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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 11 - 17 October 2001 Issue No.555 |
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Uprooting terrorism
Restoring domestic stability was President Hosni Mubarak's top priority upon assuming power. But, as Ahmed Moussa reports, some mistakes were made before this goal was achieved
When President Hosni Mubarak came to power following the assassination of Anwar El-Sadat in October 1981, the nation was facing unprecedented instability. In the words of Hassan Abu Basha, who was appointed interior minister three months after Sadat's killing, "that was a period when a security setback occurred, taking the form of sectarian sedition and an unprecedented escalation of terrorism."
A few days after the assassination, militants stormed the security department of the southern city of Assiut, killing 120 officers and policemen and injuring 150 others.
Mubarak, addressing on 3 January 1982 the first meeting of his cabinet, said the restoration of stability was his first priority. Socio-economic development and a greater margin of democracy would follow.
The first step towards the restoration of stability was to unravel the secrets of, and then smash, the Jihad group which the government had blamed for Sadat's assassination. Investigators reached the conclusion that the militant Islamist Jihad had planned to launch an "Islamic revolution" by killing Sadat and then broadcasting its "Communiqué No. 1" on state television. A special Jihad unit had made preparations to storm the headquarters of Egyptian television in downtown Cairo, but these were either foiled or the attempt to implement them was aborted.
Investigations showed that Jihad, at the time, was made up of two factions. The first was led by Salem El-Rahhal, a Palestinian, and its task was to recruit members from among army officers. And it did manage to recruit several, including Ayman El-Zawahri and Abboud El-Zomor.
But state security authorities erred by ordering El-Rahhal deported in mid-September 1981 before having wrested from him any information about his faction of Jihad or even about the man himself, Abu Basha said.
The second Jihad faction was led by Mohamed Abdel-Salam Farag, author of Al-Farida Al-Gha'iba [The Forgotten Religious Duty], a book that served as a guide for militants.
Looking to the future (from top to bottom): Mubarak taking time out with his first grandson; welcoming some of his country's youngest guests; motivating young citizens to achieve educational excellence; presenting a farmer with a land deed
According to Abu Basha, Jihad made a comeback attempt in September 1982, when jailed members, including Ayman El-Zawahri, plotted to escape from prison and attack a military unit with the aim of igniting the "Islamic revolution." But the plan was foiled.
In his quest for stability, Mubarak ordered the release of about 1000 political and intellectual figures, from across the ideological spectrum, whom Sadat had detained in September 1981, one month before his assassination. Mubarak's action healed a "deep wound that had afflicted the domestic front," Abu Basha said.
The action was also a step in the direction of greater democracy. Restrictions on opposition parties were removed. As a result, the liberal Wafd and the leftist Tagammu parties resumed their activities and the publication of their newspapers.
A period of calm followed but, according to Abu Basha, the major mistake made by security authorities in the period 1985-1987 was to allow several militants who had taken part in the 1981 unrest to leave the country. The most prominent were Ayman El-Zawahri, Rifa'i Ahmed Taha, Mustafa Hamza and Mohamed Shawki El-Islambouli, The brother of Sadat's convicted killer.
These men moved to Afghanistan where they received para-military training. And then they returned.
In 1987, members of a group called Al-Nagun min Al-Nar [Those who will be spared hell-fire] made abortive attempts on the lives of Abu Basha, Nabawi Ismail, a former interior minister, and Makram Mohamed Ahmed, chief editor of Al-Mussawar magazine. The attempts were led by Mohamed Kazem Abdel-Qawi, a militant who was later killed in a gun battle with police in the Nile Delta province of Menoufiya.
In October 1990, Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiya militants, seeking to assassinate then Interior Minister Abdel-Halim Moussa, killed Parliament Speaker Rifaat El-Mahgoub by mistake.
In 1993, Jihad militants made abortive attempts on the lives of then Prime Minister Atef Sidki and Interior Minister Hassan El-Alfi. Al-Gama'a militants also made an abortive attempt on the life of Information Minister Safwat El-Sherif.
Terrorism reached a peak when Al-Gama'a militants made an unsuccessful attempt on Mubarak's life on 26 June 1995, following the president's arrival in Addis Ababa to attend an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit. In November of the same year, Jihad suicide bombers hit the Egyptian embassy building in Pakistan.
In 1996, 18 Greek tourists were killed near the Giza pyramids. And in September 1997, 11 German tourists were killed outside the Egyptian museum in Tahrir square in the heart of Cairo.
The last major act of terrorism was the Luxor massacre in November 1997, in which 57 foreign tourists and 10 Egyptians were killed. There were conflicting claims on whether the Al-Gama'a was responsible for the carnage, but most indicators suggest that it was.
Smaller-scale attacks targeted police officers and Copts. And intellectuals were not spared the group's wrath. Secularist writer Farag Foda was assassinated in 1993 by Al-Gama'a militants and there was an abortive attempt on the life of Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz, also by Gama'a militants, in 1995.
At the beginning of 1994, security forces were prepared for a full confrontation with militants. After militant strongholds in the Cairo districts of Imbaba and Ain Shams were purged, the militants confined their activities to the southern governorates of Minya and Assiut, targeting policemen, Copts and tourist sites.
The strategy of security forces was to define the dimensions and locations of militant factions, eliminate their leaders and masterminds, then smash the groups' channels of communication and put a stop to financing, while at the same time stepping up security precautions.
In addition to giving chase to militants hiding in the cultivated areas and amongst the mountains of southern Egypt, authorities managed to win the extradition of more than 80 leading militant figures, mostly Jihad members.
Egypt signed security cooperation agreements with many countries and put diplomatic pressure on countries that give refuge to militants, urging their extradition or expulsion. Egypt, in particular, targeted countries that, citing human rights, granted political asylum to militants who had taken part in terrorist attacks back home and were convicted by Egyptian courts.
But the Egyptian call fell on deaf ears in several countries. Worse, Egypt came under fire from human rights organisations there.
The situation, of course, has drastically changed since 11 September this year. The world would do well to remember Mubarak's warning that countries which give shelter to terrorists would ultimately be burnt by those granted safe haven. And, since 1986, Egypt's president has also repeatedly called for an international conference to combat terrorism.
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