22 - 28 November 2001
Issue No.561
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 22 - 28 November 2001 Issue No.561 |
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None of the above
The US is caught between a rock and a hard place when it comes to setting down a plan for post-Taliban Afghanistan, writes Nyier Abdou
When the Northern Alliance rumbled into Kabul last Tuesday, it was not the glorious homecoming they had been dreaming of since former President Burhanuddin Rabbani and his Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan (JIA) party were ousted by the upstart Taliban movement in September 1996. Images of triumphant NA members taking down the Taliban flag and beaming Afghan men caressing the bare skin of their cheeks for the first time in years belie the wave of queasiness washing over US planners, UN diplomats and Afghans alike. Has the Afghan civil war finally come full circle?
Still the titular president of the UN- recognised Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) -- not to be confused with the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), which until recent weeks covered more than 90 per cent of the country -- Rabbani is gunning to play a major role in the future leadership of Afghanistan. Public statements by Rabbani since his return to Kabul on Saturday have pussyfooted around declaring his shadow government back in power. He insists that the JIA is merely holding down the fort until an internationally recognised, broad-based coalition can rise up in his place.
These are the right words for Western ears, but the JIA's actions in Kabul bespeak a reinstallation of the predominantly Tajik JIA -- a move that could reignite the old ethnic rivalries and infighting that characterised the post-Soviet, pre-Taliban period. Other minority factions in the fragile coalition that makes up the NA -- notably those of Uzbek leader Abdurrashid Dostum and radical Islamist and former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar -- will not stand by and see their claims to power ignored.
As the Taliban crumbles, the lack of forethought regarding a transition government has become painfully obvious. The so-called six-plus-two group (the countries that border Afghanistan plus Russia and the US) all have direct concerns, and their own agendas, in Afghanistan. None of these nations -- from Pakistan, with its large Pashtun population; to Iran, who wants a say for Afghan Shi'as; to former occupier Russia -- is an honest peace-broker in this crisis. Both Russia and Iran, who strongly back the NA, intend to reopen embassies in Kabul.
S Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, points to Russia's efforts to prop up Rabbani as particularly flagrant. Although the US urged the NA not to take Kabul, and despite numerous statements acceding to this directive, "the NA rushed to enter Kabul, sent in a 2,000-man militia, brought Rabbani to the capital, began appointing governors, took over key ministries, and declared that it alone -- not the UN, the king or anyone else -- would convene the meeting to create a new government," Starr told Al-Ahram Weekly. He added, emphatically: "This rush for control is exactly what the Russian army did in the case of Pristina during the Balkan struggle."
Starr says that the US should pressure Putin to withdraw his recognition of Rabbani -- a move he also recommends to the UN. "We are wasting our time only dealing with Rabbani, when his actions, both their ends and means, derive more from decisions in Moscow than in Afghanistan. This is 100 per cent the revenge of the Russian generals [for] their defeat in 1989. It must not go unchallenged at that level. Nothing else will work at this point."
Before the taking of Kabul, there were basically three options open to the US-led alliance: they could back the NA from start to finish and leave the former government in power; they could put their faith in former king Mohamed Zaher Shah and the holding of a traditional loya jirga (grand council); or they could call for a full UN transitional government similar to that of Kosovo and East Timor. None of these options is entirely appealing on its own, which is obviously why there is still so much confusion about post-Taliban plans.
Thomas Gouttierre, director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, told the Weekly that most of the prominent NA leaders like Rabbani, Dostum and Hekmatyar carry "a lot of baggage" and should not be a part of a future government. Gouttierre dismissed Rabbani as "more of a divisive force than he is a constructive one" and warned that the reinstallation of the NA in Kabul will drain much-needed support in the south.
It seems that the US and other European allies have been leaning toward a blend of the latter two options: a broad-based government initiated by a loya jirga, with the king as a figurehead, but enforced by the UN. This plan still evades naming an uncontroversial figure to be groomed as the future leader, without which a credible leadership can seem unattainable. But perhaps even more important than the 'who' is the 'when'. Convening a loya jirga on the scale sought by Zaher Shah and agreeing on the new council and leadership could simply take too long.
David Edwards, author of Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier and Children of History: Genealogy of Afghan Jihad, stresses that the role of Zaher Shah at this stage is crucial, although he admits that there are significant drawbacks in putting too much weight behind the authority of an ageing king. Edwards suggests that one of the main avenues available for establishing the infrastructure of a new government is the humanitarian crisis itself. "While we are addressing the immediate needs of the people, we should also see this crisis as an opportunity for laying down the grid of government authority in the country," he said.
The issue of a UN transitional government has been raised repeatedly among experts as the only credible way to introduce a more moderate and stable government in Kabul. Last Wednesday the UN Security Council approved a resolution formally committing to a "central role" for the UN in a transition government. UN envoy Francesc Vendrell, who arrived in Kabul on Saturday for intensive talks with NA leaders was working to persuade Rabbani and other leaders to take part in an inter-Afghan meeting on establishing an interim government. Though Rabbani initially insisted on holding the meeting in Kabul, he has since relented on this demand. On Tuesday, it was announced that the meeting would likely be held in Berlin next Monday, although Rabbani had not yet accepted an invitation to take part.
The plan outlined to the Security Council by UN senior envoy Lakhdar Brahimi involves a two-year transitional government backed by a peace-keeping force. This is a tall order for the UN, particularly since other transitional administrations, like that of Kosovo, are by no means a success story. Edwards points out that given the inexperience of the Bush administration in foreign policy, Brahimi and the UN should be empowered to guide the next stage of the operation in Afghanistan. "We need to bring the parties to the table and keep them there," Edwards told the Weekly. "We are going to need to offer incentives, bribes, exhortations and threats in exactly the right proportions and at the right times -- and that entails a degree of familiarity with the actors and the culture I'm not convinced we have. So the will may be there, but it remains to be seen if we have the talent for it."
"One thing [the US] should not do is take a backseat to Pakistan, as we have done in the past," says Edwards. He insists that although Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf deserves America's gratitude for taking a "risky course of action", following Pakistan's lead is the wrong way to repay him. "Pakistan was in many ways the author of this tragedy, through its support of groups like [Hekmatyar's] Hizb-i Islami and then the Taliban, and we can't forget that."
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