27 Sep. - 3 Oct. 2001
Issue No.553
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 27 Sep. - 3 Oct. 2001 Issue No.553 |
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The only option
The terrorist offensive on New York and Washington has added a different set of implications to the Intifada. Because the attacks have brought about a fundamental change in international political calculations -- even, and especially, in the priorities of Arab policy -- the Intifada affords an altogether more complicated prospect. The Israeli government began capitalising on America's plight in the first few hours after the attacks, intensifying efforts to invade and oppress Palestinian areas and popularising claims that what Israel is facing is terrorism of the same kind.
On the face of it, as the first year of the Intifada comes to an end, the future seems bleaker than ever. The 1987 Intifada was aborted, ending with the Oslo Accords in 1993; the fate of the second Intifada, which began in September 2000, seems to be taking a similar turn. The attacks on the US and the consequent changes in US policy are giving rise to a far stricter position on Islamic- oriented resistance, which is seen as terrorist in essence.
Such changes will not be restricted to American policy alone: the European and perhaps the Russian position too are expected to change, since the attacks have caused a relative decline in public support for the Intifada. The general feeling is that the uprising is not destined to continue after its first year, for all the circumstances indicate that Israel now has the opportunity to crush it completely. Furthermore, it has been beset by difficulties since it began, and is now in an even more difficult position than previously; yet I would argue that the end of the Intifada is not a viable prediction, for the following reasons.
The first Intifada was not brought to an abrupt end simply because of the Oslo accords, which promised the Palestinians a brighter future. The main factor, rather, was the change in President Arafat's position, and his use of the Palestinian Authority's apparatus to liquidate the uprising. This is not the case today: Sharon's policy, by placing Arafat and the PA in the same position as the Intifada, has caused them in turn to take a less violent stance, and thereby allow the Intifada to continue. Politically, Arafat is no longer able to exercise the same pressure on the resistance as he did during the first Intifada. This would now constitute a form of political suicide.
If false harbingers of peace decreased support for the resistance toward the end of the first Intifada, the seven years since Oslo have made this deception impossible. The Palestinians now know from practical experience that resistance is the only viable option.
Sharon's government has escalated its oppression of the Palestinians, while American threats have spread an atmosphere of terror among the dispossessed. These factors will give rise to increased defiance and galvanise support for the resistance, and thus throw its targets -- the Israeli occupation and American hegemony -- into sharp relief.
It is on this basis that I believe the Intifada is more likely to be escalated than curbed or brought to an abrupt end.
* The writer is a columnist for Al-Ahram.
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