Al-Ahram Weekly Online 25 - 31 October 2001 Issue No.557
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Al-Ahram:

A Diwan of contemporary life (413)

Because of the Nile's immense importance to Egyptians, the security of this sacrosanct river has always been a matter of major concern. Thus Egyptians were badly shaken when news came of an agreement between a US firm and Ethiopia to build a huge reservoir on Lake Tana, the largest lake in the Ethiopian highlands, to feed the Nile. If completed, the American company and Addis Ababa would have controlled the source of the Blue Nile which provides Egypt with its fertile crop-producing soil. That Britain, given the history of its colonial designs, was suspected by Al-Ahram of masterminding the plan, alarmed Egyptians even more. Professor Yunan Labib Rizk* provides the details in this Nile Valley crisis

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Nile jitters

Mohamed Ali; Ibrahim Zaki; Othman Muharram and Mohamed Sherif

Since the earliest days of the Pharaohs, Egyptians have greeted the annual flooding of the Nile with a mix of jubilation and dread. If the flood reached a suitable level, its fertile silt would bring prosperity; if not, it would lead to devastation and draught. It is little wonder, given the inability to predict whether the Nile would bestow its life- giving blessings or vent its destructive anger, that the Nile god Hapi was one of the most venerated Pharaonic deities. The awe Hapi engendered has been reflected in folk songs that are sung on the occasion of the annual flood up until now.

Yet, long before the Aswan dam tamed the Nile, Egypt's rulers sought to plumb the river's secrets in the hopes of guarding against its whims. Undoubtedly the most pressing question in this quest was where the Nile came from, or as Ahmed Shawqi wrote in his Ode to the Nile, "Did you descend from the heavens or surge in rivulets from the upper reaches of paradise?"

Mohamed Ali, the founder of the modern Egyptian state, spearheaded the quest. As he secured the upper Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown, scientific expeditions explored further into the upper reaches of the river. Perhaps the most famous of these was that led by Salim Pasha Qubtan. The mystique of the "eternal river" soon captured the imagination of European and American explorers. Nineteenth century history abounds in discoveries which enabled them to chart the upper reaches of the Nile. The greatest colonial power of the time, Britain, was in the vanguard of these explorations, which explains why the largest of the equatorial Great Lakes at the head of the Nile was named after Queen Victoria and two others were named after her husband, Prince Albert, and her son, Prince Edward.

If the European discoveries unveiled one of the hidden secrets of the Nile, it seemed that the more familiar they became with the river, the more Egyptians had cause for alarm. Egyptian fears of European designs came to a head on several occasions. The first occurred shortly after the British occupation of Egypt when the British authorities insisted that Egyptian forces evacuate Sudan, leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed Sherif Pasha in 1884. The prime minister's famous words before resigning -- "although we have left Sudan, Sudan will not leave us!" -- epitomised the Egyptians' realisation of colonial intentions in that extensive area that was officially under Egyptian rule.

Egyptian apprehensions cropped up again in 1898 when a French campaign sought to take control of a part of the upper reaches of the Nile. They only abated when Kitchener, commander of the British-Egyptian expedition to reconquer Sudan, confronted Captain Marchand, the commander of the French forces, in Fashoda. To Al-Ahram at the time it appeared that "the world was on edge" at the prospect of a war between the two colonial powers. However, the crisis ended with the withdrawal of the French troops.

A quarter of a century later, in 1924, the assassination of Sirdar Lee Harvey Stack, governor-general of Sudan, precipitated another Nile Valley crisis. The assassination led Lord Allenby, the British high commissioner in Cairo, to deliver his notorious seven-point ultimatum to Prime Minister Saad Zaghlul. Point five of the ultimatum ordered the Egyptian government "to issue within 24 hours orders to recall all Egyptian officers and army units headed towards Sudan." More alarming was point six, which ordered the prime minister "to inform the relevant authority that the government of Sudan will increase the area of land under cultivation in Al-Jazeera from the present 30,000 feddans to an indefinite size, as needs require."

The ultimatum brought the downfall of the Zaghlul government. However, a lesser-known fact is that point six of the ultimatum eventually cost Allenby his post in Cairo. During World War I, Allenby led the campaign that drove the Turks out of Palestine, and on that crest of fame he was appointed high commissioner of Egypt in order to put down the nationalist uprising that had erupted in 1919. He succeeded in this task, for at his urging London issued the Declaration of 28 February 1922, granting Egypt nominal independence. Not long afterwards, however, he was recalled to London where officials informed him that, as Al-Ahram reported, "he was no longer to be the British commissioner in Cairo, news that came as a surprise to all, especially the Egyptians."

Allenby's dismissal continued to mystify historians until 1975 when the British government declassified the Foreign Office documents of 1924. Half a century after the assassination of Stack, it came to light that Allenby's superiors in the Foreign Office were angered that he had issued the ultimatum to the Zaghlul government without first having obtained their approval and that they were particularly infuriated by point six of the ultimatum. London was acutely aware that Egyptians would find any action it took that affected the flow of the Nile highly provocative. Indeed, soon after Allenby's dismissal, London officially rescinded the notorious sixth point.

Three years later, Egyptian fears for their sacrosanct river loomed again when reports reached Egypt of an agreement between a US firm and Ethiopia to build a huge reservoir on Lake Tana, the largest lake in the Ethiopian highlands, which feeds the main river through its tributary called the Blue Nile. This little- known chapter in the history of Nilotic nightmares was covered extensively in Al-Ahram throughout the winter of 1927.

On 5 November 1927, several alarming headlines appeared in the newspaper like, "Grave threat to Egypt, the Ethiopian government makes deal with US firm to build a dam on Lake Tana." Under this headline, the newspaper attempted to convey to its readers the significance of this distant lake. Totalling 3,000 square kilometres, Lake Tana is situated in a vast 14,000 square- kilometre basin. The basin collects an average of a metre of annual summer rainfall in addition to at least 6.5 billion cubic metres of floodwater. "The lake could be transformed into an enormous reservoir without altering it significantly, simply by modifying its outlet," the newspaper added.

It went on to report that a group of American entrepreneurs concluded a deal with Ethiopian Crown Prince Ras Tefri -- later to be crowned Emperor Haile Sellassie -- to construct a dam on Lake Tana. "The project is estimated to cost LE4 million. If completed, the American company and the government of Ethiopia will have secured control over the source of the Blue Nile, whose annual flood inundates the Nile Valley and provides Egypt with its fertile crop-producing soil," Al-Ahram said.

Because of the potential threat of the proposed dam, the newspaper exhorted the Egyptian government to develop its relations with Ethiopia. "The government should appoint two diplomatic representatives to that country, resolve whatever differences exist between the Ethiopia and the Orthodox Coptic Church, and take all possible advantage of the religious, geographical and historical ties that link the two countries," it urged, adding, "Nothing could be more dangerous for Egypt at present than the pursuit of a policy of negligence and complacency with regard to the sources and course of the Nile."

The Aswan High Dam

The following day, alarm increased with a report from the New York Times which Al-Ahram carried. The Hewitt firm in New York had submitted to Addis Ababa a proposal for a dam to be built on Lake Tana at its outlet, the Blue Nile. The dam, which would cost $20 million, "would hold back the floodwaters that descend from the Ethiopian plateau, thereby allowing for the regulation of the flow of the Blue Nile and making it possible to irrigate the British-owned lands through which the river flows. The company has announced that it intends to construct the reservoir at its own expense and sell water to Britain." The Times further reported that the US secretary of state was close to approving the project and that, for the first time, Washington would send a permanent diplomatic representative to Addis Ababa.

Describing the reaction in Egypt, Al-Ahram wrote: "Hardly did the newspaper hit the stands yesterday than readers snatched it up to follow with great trepidation the grave news on the deal between the American company and the Ethiopian crown prince. The issue is the major topic of concern in the capital and all other Egyptian towns and cities and in meetings of the nation's leaders. As for Egyptian farmers, they are perplexed, wondering what their government and the Ministry of Pubic Works intend to do."

Given the history of British colonial designs in Sudan, Al- Ahram initially suspected that the British was behind the project. After all, the extensive farmland of Al-Jazeera would be the first to benefit from the Blue Nile's life-giving waters and precious silt. However, Washington's support for the project led it to another conclusion. The US, which had emerged from World War I as Britain's major competitor, hoped to "deliver a blow to Britain by securing its grip over Lake Tana on which the British had wanted to build a dam but failed to win over the government of Ethiopia for the project."

Al-Ahram then turned its sights on Minister of Public Works Othman Muharram Pasha whom it accused of inaction. "We cannot understand the minister's position on this matter, nor how he can fail to appreciate the duty of the press, the gravity of the situation and his duty towards the people. Does he think the matter will simply go away if he ignores it, as he did with regard to other major irrigation projects?"

The project also stirred misgivings in Britain where it seemed that every newspaper without exception spoke out against the project. The Morning Post proclaimed that the dam could not be built without British approval. "It will be impossible to obtain the necessary materials for constructing the dam without first building a motorway or a railroad to the area, and this must past through Sudan," it argued. More importantly, it held that the proposed project was not even feasible, because the ravines through which the Nile passes as it emerges from Lake Tana were too cavernous and the areas around the lake were swamps unfit for irrigation.

The Daily News was quick to point out that London was a signatory party to the League of Nations resolution that stated, "Should any nation seek to undertake a project pertaining to its water resources that would affect the water resources of neighbouring countries, that nation must negotiate with its neighbours before engaging in any action that might harm their interests." The implication was clear. Britain could well intervene to put a halt to the project.

The British media campaign against the dam reached its peak in the London Times, well-known for reflecting the thinking of the Foreign Office. It wrote: "The British government has long sought to persuade the rulers who have succeeded to the throne in Ethiopia of the benefits that would accrue to Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia itself from regulating the floodwaters at Lake Tana." It went on to charge that by reaching an agreement with an American firm, Addis Ababa was giving preponderance to economic considerations to the detriment of political considerations. Specifically, it reminded Addis Ababa of an agreement it signed in 1902, and warned that "the reservoir will be of little avail if Addis Ababa does reach an agreement with the countries through which the Nile flows."

In the ensuing flurry of communications between British officials and their counterparts in Washington and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia dispatched a representative, Dr Martin, to London in an attempt to overcome the British opposition to the dam. Martin had been instrumental in securing the deal with the Hewitt construction company. According to Al-Ahram's Abul-Fath who interviewed Martin, he was "in his sixties, of medium height, somewhat dark- skinned and with little hair left, mostly white. His expression appears placid, hiding great cunning and intelligence."

The Egyptian consul in Liverpool was on hand to greet Dr Martin upon his arrival in the British port. By way of offering reassurance, Martin informed the consul that the agreement had not yet been signed and that the main purpose of the proposed reservoir was to enable his government to sell water to Sudan. It is not difficult to imagine that such reassurances did little to assuage Egyptian fears.

Martin was unsuccessful in overcoming British objections to the project and the proposed agreement with the Hewitt company. Clearly frustrated at the end of the talks, he declared that the whole affair was a misunderstanding, "a storm in a teacup." "Since there was no intention to impinge upon the pledges to which Britain is committed, we did not feel it necessary to inform Britain of the agreement, particularly as the government of Addis Ababa had no intention of obstructing the flow of the Nile."

Having thus surrendered, Martin decided to shelve the project and return home. In Egypt, however, where alarm bells over the nation's lifeblood had been sounded, officials and experts were not so readily prepared to put the matter behind them.

Curiously, it was only when the crisis abated that the long silent minister of public works finally spoke. In an interview with Abul- Fath, Othman Muharram Pasha said that the Blue Nile, which conveys its precious silt to Egypt, gets only a small portion of its water from Lake Tana. "Most of its water comes from the many rivulets that flow into it, and it is these rivulets that supply the silt, not the lake water which is clear." In somewhat more detail, he added that the Blue Nile derives no more than a tenth of its water from Lake Tana and that the waters from the lake constitute no more than 7.5 per cent of the water that reaches Egypt during the Nile flood and between three and six per cent of the water when the Nile is at its lowest ebb.

Although Al-Ahram featured the interview with the minister on its front page, his reassurances were not enough to allay Egyptian fears. Al-Ahram, therefore, turned to other sources who would inspire confidence: members of the ruling family known for their concern for Sudan and the Nile Valley, the head of the Wafd Party and, finally, irrigation experts.

In an interview with Al-Ahram, Prince Mohamed Ali said that although he was not an engineer, he was aware that in view of the nature of the Nile and the amount of water which is lost to the Mediterranean every year, Egyptians should not be alarmed at the news of the Lake Tana reservoir project. "There are no grounds for fear because the proposed reservoir can only hold so much water and the surplus must inevitably take its natural course as it has done for thousands of years," he said.

Prince Omar Touson, a champion of the nationalist call for the "unity of the Nile Valley" and the security of the Nile, was cautiously optimistic. He told Al-Ahram that the Lake Tana project could turn out to be beneficial for Egypt because it would "foretell the benefits or harm the river might bring to Egypt." He advised Egyptians to take all necessary measures to ensure that the Nile "from its sources to its mouth" does not fall under the control of a foreign power and that "Egypt alone retains full control, since its freedom has been so closely linked to the Nile since the beginning of creation until the present."

Mustafa El-Nahhas, the successor to Saad Zaghlul who had passed away a few weeks earlier, seemed keen to show how inspired he was by the spirit of the late nationalist leader. "This is indeed a very grave concern," El-Nahhas said. "To construct a dam at the outlet of Lake Tana without consulting Egypt and without permitting Egypt to stipulate its conditions for the distribution of its water so as to safeguard its permanent right to the waters of the Blue Nile would constitute such a serious threat to Egypt's life that it would not be able to remain silent."

While Egyptians may have found some comfort in the statements of the princes and the Wafd leader, only experts could provide the necessary hard facts. For these, Al-Ahram turned first to Ibrahim Zaki, a young irrigation expert who would become the minister of irrigation in the late sixties and an important figure behind the construction of the High Dam. Zaki contributed a lengthy feature that was published in Al-Ahram on 11 and 12 November 1927 under the headline, "Lake Tana: a historical myth."

The contents of Zaki's article were consistent with the headline. Zaki listed several reasons which he believed would allay Egyptian fears over the Lake Tana project. Firstly, he said, within seven years of the completion of the dam, the water level in the basin would rise by more than nine metres, submerging all the islands in it and forcing their inhabitants to flee. The enormous lake would then become a cesspool of stagnant water that would breed epidemics posing a threat to the health of the rest of Ethiopia's inhabitants. Thirdly, damming the lake would lead to the drying up of three river beds that supplied water to villages up to 20 kilometres away. Moreover, dam gates would constantly be silting up, requiring restoration work at least every seven years, the costs of which the Ethiopian government could never afford. If the dam worked, Zaki said, Egyptians would not feel the difference from one year to the next. In 1916, 60,000 million cubic metres of water passed through Egypt, of which only 2,500 million cubic metres came from Lake Tana. But he said if the dam were to open after several years, the cities of Khartoum and Umm Durman and all of Upper Egypt would be lost in less than 10 days, "a calamity unknown in history."

Eventually, Egyptians set aside their fears over the Lake Tana project, and several decades later the High Dam enabled them to stop worrying forever over the unpredictability of the Nile floods. Ironically, though, the High Dam created a new Nile anxiety exploited by Egypt's foes. A call was made last year by Israeli Minister of Infrastructure Avigdor Lieberman to bomb the dam. But then, Lieberman did not draw a lesson from the fate that befell Lord Allenby in 1924 when he, too, tried to play dice with Egypt over the Nile.

* The author is a professor of history and head of Al-Ahram History Studies Centre.

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