22 - 28 November 2001
Issue No.561
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 22 - 28 November 2001 Issue No.561 |
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Washington reconsiders
The reorientation of US policy, signalled by Colin Powell, suggests a basis for progress in the peace process, writes Ibrahim Nafie
No one expected the US to propose -- or impose -- a final settlement to the chronic problems between the Palestinians and Israelis. What we expected was for Washington to take a fresh approach towards resolving the conflict within a framework that would make it possible to halt the deteriorating situation and bring both sides back to the negotiating table, reviving hopes for a just and permanent solution. What US Secretary of State Colin Powell has put forward meets, at least in part, such expectations.
The Powell proposal, as a whole, marks an important turning point in Washington's attitudes towards the peace process, in that it offers something that can be built upon, but only if it can be put into effect.
Until now the current US administration has opted to maintain a low level of intervention in the interplay between the Palestinians and Israelis, out of the belief that the two sides could resolve their problems on their own. Indeed, it thought that this was the only way their problems could be sorted out.
In practice this approach proved detrimental to any progress already made on the Palestinian-Israeli track of the peace process. And the US administration intervened practically only in order to curb further deterioration, rather than to push for progress. It thus appeared sometimes that Washington had decided to allow the two sides to wear one another out until they were ready to contemplate a more constructive mode of action. The effect of this was to give Sharon a free hand to pressure the Palestinian people.
Simultaneously, the US administration's perception of how to handle the current crisis remained confined within the limits of the Mitchell Report (and Tenet plan), which provided a practical agenda for halting the violence and resuming negotiations, although the intent was essentially to build confidence rather than resolve outstanding problems. Although this framework offered some useful and potentially productive ideas, it was flawed in several ways.
It failed to address the core issues at the root of the tensions. It obliged the PA to contain Palestinian anger at the Israeli occupation and Jewish settlers while leaving it without the slightest notion of what lay in store for the future. Certainly, the Likud government entertained no acceptable visions for a viable peace.
The thinking embodied by the framework did not encompass a practical mechanism for monitoring and enforcing the implementation of existing obligations under agreements already reached. In view of Israel's greater ability to garner Washington's sympathy, the Palestinians have always been made to appear at fault for obstructing the implementation of the accords, which has led many in Washington unfamiliar with the situation to believe Israel has been acting in self-defense.
Washington's thinking also lacked any time frame for the negotiating process. Given Israel's desire for a settlement process founded upon a series of interim phases that would take years to implement, and a government that has no compunction against jettisoning all progress made under previous agreements, the peace process had become a mirage.
Powell's proposals do not address all these problems. They do not, for example, address the question of a time frame or the implementation of provisions under interim agreements already signed, notably those regarding the third phase of redeployment. His proposals were also vague on the mechanisms ensuring the transition from one phase to the next -- from a halt in violence to negotiations and from there to a final settlement.
Still, there are certain respects in which Powell addressed the problems surrounding the Mitchell-Tenet framework that make it possible to speak of an important departure in US policy. Firstly, his proposals as a whole signal that Washington has abandoned its hands-off policy towards the Middle East and is now determined to reach practical solutions to the problems at hand.
Secondly, Powell touched upon the crucial issues of borders, Jewish settlements, Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. Not only did his speech allude to the principle of land for peace and the progress made in Camp David, it included pointed references to "the occupation" and Israeli "settlements," never before raised openly in the rhetoric of the Bush administration.
Thirdly, the formulae for dealing with final status issues have a practical dimension that makes them worth further consideration. The proposal addressed questions of withdrawal and settlements in an unequivocal manner and called for a just and realistic solution to the problems of Jerusalem and refugees, and as such could serve as the basis for direct negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis.
The policy statement was relatively balanced in delineating the primary bases for moving forward in the coming phase. It called upon the Israelis to end the occupation and halt settlement construction and the Palestinians to halt the violence, or to exert its utmost efforts towards this end. The PA will have no problem abiding by this framework as long as the causes behind resistance show hope of ending.
Powell affirmed the need for a specific mechanism for implementing the Mitchell-Tenet framework: General Anthony Zinni would be sent over as a resident envoy to participate directly in the negotiating process until a cease-fire is securely in place. In addition, the US is also prepared to consider a form of monitoring, which would eliminate a whole range of complications.
Powell's policy statement made it clear that the US needed other parties, such as Egypt, the EU, Jordan, the UN and Russia, to assist in this process. That he paid a special tribute to Egypt and President Sadat signalled the type of creativity and initiative the US hopes to bring to bear in reaching a solution.
These preliminary observations point to a constructive approach in US policy towards the Middle East, one that might offer a reasonable basis for beginning a new phase in the peace process. Most important now is to turn this approach into action, which requires cooperation between all parties concerned, chief among them Israel, to ensure Powell's ideas do not become another lost opportunity.
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