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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 9 - 15 August 2001 Issue No.546 |
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Logic of liberalisation
A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, Eberhard Kienle, London: I.B.Tauris Publishers, 2001. pp256
How far did the programme of economic liberalisation implemented under state auspices during the 1990s reshape Egypt's political and socio-economic structures? How did local elites go about protecting their power and influence, and how does one explain the persistence of the current political order in Egypt despite the country's continuously accumulating economic difficulties? In answer to these questions, Eberhard Kienle, chair of the Centre for Near and Middle Eastern Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies at London University (SOAS), gives a comprehensive reading of Egypt's political economy during the 1980s and 90s. In so doing, he not only argues that the Egyptian regime failed radically to transform Egypt's socio-economic order, but also outlines the important constraints placed on personal liberty in the country as a result of this failure. In fact, the novelty- and probably also the limitations- of Kienle's study comes from his placing the concept of liberty at the centre of his picture of Egyptian society over the past two decades. He argues against the view that Egypt has been returning to a liberal political order, such as developed in the country in the course of the 19th century and was interrupted with the 1952 Revolution, claiming that this picture, though seductive, is not in fact a true one.
Kienle writes that his book seeks to criticise the idea that Egypt has been witnessing a transition to democracy. Advocates of this commonly refer to the liberal and democratic features of the period covered by the study, pointing to the major role played by the Judiciary, for example, which has overruled certain measures taken by the Executive, and the press, which has not hesitated to criticise the regime. Kienle, by contrast, disputes this view, pointing to "the trials of civilians by military courts, the spiralling number of death sentences and the growing number of political prisoners, as well as the restrictions imposed on civil society" in the country. In so doing, he borrows the well-known distinction, popularised by the late Anglo-Russian political philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin, between "positive" and "negative" liberty. In this context, positive liberty means the liberty "of the ruled to choose their rulers or to at least influence this choice and thus to determine the policies of the government," negative liberty being the freedom from "intrusion and interference ... whoever the rulers may be and however, democratically or otherwise, they came to power."
Kienle says that positive liberty in its true form is rarely found in Egypt, since "participation in the selection of the rulers is highly restricted." However, he suggests that one can nevertheless talk legitimately of positive liberty in the Egyptian context since possibilities exist for participation and representation at lower levels of the state structure and in entities regulated by the regime. Negative liberty, the scope allowed for personal freedoms, such as the freedom of expression and of assembly, is also severely circumscribed in Egypt, Kienle argues.
In the first three chapters of his book, Kienle gives a description of what he claims as the encroachments on individual liberty which, he says, have marked the Egyptian political landscape over the past two decades. He cites important events and actors, and describes the role of the Judiciary. Kienle believes that the celebrated rulings by which the Judiciary has been able to assert its independence have in fact offered few inconveniences for the regime, which has been able to adapt without substantially changing its policies. Kienle offers a comprehensive survey of where such restrictions exist, locating them in political parties, professional syndicates, trade unions and chambers of commerce. Nevertheless, he argues that the last three have remained largely independent of the regime, and they have been the principle arenas in which the opposition has been able to develop political activities. This, in Kienle's view, explains why the Islamists have viewed the professional syndicates as being particularly important, since what is described here as the "Islamist conquest" of the professional syndicates was a strategy imposed by their exclusion from the parliamentary process.
In his examination of the "logic of deliberalisation," or of the systematic imposition of restrictions on personal liberty, Kienle provides a chapter in which he challenges the idea that such restrictions came in response to the state's conflict with the Islamist groups during the 1990s. Though this conflict, as he argues, undoubtedly explains certain restrictions, such as the amendments to Law No. 97 of July 1992 on the State Security Courts, it does not explain others. Other factors, such as the change to majority voting in parliamentary elections, the economic crisis and associated reforms that began in the 1980s, should be looked at, Kienle argues.
Who then are the major beneficiaries of the economic reform programme and of the changes that have come with it? In answering this question, Kienle brings new insights to what he dubs "the class of owners of capital," arguing that it is this class that has substantially benefited. The owners of capital, he explains, have been the direct beneficiaries of the economic reforms and programme of economic liberalisation carried out by the state over the last two decades or so. "They have been able to represent their interests at the highest levels of the State structure and in the NDP Party apparatus, often running as NDP MPs," Kienle wrote. Major entrepreneurs, such as Ahmed Ezz, Ibrahim Kamel and Mohammed Abul-Enein, entered the NDP leadership in 2000, nevertheless, Kienle concludes this part of his analysis by saying that the relationship between regime and new rich has not been an entirely "one- way street;" the regime, in his view, is not fully identified with the capitalist class.
In the last two chapters of the book, Kienle builds on his notion of positive and negative liberty in order to evaluate the effects of the economic and political liberalisation that has been taking place in Egypt over the past two decades. He argues that though economic change, including economic liberalisation, has reduced the direct control that the regime is able to exert over economic actors or activities in the country, either through patronage or through its ownership of an economically dominant public sector, such economic liberalisation has not led to a liberal political order, as is sometimes assumed will be the case in liberalisation theory. The problem, Kienle says, lies with the specific features of Egyptian economy and society and with the context in which economic liberalisation has occurred. "Certain social, cultural and political factors prevented economic liberalisation from translating into political liberalisation," he writes. But ascribing the principal explanatory power of why political liberalisation did not follow economic liberalisation to social and cultural factors is culturally specific and exaggerates the influence of cultural and social values.
In conclusion, one cannot but question the impression that Kienle leaves concerning the future of the reform process in Egypt. The picture that emerges from his book is a grim one. He concludes by saying that indications that Egyptian society is becoming more "liberal" in terms of norms or values are few, and that most of the factors that have contributed to restrictions on liberty remain in place. He predicts that "no major constitutional or political reforms are to be expected within the coming few years," due to the absence of internal pressures, such as "uncontainable opposition," or of external ones, such as "political conditionality" from major foreign donors. In particular, Kienle is unimpressed by a development that many observers thought was a sign of possible political reform, namely the court ruling issued in July 2000 that forced the government to conduct parliamentary election under full judicial supervision. Perhaps one of the main drawbacks of such a bleak reading of Egyptian economy and society over the past two decades is that he hardly refers to the legacies inherited from previous regimes which were essential in shaping today's events. Kienle also makes no reference to the regional setting which influenced the outcomes of some domestic events such as the peace process, the Egypt's return to the Arab fold and the relations with the United States. Kienle's study nonetheless, is important for the insights it brings to bear on Egypt's recent history, and its identification of the many key actors in contemporary Egyptian political and economic life.
Reviewed by Omayma Abdel-Latif
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