22 - 28 November 2001
Issue No.561
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 22 - 28 November 2001 Issue No.561 |
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The Bush-Putin rapprochement
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed wonders if the warm relations between Bush and Putin are merely the result of good chemistry, or whether they reflect the deeper concerns of the two sides
The high point of the three-day Bush-Putin summit meeting, which ended last Friday, was the 24 hours they spent on President Bush's ranch in Texas, where the relaxed surroundings provided an ideal opportunity for the two men to cement what already appeared to be a warm personal relationship. Although the summit's accomplishments were relatively modest on issues of substance, notably on the Antiballistic Missile Treaty controversy and the decommissioning of nuclear stockpiles, the tone remained determinedly upbeat, with both presidents vowing to overcome differences and strengthen relations between their two countries. This is in stark contrast with the rationale that prevailed throughout the Cold War, when these relations were determined by objective, not subjective, factors. Is the sudden decision of the two parties to make mutual trust rather than mutual suspicion the driving force of their relationship no more than a passing whim, or does it reflect something more fundamental?
There has been a profound change in the objective conditions which once informed relations between the two states. Under the previous bipolar world order, they were two superpowers leading two hostile blocs of states confronting one another over a deep ideological divide. Today, they both belong to the same camp in the face of a common threat, an amorphous and elusive enemy located in no specific state and known as global terrorism.
For a long time, terrorism was regarded as an accidental, marginal, or regional phenomenon. But following the terrorist attacks that shook America on 11 September, it became clear that terrorism occupies a central position in the new world order -- so central, in fact, that it has managed to forge the two poles of the former bipolar world order into one pole.
During the Cold War, anti-communism took precedence over inter-religious strife and toned down the sharpness of confrontation between religions, particularly the confrontation between Islam and Christianity, whose roots go back to the Crusades. Confrontation along religious lines was reinvigorated by colonialism, and reached critical proportions in the Nazi progroms against the Jews.
After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, followed by the demise of the Soviet Union, the communist danger disappeared and the clash of civilisations moved to centre stage. In this context, America and Russia, both Christian states locked in confrontations with what they describe as Islamic terrorism, find themselves in the same boat. Once critical of Putin's war in Chechnya, Washington is now calling on the Chechens to "dissociate themselves from terrorist groups". At the same time, however, both Bush and Putin are careful to draw a distinction between terrorism and Islam.
Reacting swiftly and decisively to the 11 September attacks, Putin was among the first world leaders to express sympathy for America's loss and to pledge support for its war against terrorism. This does not necessarily sit well with Russia's still powerful military establishment, the bureaucracy of its foreign ministry and many ordinary Russians, who fear Putin may fall victim to what analysts call the "Gorbachev-Yeltsin syndrome," defined as giving too much away without assurances of getting anything in return.
Although Putin cast his lot in with the Americans without demanding anything in counterpart, this does not mean he is not expecting some kind of payback. With many subjects under discussion between the two parties, this could take various forms: agreeing on an alternative to the ABM treaty in case it is scrapped; offering support for Russia's efforts to join the World Trade Organisation; cancelling Russia's external debts, which have reached critical proportions with the continuation of the war in Chechnya; the expansion of NATO to include Russia.
Putin explained Russia's position in these words: "In the war against terrorism, we are not asking the West for services in return for our support. We are not asking to join the WTO, we are not asking for facilities in respect of our external debt. This is a crucial struggle whose outcome will affect us all. We want to be part and parcel of the international institutions, and our participation in these institutions will be beneficial to all. Although this is not a new policy, it was not noticed before 11 September. After the events of that day, it can no longer be overlooked."
But Russia's policy on the issue of terrorism, like America's, has not proceeded in a straight line. Moscow continued to maintain diplomatic relations with states described in the West as "rogue," and to sell weapons to countries opposed to the United States. Indeed, it has been accused of contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This policy was pursued under both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as long as Russia's opening to the West did not yield satisfactory results. It changed dramatically after last September's terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, not least because the supposed mastermind behind the attacks, Osama Bin Laden, has been backing the Chechens in their war against Russia. Afghanistan was no longer a theatre for Russian-American antagonism, but a reason for the two erstwhile enemies to join forces in the face of a common threat.
From an American perspective, the growing terrorist threat, together with Russia's poorly maintained nuclear arsenal and its potential for more Chernobyl-style accidents in future, were compelling reasons to try and reach some form of understanding with Russia, instead of allowing relations between the two countries to become an additional source of tension in an already unsafe world.
The previous administration's policy towards Putin could not possibly be described as friendly. Clinton refused to ease Russia's debt burden and insisted on expanding NATO eastwards to include Eastern European countries directly bordering Russia. In his first eight months in office, Bush pursued a similar policy towards Russia. He showed no interest in resuming serious negotiations to solve the many pending problems. He announced his intention to incorporate the Baltic states -- Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania -- into NATO, and continued to threaten the unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty. Has Bush now become aware that the growing threat of terrorism requires a different policy? Is talking of the need to replace mutual suspicion by mutual trust an expression of such an awareness?
The Texas meeting between the two presidents has highlighted the need for a serious effort to minimise what they both admitted were differences of opinion and strengthen friendship to the utmost. There are differences not only over an accord on strategic defence and the Bush administration's proposed anti-ballistic defence shield in opposition to the ABM treaty, but in many other areas as well. Moreover, it is doubtful if Putin can continue to build on his friendship with Bush when many of Russia's ruling elite are suspicious of the American president's intentions. They already fear that by allowing America to launch strikes against Afghanistan from military bases in neighbouring Uzbekistan and other former Soviet republics of Central Asia, Putin has given Washington a permanent foothold in what was traditionally part of Russia's sphere of influence. They also fear that an American military presence close to Afghanistan will became a means of pressure to ensure a pro-American government in Kabul. Russia fears it will find itself dragged into a form of alliance with America that would prevent it from pursuing an independent policy toward countries like Iraq.
For the first time, American-Russian relations are being based on the assumption of mutual trust, not mutual suspicion. For the first time, terrorism is regarded by both states as a threat surpassing the differences between them. Can the two presidents impose the "friendship" between them on the various institutions in both states, which still remain sceptical of the possibility of implementing the policies advocated by their leaders?
Many factors justify a policy based on understanding between the two powers. Would Blair's intervention help? He has proposed a new formula for relations between Russia and NATO, based on the creation of a new council that would include Russia and NATO as equal partners to negotiate security problems, primarily disarmament and peace-keeping. Blair hopes such a council can be established before the NATO summit in Prague next year, where the member states will be called upon to discuss the integration of the Baltic republics into NATO.
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