22 - 28 November 2001
Issue No.561
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 22 - 28 November 2001 Issue No.561 |
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Slipping down the slopes
The United States has put together an international posse to hunt down shadows in the desert. Is the campaign well planned, or ill-fated? Medhat El-Zahed * sees ghosts on the political horizon
Oceans and seas have seen US fleets steaming confidently through. Desolate skies have watched US bombers and missiles zooming past. The strangest war declaration ever made was possibly that pronounced by US President George W Bush following the 11 September suicide attacks. It sent US troops into the puzzling terrain of Afghanistan, to seek out "suspects" in caves and crevices suitable for nothing if not for hiding from an uncertain assailant. The US's tactics were borrowed from a Western, the stickers on imaginary global walls familiarly anachronistic: Wanted, Dead or Alive.
American politicians, stepping into freshly-polished cowboy boots, put together an international posse to catch the villain, Bin Laden, and break his outfit, Al-Qa'eda; but can terror be eliminated by sheer force of sheriff-tactics, even when elevated to the realm of international diplomacy? Can men be hunted down, fleets and bombers in full throttle, on mere suspicion? To date, no one has offered conclusive evidence that Bin Laden is guilty as charged.
What can one make of the fact that Washington, after military operations had begun, informed UN officials that these operations will extend to other countries if investigations currently underway indicate their involvement in the 11 September attacks? Where does one draw the line between terror and national liberation movements?
Sheriff-style tactics can cause more damage than good. When terrorists massacred dozens of tourists in Luxor in 1997, many called for the army to intervene and finish the battle against terror. Egypt's top leadership refused, maintaining that armies are not meant for fights against terrorists. Armies are trained and should only be used to fight against a known enemy in a well-defined theatre of operations. They are not meant to chase after ghosts. This still rings true today.
Going after an elusive target, promising further strikes at an undefined later date, doing battle in a confusing theatre of operations, attacking targets that are as likely as not to be civilian: this is not right, and has done little to shore up the international coalition Washington still needs to build. In the Gulf War, the objective and theatre of operations were fairly clear; in contrast, this campaign against terror, this war against ghosts, got off on the wrong foot.
The fervour with which the United States is pursuing this war spreads political reason a bit too thin. True, Europe offered solid, though cautious, solidarity. True, international intelligence services have been forthcoming. True, shipping and flight lanes have been opened to US men and materiel. But operation "wounded eagle," as it were, is still a far cry from Desert Storm. With the remarkable exception of the United Kingdom, no one outside the United States is excited about fighting a war against chimeras, a war of unpredictable arena, scope, and consequences.
The military campaign opened with missile strikes guaranteed to cause havoc on the ground. There was not much to destroy in war-torn Afghanistan, however; and by now, the suspects so dearly wanted by the United States must have taken refuge in fairly inaccessible mountain hideouts. Terrorists may be mad, but not mad enough to hang around in locations singled out as firing ranges by the mightiest war machine on earth.
The ghosts, that is, are gone and, in all likelihood, will not be tracked down except through concerted global intelligence cooperation. Now, is current US conduct conducive to such cooperation? Has fighting a conventional war against an elusive target, with such a high "collateral" toll, served any purpose? Indeed, has it not made matters worse?
The answers seem obvious, but then, maybe not. American, and some Western, media would have us believe that the fate of the suspects, the elusive villains in this Hollywood-style military drama, is sealed. But simplification, even taken to the point of utter delusion, is not an answer to profound international dilemmas. Even if Bin Laden is arrested, even if Al-Qa'eda is pounded to smithereens, terror will not go away. The fight against terror cannot be won, once and for all, unless certain conditions are met.
Injustice and unfairness have created areas of considerable volatility on the international map. These flashpoints of anger and frustration are the perfect crucibles for terror, for violent and twisted reasoning. The United States, instead of understanding this reasoning, instead of defusing its causes, is at best inflaming, at worst matching, it.
A world with a less uneven distribution of wealth, in which inequities are not left to fester, will have fewer of these flashpoints. Is anything being done about that? Is the richest and most powerful country on earth doing anything to alleviate the indignities suffered by the weak and helpless? Is the United States acting in recognition of human rights and the law, or is it, mindlessly and dangerously, borrowing the same terrorist tactics it so ferociously condemns?
The current US campaign is associated with measures limiting civil freedoms as well as a racist campaign against Muslims. Even if it were true that Bin Laden's outfit is responsible for the 11 September attacks, has Christianity ever been blamed for Hitler's crimes, Judaism for Sharon's atrocities?
Notwithstanding the stated goals of the US administration, the current military offensive is likely to strengthen the very groups and ideology it targets. The offensive may make a military dent on Bin Laden's outfit, but the political and ideological ripples it is setting in motion are ominous. New generations of terrorists will be born, President Mubarak has warned. When pictures of Bin Laden are held aloft at anti-US protests, one should pause; but the US administration has not. And even now, the stakes are getting higher.
American missiles and bombers have not brought enlightenment and prosperity to Afghanistan. Muddled US politics will not bring order to a nation encouraged to wage jihad against the Soviets, and then, once the Soviets were out, left to its own devices. The current offensive may or may not have succeeded militarily, but it has set the stage for the rise of groups that espouse violence, everywhere. America may lead other states by the nose, but in the resulting political void, from the darker reaches of inequity, shadowy militants will march on, ghosts will jostle for their 15 minutes in a deadly spotlight, and then ride off into an invisible horizon.
A sombre prophesy? Hardly. Terrorism is the illegitimate child of guerrilla warfare. A weaker adversary may find it difficult defeating an invincible enemy in broad daylight; but a small, determined, irregular outfit employing hit-and-run tactics can harass such a giant to distraction. This much was actually stated in a pamphlet by Dr Ayman El-Zawahri, military commander of Al-Jihad, suspect number two on the US's most-wanted list, and Bin Laden's likely successor. El-Zawahri dubs his tactics the flea-and-dog method: a flea may not be able to defeat the dog in a headlong confrontation, but can suck his blood, with numerous tiny bites, until the dog is writhing in misery. The idea is not new. The same line of reasoning is to be found in the writings of such eminent national liberation figures as Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, General Giap, and Che Guevara.
Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, one of Egypt's leading political writers, in a recent article (Kutub: Wughat Nazar, October 2001), warns that the United States, although relatively safe from attacks by other nations, is now vulnerable to new forms of assault. US intelligence experts cited in Heikal's article speak of a new form of war, without battlefields or regular armies, one in which hit-and-run tactics reign supreme. In the same article, Heikal mentions European scepticism over Bin Laden's presumed responsibility for the 11 September attacks. Since the attack on the USS Cole, European experts note, Bin Laden and his outfit have been under close US scrutiny. How can anyone mount such a well-coordinated attack while still under surveillance? This tantalising question remains unanswered. True, Bin Laden implicitly claimed that his forces carried out the attack, but this proves little more than his own folly. Bin Laden's campaign against Christianity and Judaism betrays a racism no less frightening than Berlusconi's; the only difference is that Bin Laden is a terrorist made by US intelligence and Berlusconi a prime minister made by the Mafia.
There is a world of difference between garden-variety terror operations -- bombings of embassies and theatres, attacks on tourists, assassinations of writers -- and a coordinated assault employing four passenger aircraft against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. The masterminds of 11 September even went so far as to confound US authorities with false leads: individuals whom passenger lists recorded as being aboard the four planes were later found alive and well, outside the United States.
Whoever the perpetrator, a new pattern may be emerging. The success of the attacks may trigger a wave of sporadic violence, the kind of violence the United States, with its current campaign, is instigating rather than eliminating. But why is the United States acting in this way? Why is it exhibiting more zeal than statesmanship?
One reason could be that it is intoxicated by its own superpower status, blinded by its own might. Another is that the American public, infuriated by the attacks, is demanding vengeance. Most countries, eager to appease the mighty superpower, played along initially. Then enough time passed for reason to set in, and nothing happened. The US military campaign is still going strong. Is the United States waiting for some retribution to be exacted, or does it have something else in mind? For one thing, there is the allure of setting up a proxy government in Afghanistan, a country strategically situated among Russia, several former Soviet Republics, China, and Iran -- all of which are states the United States would like to keep an eye on -- and close to the rich oil resources of the Caspian Sea. In other words, Washington may have bigger fish in sight than Bin Laden and the Taliban.
Those within the US administration who wish to keep some perspective on the scale and goals of the military campaign remain a minority. The military-industrial complex wants operations to expand and endure. The current campaign is a money earner for arms manufacturers, the bloodhounds of war who kept the Vietnam conflict alive for so many years, even in the face of ardent public opposition. The magnates of the weapons industry do not wish to see flashpoints extinguished; on the contrary, they want flare-ups to grow more frequent and more intense. This is the only explanation for Washington's assertion that the current campaign against Bin Laden and the Taliban may last for years and even spill into other countries. In short, the arms industry may be leading the United States, unwittingly, into another Vietnam, or worse. And, who do you think will foot the bill?
* The writer is a journalist for Al-Ahali newspaper.
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