yet another debilitating war. If we are to avoid this worst-case scenario, we must first ask how and why peace-making as it has been conducted since the 1967 War collapsed. I believe the simple explanation is that the protagonists failed to agree on a common definition of the word "peace" in the specific conditions of the Arab-Israeli dispute. They went along with the somewhat vague wording of Security Council Resolution 242, which defines peace as what Israel gets (termination of claims or states of belligerency and acknowledgement of its sovereignty and territorial integrity) in exchange for relinquishing the Arab territories it occupied in the 1967 War. But on why specifically these territories, and what specific traits a regional peace should have, the resolution remained silent. No agreement exists on Jerusalem, on the Israeli settlements in Arab territories or on the Palestinian right of return. Palestinian-Israeli negotiations have revealed that there is no common understanding of what constitutes Israel's territorial integrity, i.e. final borders, and what the Arabs are required to acknowledge as Israel proper.
The breakdown of the negotiation process can therefore be attributed to reasons going beyond the Palestinian issue alone and touching on the very essence of any settlement. It is now generally recognised that the "land-for-peace" tradeoff cannot be implemented for the simple reason that the parties are unable to agree on what such a tradeoff entails or to translate it into a package of mutual and binding obligations.
The Middle East now finds itself in a dangerous vacuum where no conflict-resolution mechanism has been devised to replace the failed peace process, while attempts at conflict-management, like the Mitchell report, aimed at preventing the vacuum from exploding into an all-out war detrimental to all, are merely stop-gap solutions that remain shaky and vulnerable to collapse at any moment.
The repercussions of such a collapse, some positive, some negative, will be felt more acutely by the Arab parties. What we are likely to see in the wake of the collapse is a growing radicalisation of the Arab masses and an intensification of campaigns calling for the boycott of Israelis and opposing normalisation of relations. The Intifada is likely to spread, overspilling in the Arab environment and targeting not only Israelis, but also any Arab regime that is considered "soft" towards Israel. We might even see a replay of the post-1973 War scenario, when the oil weapon was used to devastating effect. But such radical measures are certain to be faced by no less virulent counter-measures and the Arab world will witness deep polarisation, sometimes superseding in intensity Arab-Israeli confrontations. And as long as the balance of power is tilted to the advantage of one party at the expense of all others, for structural and not only fortuitous reasons, it is very unlikely that the conflict will come to an end. Indeed, it will continue to flare up spasmodically, albeit in different guises.
Is there a way out of the dilemma? I think that, in the present circumstances, a special effort must be furnished to "invent" a third path that is neither conflict resolution nor conflict management -- a path I will call conflict engineering ("engineering" having the meaning it has in "genetic engineering," for instance). By this term, I mean deliberately adding (or subtracting) elements to the conflict and not remaining slaves to the specific aggregate of elements expected to acquire greater importance in future and which have so far been dismissed, neglected, or not foreseen.
The curious thing is that we do not think of adding new elements to the conflict in the aim of improving our negotiating position, while other parties do it without scruple. This seems to have become part and parcel of our shrinking, globalised world, with intervention and interpenetration between actors occurring at various levels and in a variety of manners. For example, the United States has introduced the Iraqi element into the Arab-Israeli set of elements to reshuffle the Middle East game to its advantage. In counterpart, should we not as Arabs try to offset that game by exposing Bush's relentless pursuit of Saddam Hussein (and Milosevic) as being completely at odds with his blithe acceptance of Sharon, currently charged with crimes against humanity before a Belgian court, as a statesman and a partner?
Many factors related to the Arab-Israeli conflict will acquire greater relevance in future and Arab parties have every interest in exploring them before they get out of hand. There is, for instance, Israel's undeclared nuclear capability, which cannot be ignored at a time a race to acquire new weapons of mass destruction is unfolding throughout the region. This development has no solution unless dealt with in political terms and between parties enjoying a certain degree of parity. The same can be said of the growing threat of water scarcity throughout the region, which can become a new critical source of friction in future, with protagonists facing off across lines of confrontation, and in terms of alliances very different from the ones now prevailing. The continuation of the status quo is not destabilising in terms of future developments only, but could adversely affect what has been formerly agreed upon in the name of stability. Conflict engineering has become a must.
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