25 - 31 October 2001
Issue No.557
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 25 - 31 October 2001 Issue No.557 |
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( photos: Reuters and AFP)
Many options, few choices
The US ground war in Afghanistan is less straightforward than it first appears, writes Galal Nassar
Now in its third week, the US-led war in Afghanistan has entered a critical phase. All sides -- the US and its allies, and Bin Laden and the opponents of US intervention -- are waiting nervously as the first wave of land attacks rolls into that rugged terrain. And as the attacks redouble, so does speculation on possible US scenarios, Taliban responses, the types of arms being used and the objectives they intend to achieve.
US special forces are gathered in several airbases in surrounding countries and the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions may take part in the land operations. These developments have raised several questions about the nature of the land war. Is this to be a non- conventional offensive as Pentagon officials have indicated? Will the US, for fear of more extensive involvement, restrict its efforts on the ground, perhaps giving a few elite tasks for its special forces, and abetting moves by anti- Taliban factions? In short, what are the objectives of the land war, and will they be achieved?
When the assault on Afghanistan began, the Pentagon had the answers. Its aims, it said, included changing the balance of power in Afghanistan with the assistance of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, disabling Al-Qa'ida as a source of terrorism, and ensuring that Afghanistan no longer serves as base or shelter for potential terrorists, particularly for the Taliban and Afghan- Arabs.
But talk is one thing: action may be less easy. The record suggests that these goals will not be achieved by airstrikes alone. In its war against Iraq, the US airforce performed 40,000 sorties in 38 days, unleashed 209,940 conventional bombs, 9,473 laser-guided bombs and 5,647 missiles: a sum total of 88,000 tons of explosives. But the aerial assault did not force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Rather it was the land battles, which lasted only five days.
In Afghanistan, the nature of the terrain and the forces opposing the US make a ground offensive vital: if the US is to achieve its objectives. But there US troubles begin. Mountain ranges rearing over 7,000 metres high crisscross Afghanistan's expanse, making the country hard to penetrate, and favouring defenders. The Taliban forces are not a conventional standing army. The interplay between the diverse armed factions lend them a unique character. Rather than formal military formations, the Taliban army consists of several armed divisions of up to 30,000, controlled by wireless communication. These divisions use the craggy mountains and passes as control bases, fortresses and refuges. Ground battles against such forces in such an environment demand tactics radically different to customary ground campaigns.
The storm ahead: (from the top) Northern Alliance opposition forces prepare for advances into Taliban controlled territory; the deadly US MC130P, now being used in Afghanistan; survivors of an attack on Kabul this week in front of their destroyed home; US special forces are conducting night raids in search of any information about reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Mohamed Omar and Osama Bin Laden
Other considerations will test US military planners. The US army has the lowest ratio of ground to other forces in the world. Transport, too, is a formidable problem. The US has no permanent bases near Afghanistan and those forces permanently stationed on US fleets and aircraft carriers are insufficient, on their own, to launch an effective ground assault. It would take at least six days to transport an airborne brigade of 4,000 to the vicinity, 12 days to transport a 27,000-strong airborne division and 16 days to transport a 7,000-strong mechanised brigade, with tanks, artillery and armoured vehicles.
Nor can the US rely on special and airborne forces alone to accomplish its objectives. These forces, consisting of units of between 50 and 150 15- member teams, and capable of operating between 75 and 400 kilometres behind enemy lines, are generally equipped with light arms and artillery. But however strategic their tasks, these forces cannot determine the outcome of a land battle. In any case, success in the tasks they undertake depends on many things, such as central planning, secrecy, accurate information, and precise timing and coordination, in order to ensure the element of surprise. These things are particularly hard to guarantee in Afghanistan.
Another consideration relates to changes in US war strategy that have taken place since presidential order 18 of August 1977. That order commanded the creation of rapid deployment forces. At first, these forces operated on the principle of arriving quickly at the scene of battle and relying on superior firepower to sap enemy strength. This method, using attrition to wear an opponent down, could result in prolonged engagements. But now strategic thinking has turned to ways of avoiding a drawn-out engagement. US tacticians now prefer smaller units with greater manoeuvrability, who aim less to destroy than to surprise an enemy into confusion and disrupt its military cohesion.
Given these considerations, US and British forces operating in Afghanistan could implement any number of scenarios, separately or together, alone or with the Northern Alliance. One of those scenarios is already in progress. Intensive aerial and missile strikes have been followed by special forces transported into combat by long range CH- 47, MH-53, AH and HH-3 helicopters taking off from Pakistan's Jacobabad airforce base, which is near Kabul and Jalalabad. As these forces attacked from the south, C-21 and C-28 tactical fighters approached from an airbase in Uzbekistan in the northwest and dropped paratroopers near Kabul and Mazar Al-Sherif. This two-pronged offensive aims to unbalance Taliban defenders, forcing them to withdraw from major cities, and clearing the way for the forces of the Afghan opposition. Subsequently, Taliban forces would be pursued into the mountains using helicopter gunships and special forces.
So far, this plan appears flawed. The US is finding it hard to assess how much damage the aerial strikes did, and it lacks precise information on the whereabouts of Taliban bases. Without such information, US land and air forces could suddenly find themselves targets for anti-aircraft artillery and Stinger missiles, which the Taliban possess in abundance.
Another decoy strategy would involve giant C-141 and C-130 carriers transporting special forces and forces of the 82nd and 101st divisions directly from their bases in the US, and dropping them over Afghanistan from a low altitude of 500 metres, minimising exposure to enemy fire. Meanwhile, special forces at Jacobabad and Uzbekistan airbases would designate the drop zones under cover of F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18 fighters. This scenario would require an inordinate number of planes to carry out effectively, and even the slightest error could result in a catastrophe, the consequences of which would be disastrous for the Bush administration.
A third scenario for ground intervention entails creating conditions for the Northern Alliance to secure Kabul, and then routing Taliban forces in other Afghan cities. In this scenario, US special forces would have to secure control of roads and mountain passes, and destroy the caves and fortified hideaways which might shelter Taliban forces. This strategy, from a US point of view, has much to recommend it. Northern Alliance forces are currently only 40 kilometres from the Taliban front-line; only Al-Sheikh mountains separate them from the Jalalabad area. On the other hand, many factors make it near impossible for such a plan to succeed. Until now, there has been no effective military coordination between the US forces and the Northern Alliance. Moreover, there are nine approaches to Kabul. The Northern Alliance controls only three, while the Taliban still controls all other access and supply routes, particularly those linking Kabul to Jalalabad, Kandahar and Mazar Al-Sharif. Nor do the Northern Alliance forces know whether US bombing has sufficiently weakened the Taliban for an assault. This makes it too risky for them to approach Kabul without outside support. Indeed, it is likely that even if they were to succeed in taking Kabul, they could suddenly find themselves besieged then eliminated from Afghanistan altogether.
Apart from these military considerations, there are important political dimensions, too. The US is acutely aware that its support for the Northern Alliance forces could alienate its ally, Pakistan. Yet even if the US were to make that political gamble, helping the Northern Alliance take Kabul would not necessarily alter the outcome of the war. US forces are unsure exactly where the lines of confrontation between the Taliban and Northern Alliance are, which would make their allies at much at risk from US bombs as their enemies.
US and British forces and the Northern Alliance are on a tight schedule. In three weeks, the holy month of Ramadan begins. At that point, more military action will only further inflame the already heated passions in the Islamic world. Also around the corner is the long and brutal Afghan winter when temperatures plunge to 50 degrees below zero and glaciers block the mountain passes for five months at a time. US strategists are not as pessimistic about the winter as one might expect. Some believe that US forces could perhaps drive the Taliban and Bin Laden into mountain hideaways and then cut their supply lines, leaving them to starve or freeze to death. Military strategists also say that the clear winter skies and the cold will help the air force and its heat-sensitive missile guidance systems.
But of course the US would like to deliver a masterstroke within the next three weeks. To do so, it must pinpoint the location of Bin Laden and his top aides, and then, perhaps, dispatch a Black Hawk helicopter to drop a commando unit nearby. The commandos -- equipped with bulletproof vests, supersensitive devices that allows them to communicate in whispers, and high-tech night vision equipment -- would steal into Al-Qa'ida bases in the dead of night, and establish bridgeheads for assaults against Taliban forces. Experts think that not only could such operations eliminate Bin Laden, but would give CNN a golden opportunity to broadcast action live for the first time since the assault on Afghanistan began.
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