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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 25 - 31 October 2001 Issue No.557 |
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The Kashmir factor
India and Pakistan vie for US support for their positions on disputed Kashmir. The result could well depend on the unfolding war in Afghanistan. Iffat Malik writes from Islamabad
US Secretary of State Colin Powell headed out to South Asia on 14 October, planning to shore up support for the military action against Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qa'ida network and the Taliban. But once there, he found that plan sidelined by a flare- up in that other regional conflict zone: Kashmir.
Heavy firing across the Line of Control (LOC) -- the boundary dividing Indian and Pakistani- controlled areas of Kashmir - killed a woman and left 35 injured. Coming after 10 months of border calm and just before Colin Powell landed in Pakistan, the timing of this latest escalation was surely no coincidence.
India and Pakistan have been quarrelling over the state of Jammu and Kashmir since Partition in 1947. They have fought three wars over it, as well as the Kargil conflict in 1999. Currently they each control about half the state.
Since 1989, an internal armed separatist movement has also operated within Indian-held Kashmir. India claims that the movement is Pakistan- sponsored terrorism, while Pakistan maintains that it is a wholly indigenous freedom struggle waged by Kashmiri Muslims, to which it provides moral, political and diplomatic support.
As so often in Kashmir, the truth may lie somewhere in between. Indian policies in Kashmir -- lack of political freedom, rigged elections, denial of regional autonomy, throttled economic development -- have fuelled a genuine desire for secession on the part of Kashmiri Muslims. This has been strengthened by the human rights abuses committed by Indian security forces as they have tried to crush Kashmiri militancy. But there is little doubt that without Pakistani funding, training, arms and other logistical support, the Kashmiris would have found it far harder to fight New Delhi.
Efforts at resolving both the long-standing international dispute and the internal ethnic conflict have always floundered. A big problem is the huge gulf between the two sides' positions -- New Delhi says that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral and permanent part of the Indian Union and Islamabad and the Kashmiris demand that the people of the state should be given the right to decide their own future. Add to this the weight of history (the two sides have maintained their stances for 50 years) and weak governments in both countries that lack the strength to make unpopular compromises, and the intractability of the problem becomes plain.
For most of the 50-plus years that the Kashmir dispute has dragged, the international community has remained aloof. Only when the Cold War turned hot did the outside world get involved. In May 1998 both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. That development raised serious alarm. There were fears that the next conflict over Kashmir could escalate into a nuclear exchange. So, when the Kargil conflict broke out in 1999, Washington pressured for a quick end.
The latest flare-up in Kashmir has again raised alarm. At a time when Washington is desperately trying to build international support for its campaign in Afghanistan, especially from sensitive Muslim states, the last thing it wants is for India and Pakistan to go to war in Kashmir.
It especially does not want Pakistan, already battling domestic Islamist opposition to President Musharraf's decision to support the US, to be distracted or destabilised (or worse, both), by its eastern neighbour.
But it is precisely the war on terror, and the international attention focused on the region, that have led India now to raise the profile of Kashmir. For New Delhi, this is an excellent opportunity to win international support for its claim that it, too, faces terrorism. A suicide bomb attack on the State Legislative Assembly in Srinagar that killed 39 people three weeks ago was well used by India to back its argument. The Indian government has been vigorously drawing parallels between the Taliban's harbouring of Bin Laden and Pakistan's alleged harbouring of Kashmiri "terrorists."
Former Indian Prime Minister I K Gujral called on the US to broaden its campaign beyond Afghanistan. "America must understand that you cannot have peace in Afghanistan and terrorism in India, against India," he said, referring to the Kashmir conflict. Other leaders have made similar statements. For its part, Pakistan has denied Indian allegations and warned New Delhi that any offensive will meet a strong response.
Since the 11 September attacks, the United States has been walking a diplomatic tightrope in South Asia. Mindful of the risks President Musharraf has taken in supporting America, it does not want to make life harder for him by applying pressure over Kashmir. But nor does it want to antagonise India, with whom the US has been building good relations. So, while it froze the assets of two Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant groups, overall the US has been silent on Kashmir.
Pakistani officials were satisfied with Powell's statements during his visit to India, in which he described Kashmir as "central to the relationship (between India and Pakistan)" and said the dispute could "be resolved if all parties engage with a willingness to address their concerns in mutually acceptable ways." Pakistani officials said this statement endorsed Pakistan's position that Kashmir is the core of the hostility between the two states. India, in keeping with its position that Kashmir is an internal problem, refutes this position.
No surprise, then, that when Powell landed in New Delhi, his next stop after Islamabad, he got a frosty welcome. Powell tried to repair the damage by resorting to semantic legerdemain (he had meant Kashmir was "a" central issue, not "the" central issue). That argument failed to mollify the Indian government, or defuse tension across the LOC.
There was more firing along the border on the nights subsequent to Powell's visit. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes warned that attacks against "infiltrators" on the other side of the LOC could be stepped up. On 18 October, Pakistan put its forces on high alert, following troop movements on the Indian side of the LOC and international border. The same day, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee ruled out any resumption of peace talks with Pakistan while it continued to make Kashmir the core of bilateral relations.
The escalation in violence along the LOC, as well as within Indian-Kashmir, is a cause for concern. But it is unlikely to lead to another military conflict now. Mindful of international pressure, both governments will heed US President George Bush's call to "stand down" while the Afghan operation is under way.
But once that operation is over, India will certainly seek international pressure to stop Pakistan supporting separatist groups in Kashmir. Washington's response - when it is no longer so dependent on Islamabad's cooperation - is likely to be sympathetic. And that will mean more problems for beleaguered Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.
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