13 - 19 December 2001
Issue No.564
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 13 - 19 December 2001 Issue No.564 |
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Human, all too human
As Israel escalates its attacks on the Palestinians, the latter have answered with the most devastating weapon in their arsenal: suicide bombers. But are they aiming true? Medhat El-Zahed* weighs the options
When Palestinians send suicide bombers to attack civilian targets inside Israel, they do more than raise the military stakes. They put to the test their own ability to stay united. More than at any previous time, the Palestinians need a national consensus on what to do and what not to do: how to fight Israel's brutal occupation and remain focused, systematic and united.
The reckless abandon with which Israel took revenge for the recent explosions in West Jerusalem and Haifa brought a renewed sense of urgency to Palestinian decision-making. The suicide bombings were a reaction to Israel's capricious murder of yet another Palestinian leader, Hamas's Mahmoud Abu Hanoud; but how did they serve the overarching goal of rolling back the Israeli occupation, getting the settlements out of the West Bank and Gaza and establishing a sovereign Palestinian state?
We must address this question seriously, despite clear evidence that Sharon intentionally provoked Hamas and Jihad by assassinating their members before Anthony Zinni's regional tour and Sharon's visit to the United States.
His tactic worked like a charm. Hamas answered the provocation in the traditional way: by sending suicide bombers into Israel. Counter-attacking, Sharon launched a full-scale offensive on PA-controlled areas and institutions, and turned the diplomatic agenda upside down. Powell's initiative was out; Palestinian "terror" in.
The Intifada is perhaps all the Palestinians have. But how can they keep the Intifada from being exploited by the very enemy that stole their land, keeps them on a leash, and is now professing virtuous outrage at any act of resistance on their part? How can the Palestinians frustrate Sharon's tactics? How can they liberate their land without being battered, vilified and humiliated at every turn by a more resourceful adversary?
Since he came to office 10 months ago, Sharon has had a clear plan: crush the Intifada; coerce the Palestinians into accepting a long-term military solution that postpones final- status issues (borders, sovereignty, Jerusalem, refugees, water and settlements) indefinitely; force the PA to play law- enforcer for its Israeli masters; and make no political concessions whatsoever.
The immediate challenge, then, is a response to Sharon's tactics: in other words, the use of force in a way that rids them of occupation and settlements and wins them a truly sovereign Palestinian state. The Palestinians need to escalate the struggle against Israeli colonialism and racism.
Even before recent developments, the Palestinians had been debating subtle tactical points related to when and how force should be used. This debate, however, has nothing to do with their legitimate rights. Every nation that lives under occupation has the right to engage in armed resistance. All international norms and treaties recognise as much. What this debate entailed, rather, was an assessment of alternative forms of struggle and how they affect international backing, national unity, and future plans. The Palestinians need to rally international support, isolate the most fascist extremists within Israel, and turn the divisions in Zionist society to their advantage.
For a while, stone-throwing seemed a suitable way of maintaining pressure, rallying Palestinians forces, winning international sympathy, and keeping at bay the worst fascist elements within Israel. But when Barak and then Sharon confronted stones with guns and a complete siege, the Intifada grew more militant. The Intifada has sent a clear message to the world that the Palestinians are no longer going to wait for whimsical diplomatic flourishes. Nor do they expect Arab armies or fiery rhetoric to give them back their land.
In a sense, the Intifada did liberate the Palestinians, at least from delusions. It set the stage for a change of strategy, for the Palestinians to take matters into their own hands and stop waiting for Arab and international help. The Intifada showed that Israel -- a country nearly unassailable in regular battle and immune to diplomatic pressure -- is not invincible if challenged from within. It also proved that the Palestinians cannot be defeated in a blitzkrieg.
This realisation altered the Palestinians' psyche, gave them a means of self-defence and a sense of empowerment. Even so, the Palestinians, as a nation, have yet to decide on the tactics best suited to their cause.
The leaders of the Intifada seem to think that combining stones and bullets is the most effective method of resisting the occupation. They also seem to believe that resistance against settlers should be combined with attacks inside Israel.
Still, even supporters of this view must be aware that despite the painful effects of suicide attacks on the Israelis, these actions trigger a brutal backlash and confuse world opinion as to who the real victims are. This suits Sharon just fine, for it gives him an excuse to take more Palestinian land and undermine the Palestinian Authority.
Generally, Palestinian strikes in the West Bank and Gaza tend to be more politically effective than spectacular bombings that may satiate Arab and Palestinian anger at Sharon's brutality, but at considerable cost to the Palestinians.
Suicide bombings in Israeli cities also undermine the Palestinians' ability to exploit Israeli disagreement on the issue of settlements. The more Palestinians focus their strikes on the settlers and the occupation forces, the sooner the Israelis will realise the security burden that the settlements have created and call for a stop to the colonisation madness. Some Israelis are likening the settlements to a cargo that must be jettisoned to save the passengers' lives.
Conversely, when Palestinians strike at restaurants, nightclubs, and gas stations inside Israel, many Israelis conclude that the very existence of Israel is at stake. This gives Sharon a license to kill.
Calculating the use of force -- choosing the right methods and targets -- will deprive Sharon of his right to retaliation. The Palestinians have actually been aware of this for some time. They abstained from carrying out attacks inside Israel after Sharon and Arafat met in June 2001, declared a cease- fire, and agreed on security measures reminiscent of those reached in Lebanon in April 1996. Israel promised to stop shelling Palestinian areas in return for Palestinian pledges to call off attacks inside Israel.
Palestinian groups upheld this agreement until Israel revived its state terror tactics, and the inauguration of missile-guided guerrilla warfare, which uses a sophisticated communications network, agents operating in the West Bank and Gaza, and Apache helicopters to assassinate resistance leaders. The policy of assassination unleashed a new wave of Palestinian anger. It also changed the course of the Intifada. Meanwhile, Sharon was encouraging the settlers to take action against the Palestinians. Aided by tanks and attack helicopters, and equipped with armoured cars and flak jackets, the settlers complied willingly. Sharon thus achieved a twin objective: he alleviated the pressure on the Israeli army, and promoted the settlers' most belligerent tendencies.
Palestinian groups then resumed attacks inside Israel, paving the way for a new wave of escalation. Israel stormed self- rule areas, conducted land, sea, and air attacks on Palestinian targets, destroyed official installations, and continued to assassinate Intifada leaders. After the 11 September attacks, Israel scrambled to find analogies between its own situation and the US's.
Sharon exploited the anti-Arab and anti-Muslim campaign to whip up sympathy for his war against the Palestinians. As major powers joined the United States' "war against terror," Sharon portrayed Israel as a country dealing with its own Bin Laden. The gimmick apparently worked.
On 12 September, the day after the attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, Sharon ordered his tanks in to Palestinian cities. On that day alone, 17 Palestinians were killed and dozens wounded. No one denounced the massacre.
When George W Bush mentioned the possible creation of a Palestinian state, things deteriorated even further. Sharon considered the US remarks an act of appeasement, vowed that Israel would not be another Czechoslovakia, and took his campaign against the Palestinians to new heights of brutality.
It is worth recalling here that Yasser Arafat condemned the 11 September attacks and declared an unconditional cease- fire. Sharon was the one who torpedoed the truce.
Sharon's criminal proclivities aside, however, the Palestinians still have to pinpoint their objectives and fine-tune their methods of struggle. They are in no position to give up the Intifada, but they must keep it focused and effective.
Wars of liberation are long, painful affairs. The Palestinians cannot afford to let Sharon impose his tactics on this conflict. They may not need to hold their fire, but they need to aim well.
* The writer is a journalist with Al-Ahali.
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