19 - 25 July 2001
Issue No.543
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 19 - 25 July 2001 Issue No.543 |
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Liquidating Arafat
Arafat's life is in serious jeopardy. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed explains why
An existential dilemma has faced Israel's leaders since the creation of the Jewish state in 1948: does Israel's survival require that it make peace with its Arab environment or does it require, on the contrary, that the two sides remain locked in a standoff situation indefinitely. One school of thought proceeds from the assumption that peace with the Arabs is impossible because they will never accept an alien state thrust into their midst, created on land they considered theirs over centuries, and that therefore Israel is doomed to remain a garrison state. As such, it must always remain militarily superior to all the Arab states taken together, its survival dependent on its ability to deter any Arab attempt to challenge its existence. That is the school of thought to which Sharon and Netanyahu belong.
The other school of thought proceeds from the assumption that Israel cannot run the risk of harbouring hostile relations towards its environment indefinitely. Eventually, the Arabs might acquire sources of power that cannot be foreseen in our rapidly changing world, and which need to be neutralised through relations that are not necessarily antagonistic. One example of power unexpectedly acquired by the Arabs was the oil price boom in the 1970s. This uncertainty factor makes it contingent on Israel to seek some kind of accommodation with the Arabs. Creating complementary relations of mutual dependence (a Middle East market, for instance) must be repeatedly attempted to offset the effect of mutual hostility due to ideology (Zionism versus pan-Arabism). That is the school of thought to which Peres belongs.
After the failure of the peace process exactly one year ago in Camp David, it is now the Sharon school that has the upper hand. True, Peres has joined the Sharon government in the hope of "neutralising" its "negative" effect. But with Sharon as prime minister and Peres in the subordinate role of foreign minister, it is more likely that the school of thought represented by Peres is the one that has been neutralised.
For Sharon, the peace process, with Arafat as a partner, is a legacy of the past that is no longer justified following the collapse of the process, a collapse he, and, indeed, the majority of Israelis who elected him to power, see as vindicating the hard line he has consistently advocated. In his mind, the time has come to regard Arafat as the "problem" itself, not the "key to the problem" as Chirac described the Palestinian leader when he met Sharon in Paris a fortnight ago.
And if Arafat has come to be seen as a problem, it follows that he must be removed from the equation, physically and not only politically, that is, while guaranteeing his personal safety. There will be no exiling of Arafat to a remote country like Tunis, in a repeat performance of his 1982 expulsion from Lebanon by the very same Sharon who was then Israel's minister of defence. This time, liquidating Arafat will mean liquidating him physically. Sharon is already implementing a policy involving the physical liquidation of Palestinian activists, mainly members of Fatah, whom he accuses of keeping the Intifada alive. As Arafat is now himself looked upon as keeping the Intifada alive to put pressure on Israel, he is a legitimate target of a political assassination as far as Sharon is concerned.
Sharon is still very popular in Israel. His popularity is symptomatic of disappointment with the breakdown of the peace process and of the belief that Sharon's school of thought proved to be right. His downfall is not in sight. It is more realistic to believe that it is not his political line that will bring about his downfall, but rather that external factors will intervene to convince the Israelis that his political line is not right. Sharon must be isolated from the majority of Israelis.
Of course, Israeli public opinion is not the only key factor. Global public opinion is also of paramount importance. The trial now underway in Brussels, where a Belgian court has accepted a lawsuit raised by survivors of the Sabra and Shatila massacres against Sharon, is an element of critical significance in this equation. It should be regarded as a very serious matter. Because of the lawsuit, Sharon was forced to call off a scheduled stopover in Brussels during his recent tour of European capitals. To avoid what could have been a serious diplomatic incident, Belgium's foreign minister, Louis Michel, flew to Berlin for a meeting with Sharon. Michel had to explain to the Israeli prime minister that the judiciary is totally separated from the executive branch of government, and that as a defendant facing charges before a Belgian court he could be apprehended on the orders of the court -- a first in the annals of diplomacy. How can Sharon carry out the normal duties of his office in the face of such constraints on his travelling abroad?
It must be understood that, because of his unsavoury reputation abroad, Sharon is expected to become still more vindictive, not the opposite. Preemptive steps should be taken to put him on the defensive before it is too late. The battle for public opinion is a key factor in this game. And here, I believe the Arab side has a responsibility to dissipate the ambiguities surrounding certain issues which Sharon is exploiting to advantage.
For the time being, the responsibility for the failure of the Camp David summit is placed squarely on Arafat's shoulders, at least as far as world opinion is concerned. Many factors have contributed to this perception, not least among them being Clinton's public reprimand of Arafat for his "intransigence" during the summit. No convincing Palestinian clarification has been made to disprove Clinton's charges. Actually, no clarification of Arab views on the matter has been put forward, despite the fact that Arab states maintain that peace is their strategic objective, and, as such, should be seriously protected and upheld whenever threatened by any of the concerned parties, including even the Palestinians themselves, for other than extremely valid reasons.
Undertaking such a task would be the most effective weapon in Arab hands to prove to the Israeli public that Sharon's line is not the only option and that it is he, rather than the Palestinians, who is to blame for the ever more serious decline of the overall situation.
The essence of the problem, as I tried to clarify in a recent article, is that the peace process failed when the 'land for peace' slogan, generally accepted as the correct reading of Security Council Resolution 242, was only agreed upon when presented as a generality, but failed lamentably at reflecting any degree of agreement when translated into the concrete issues which constitute the essence of the conflict; Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, etc. To overcome the impasse is a formidable task that Arafat cannot undertake alone. For the benefit of all parties concerned it must be a collective Arab endeavour.
Time is short. Sharon can strike at any moment. The Arab parties have to assume their responsibilities without delay. The Arab League has an important role to play in this matter. It should offer a platform for Arafat to clarify matters, corner both Barak and Sharon and explain why a seven-year effort to bring peace to the region has collapsed and what is required to begin anew.
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