23 - 29 August 2001
Issue No.548
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 23 - 29 August 2001 Issue No.548 |
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Gunning for glory
Fragmented, bloodthirsty and discredited by other Muslim groups, the Abu Sayyaf are short on ideology and big on rhetoric. More importantly, writes Nyier Abdou, they have nothing to lose
When Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo arrived in the Malaysian administrative capital of Putrajaya on 7 August to oversee the signing of a crucial cease-fire agreement between the Philippine government and the two main Islamic separatist groups in the traditionally Muslim southern Philippines, it marked a masterstroke of political acumen for Arroyo's still young administration. The Malaysian- brokered deal was a tentative détente to a 22- year estrangement between the powerful Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which signed a peace agreement with Manila in 1996, and the renegade Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which split off from the MNLF in 1979. The MILF, long resistant to negotiations, has been brought back into the fold of "credible" Muslim organisations -- meaning that the government is willing to sit down at the negotiating table with its leaders. The Malaysia agreement, which follows Libyan-sponsored peace talks, bodes well for a shot at tenable self- rule in the region, but it leaves out the wild-card in the race for peace: the militant Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
Founded in 1991 by Abdel-Rajak Janjalani, who is said to have trained in Libya and broke off from the MNLF, the Abu Sayyaf was formerly a radical, but not significant player in the long-time Islamic struggle of the southern Philippines. After Janjalani's death in December of 1998, the group splintered and does not seem to have an identifiable leader, although Janjalani's brother, Khaddafi, is a prominent figure. Based predominantly out of the island of Basilan, the ASG gained notoriety after the kidnapping of a group of tourists, many of them foreign, from a Malaysian tourist resort on nearby Sipidan island in April of last year. The drawn-out hostage crisis and the eventual release of the captives -- brokered by Libya, a traditional interlocutor in the conflict -- was a major coup for the ASG. The group savoured months of international attention and was rewarded with a ransom reportedly running anywhere from $9 million to $15 million. While it remains questionable as to whether the ASG actually received such a sum -- allegedly earmarked for developmental needs in the southern Philippines -- what is clear is that the group gained a major infusion of funds, the bulk of which went to munitions, speed boats and tantalising offers for young recruits.
At the time, the government of former President Joseph Estrada was probably grateful for Libya's intervention, but "to the extent that kidnapping has been demonstrated to be so profitable, the payment might prove to have been unhelpful in the longer term," suggests Ron May, senior fellow at the Department of Political and Social Change at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University (ANU). The event was a turning point for the ASG, and was a training exercise for the current ongoing hostage crisis.
On 27 May, the ASG raided an upscale resort in northwest Basilan, grabbing 20 hostages, among them three Americans (one of whom was allegedly beheaded last month). In the months that followed, and with the military in hot pursuit, the group continued to wreak havoc, striking brutally several times, but ultimately eluding government forces. Following a 2 August raid, the group beheaded 10 hostages, bringing the total dead to 14. Captives have been taken, freed, escaped, and released, but some 20 people remain hostage, among them the American missionary couple originally seized in May.
The Estrada administration tried to link the ASG to the MILF, but the connection is unlikely. Thomas McKenna, associate professor of anthropology at the University of Alabama at Birmingham and author of Muslim Rulers and Rebels:ÊEveryday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines, told Al- Ahram Weekly that "It is certainly possible that some disaffected MILF fighters have gone over to the ASG," but "the ASG may be best viewed as a direct challenge to both the MILF and MNLF, not as an adjunct." In light of the recent Malaysia agreement, it seems possible that the ASG could attract more support and enlarge its role as a militant Islamic force, but McKenna, disagrees, pointing out that "popular support for both the MNLF and MILF has been demonstrated time and again in public demonstrations, elections and so forth. No comparable support has been evidenced for the ASG."
May is equally wary: "I wouldn't take the MNLF-MILF reconciliation or the cease-fire for granted at this stage," he told the Weekly, "but if there is a peace agreement with the MILF, I would not expect Abu Sayyaf to gain ground -- indeed it might well become harder for it to operate as anything but a band of brigands." Ideologically, the MNLF and the MILF are fighting for cultural and political autonomy, with goals of an empowered leadership and a chance for real economic development. While the ASG has spoken of concerns for development in the southern Philippines, the primary goal of the group seems to be kidnapping for ransom. McKenna calls them "social bandits."
The future of this conflict lies in the limping arrangement known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the limited terms of which were decided on in the government's 1996 agreement with the MNLF. So far, however, the arrangement has been a significant failure. "The ARMM is not working well," says May. "What little evidence we have points to inefficiency, nepotism, financial mismanagement and lack of transparency." Even the limited measures of the 1996 agreement have yet to be implemented and there has been little evidence of economic progress. McKenna is still optimistic. "I do feel, though, that it can be made to work, at least as well as other regions in the Philippines." But expunging the thirst for lucrative ransom payments is a daunting task.
The Philippine government has been promising that it will exterminate the Abu Sayyaf for years, but with this latest crisis, it has become painfully evident how difficult that is, since the mountainous jungle terrain of the southern Philippines favours the guerrillas. President Arroyo has repeatedly used tough talk and military might, but May hastens to remind us that "quashing" a group like Abu Sayyaf militarily "will not be easy; kidnapping -- and piracy -- in that part of the world has a long history."
McKenna likens the situation in Basilan to a previous period of "social banditry" in Sulu in the 1950s, when a man named Kamlun and his followers, who protested Philippine rule, managed to elude capture for years while engaging in robbery and kidnapping. "Unlike the ASG, Kamlun did not have a cell phone, international Islamic rhetoric, or access to million- dollar ransom payments," which made running him down somewhat easier. But ultimately, McKenna feels that the ASG will get tired of running, just like Kamlun did. "I may be overly optimistic, but I think that the ASG has run out of steam and is on the decline. The Arroyo government would do best to stop announcing unrealistic timetables for 'crushing' the ASG and work quietly to contain them on Basilan."
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