2 - 8 August 2001
Issue No.545
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 2 - 8 August 2001 Issue No.545 |
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Same question, same answer
What remains of the July revolution? The fact that the question has become an annual ritual is rather moretelling than any possible answer,writes Nabil Abdel-Fattah*
The 30th anniversary of the death of Gamal Abdel-Nasser is less than two months away. The occasion, as has long been the case since his death, begs a single question -- just what remains of his vision and vast ambitions, of the social, political and regional enterprise which continues to stir bitter controversy in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world?
Why has this become such a perennial question is something of a mystery. It is a mystery, too, that questions regarding Nasser's legacy should resurface with ritualistic regularity on the anniversary of the revolution of 23 of July.
Does the obsession with this question reveal a yearning for the Nasserite rhetoric of social justice? Does this recidivistic flight back to national income distribution, fixed prices and free public services help to alleviate the pangs of a political and economic situation characterised by the fossilisation of political leadership and the widening gaps between an ostentatiously rich minority, shrivelling middle classes, an overwhelming proletariat and those completely marginalised beyond the poverty line?
Such questions bring to mind the 1960s generation, still clinging to the warmth of memories of the height of Egyptian and Arab nationalism and reminiscing over those distant days of vibrant youth, impassioned by ideals and dreams that have vanished in the seas of regional and international change, on the one hand.
The perennial nature of the questions may be indicative of a sterility in politics and political party life today. Maybe it epitomises an unrealizable attempt to revive an entire Cold War and regional conflicts played out against a backdrop of global balances of power. Or are such questions merely voiced by certain groups of intellectuals, a handful of Nasserists, for example, in unison with the Nasserists and Arab Nationalists elsewhere in the Arab world, seeking to bring back into currency the jargon of a bygone era?
This incessant query about the remnants of the Nasserist legacy may, of course, simply represent a desire to avoid the obvious answer, which is that nothing remains of this legacy once we consider the changes that have taken place in our political, social and economic life, in the network of regional and international relations and in the rules of play that have come to govern these relations since the October 1973 War. Is all that remains of Nasserism and the Nasserist revolution the nostalgia for that era in our history and the ritual observances of its successes and failures?
The collective recollections of groupings across the political and age spectrum constitute the symbolic capital that fosters group cohesion, legitimises ideological outlooks and frames of reference, adjudicates internal squabbles and furnishes weapons to level at political adversaries. But the most important use of this symbolic capital comes into play in the attempt to undermine the validity of another group's claim to being part of the legacy for which it stands. The 23 July Revolution brought into place a particular political order and ruling elite. Disputes over the continued legitimacy of the revolution could thus be said to signify various generations and parties of Nasserists that champion the order and ideals the revolution stood for, together with some Marxists with Arab nationalist leanings and others who have reconciled themselves with Nasserism and clashed with Sadatism. Are these, then, the groups who are prey to the escape into nostalgia from present day political realities?
Perhaps. Perhaps others, too, are prone to such escapism. But, the question still stands: What remains of the Nasserist order and its political legitimacy?
A cursory glance over the principles of the revolution, the political constitution it established and the ideologies and policies it promoted reveals that these phenomena were no more or less than a phase in Egyptian history. Take, for example, the principle of non- alignment and its corollary, affirmative neutrality. The whole gamut of Egyptian foreign relations and policies associated with these principles were inevitably fated to end with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of a new international and regional order. But even well before that, Nasserist opposition to reactionary and monarchical Arab regimes ended with the Khartoum conference that brought about the reconciliation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the return of Egyptian forces from Yemen. Indeed, the diminution in Egypt's confrontationalism towards its Arab neighbours, and the excellent ties Sadat subsequently formed with Saudi Arabia and the oil producing countries, made the achievements of the October 1973 war possible. Then, following the war, Sadat re-established relations with the US, a step that, together with his visit to Jerusalem, engendered a climate that enabled the signing of the Camp David peace treaty and the return of occupied Sinai.
Thus, monumental changes had shaken the ideological underpinnings of Egypt's foreign relations before the end of the Nasserist era. Sadat's pragmatism and his ability to found a new legitimacy based on the victory of the October War ushered in further changes to the Nasserist order: restricted political plurality, the beginnings of economic deregulation and reorientation towards the west.
Still, the 1952 Revolution retains its hold as one of the bases of political legitimacy and one of the frames of reference for official rhetoric. The Egyptian political system has undergone important structural and ideological transformations since the Sadat era and it is continuing to undergo these transformations under President Mubarak. Political plurality, albeit restricted, has become one of the main frames of reference for political legitimacy, along with religion, the accomplishments of the October war and the promotion of privatisation. The political plurality that is now permissible under the Political Party Law clearly represents a major departure from the one-party system. Nevertheless, the ruling National Democratic Party still resemble, structurally and operationally, the one- party system and can be said to be heir to the Arab Socialist Union.
The Egyptian revolution and Nasserism, thus, continues to live on in the folds of Egypt's political order alongside religion as a source of political legitimacy and as a political instrument.
What remains of Nasserism and the 1952 revolution? There are remnants of policies, of course, and the mystique it holds over segments of successive generations. There is a summoning up of the historical capital of the revolution, regularly made during these times of structural fragmentation and turbulent existential transformations. And the question will continue to regenerate itself as long as uncertainty over the future and the omens of current social and economic straits continue to preoccupy broad segments of the Egyptian populace.
* The writer is an expert at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
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