1 - 7 November 2001
Issue No.558
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 1 - 7 November 2001 Issue No.558 |
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The Bush-Sharon summit
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed wonders whether Bush and Sharon can see eye to eye in the present circumstances
Unlike his predecessor Bill Clinton, who met Arafat frequently during his tenure, George W Bush has studiously avoided meeting the Palestinian leader. But will the new priorities that the 11 September attacks have imposed on America's foreign policy cause him to rethink the merits of remaining aloof from Arafat? Can we expect to see the situation change dramatically, with the US president standing beside Arafat and compelling Israel's prime minister to abandon his plans to assassinate the Palestinian leader?
The Palestinian problem has reached its most critical stage. Sharon, who sees Bush's strategy to eradicate terrorism at the global level as an ideal opportunity to eliminate Arafat on the grounds that he represents terrorism at the regional level, has taken to calling the Palestinian leader the "Bin Laden of the Middle East"!
But in his war against global terrorism, Bush wants all parties around the world to concentrate exclusively on Bin Laden, whom he regards as the spearhead of the terrorist threat worldwide. Hence the need to win over the Palestinians, which entails keeping Arafat alive and able to continue functioning as chairman of the Palestinian Authority.
It is in this logic that Bush spoke of the need for a Palestinian state, a theme that was subsequently taken up by the major European leaders. The West hoped in this way to allay the fears raised by Bush's early mistake of describing the war against terrorism as a Crusade by making it clear that the campaign was directed against Bin Laden in his capacity as a terrorist, not as an Arab or a Muslim. And for the first time, a US president from the Republican Party linked the resolution of the Palestinian problem to the creation of a Palestinian state, possibly with East Jerusalem as its capital.
It would need an extraordinary effort to get Sharon to agree to the creation of a Palestinian state and to be Arafat's partner in a peace process, and not look at him as a foe, a representative of terrorism who has to be eliminated. But the question is whether such an effort is still justified after the killing of Israel's far-right minister of tourism, Rehavam Zeevi, in answer to Israel's killing of Abu Ali Mustafa, the secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Bush is faced with a very difficult equation: on the one hand, winning over the Arab and Islamic countries would require him to go further than he really wants to, for example, turning the lip service he is now paying to the Palestinian state slogan into actual reality; on the other, to deal with Sharon more harshly than he would perhaps wish, at a time the latter believes, in the aftermath of Zeevi's killing, that he is authorised to impose his viewpoint, and do whatever he thinks fit.
True, Sharon is subjected to pressure from both the American administration and from members of his own cabinet, mainly Labour Party members who are threatening to pull out of the coalition government unless Sharon resumes negotiations and stops threatening to eliminate Arafat. Sharon can hardly deny that the escalating violence he is using against the Palestinians has made the situation even more explosive, especially since most of the areas which the Israelis previously evacuated are now re-occupied. Sharon believes that as the confrontation with Bin Laden heats up, as world attention becomes more and more focused on the efforts to close in on the elusive quarry, the constraints now placed on him will ease up and allow him to strike Arafat and put the whole world before a fait accompli.
As a sop to international public opinion, Sharon could pretend that he wanted only to remove Arafat as chairman of the Palestinian Authority, not to liquidate him physically, and that the idea was to have him exiled to Tunisia or elsewhere, along the lines of what happened to him after his expulsion from Lebanon two decades ago. But history does not repeat itself, and the real objective is to remove Arafat from the picture once and for all, which would require his physical elimination. This is the charge said to have been put forward by Peres in a restricted cabinet meeting, where he allegedly accused a group of officers close to Sharon of concocting such a plan and presenting it to the prime minister for approval. Whatever the case, this issue will certainly be raised in Bush's meeting with Sharon, even if the latter tries to avoid a frank discussion.
Sharon could respond by accusing the American administration of not waging war to eliminate terrorism as it claims, but only to eliminate Bin Laden in revenge for his attack against America's most meaningful symbols: the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, perhaps even the White House if the fourth hijacked plane had not crashed before hitting its target. In Sharon's view the war against terrorism would not be complete unless it includes Arafat as head of the PLO, which is itself, according to him, a terrorist organisation. So why should Sharon bow to US pressure on the matter?
But Bush can also answer that it is in America's interest not to antagonise the Arabs and the Muslims at a time it is waging a decisive battle against Bin Laden, and that what is good for America should be seen as good for Israel as well. Moreover, Bush can ask whether it is really in Israel's interest to liquidate Arafat, the one man capable of keeping the bulk of the Palestinians as a cohesive entity subject to one central authority. Surely Israel would prefer to deal with an enemy that is well-defined and familiar rather than have to confront a multitude of separate factions not bound by any contractual agreements.
The problem is that Bush and Sharon do not feel committed to each other in terms of any solid mutual obligations. Neither has any objection to place the other before a fait accompli. Bush placed the whole world before a fait accompli by attacking Afghanistan without conclusive evidence that Bin Laden and his accomplices are hiding there. What would prevent Sharon from placing the world before a similar fait accompli concerning the liquidation of Arafat?
Sharon does not really believe that he has to return any land now under Israeli occupation. He opposes the principle of the exchange of land for peace as determined by Security Council Resolution 242. He does not agree that land has to be relinquished if peace is to be reached.
But what is new after 11 September is that the world will not be the same as it was before that date. With the tragic terrorist events of that day, one of the underlying principles guiding the new world order, which is that all conflicts can be resolved by peaceful means, no longer holds. It cannot hold if combating terrorism takes precedence over all other issues. This is a feature of the present world system that Sharon will exploit to the utmost. Bush is striving to build an international alliance against terrorism. Sharon is for leaving it to every local actor to combat terrorism the way he sees fit, with no regard for international law. After all, if terrorists act outside the rules of international law, why should those fighting them remain bound by those rules? What of the new threat of bioterrorism? Are other terrorist groups settling their accounts with the federal government without fear of reprisal, believing that Bin Laden would be blamed for the anthrax outbreak? Actors in the world game are now taking advantage of every card they hold, irrespective of its legality. Chaos is replacing "world order."
Also worth noting is that the Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict with its own structure and dynamics, one that cannot readily be instrumentalised. The protagonists in this conflict are not all advocates of a peaceful settlement, of the creation of a Palestinian state; there are also the rejectionists on either side who do not believe peace is possible. Prominent among the latter is Israel's present coalition government, whose Labour component is too weak to impact effectively on government policy.
Bush himself is closer to the Israeli rejectionists than he is to the Israeli advocates of a settlement. When he became president, he declared he would not repeat the mistake of his predecessor who, according to him, got too involved in the peace process which adversely affected America's image by failing to produce results. But now Bush is faced with the need to win over Arab and Islamic constituencies in his war against Bin Laden, and it will be interesting to see to what extent what he perceives as American interests will take precedence over what Israel sees as its interests.
Can Sharon defy Bush? Can he adopt an independent Israeli line? Or would he risk sharing the fate of Shamir in the days of Bush Sr and Netanyahu in Clinton's days, both of whom were dislodged from power for not toeing the American line? This might be the key issue in the Bush-Sharon summit in Washington, which will probably end inconclusively, even if both parties came out with statements to the contrary.
Actually, much will depend on the outcome of the war against terrorism. If catching Bin Laden remains at the top of Bush's agenda and continues to take precedence over everything else, it will be difficult for him to reach a compromise with Sharon. If Bin Laden is caught, however, there will be no reason for Bush to adopt a tough line with Sharon.
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