27 Dec. 2001 - 2 Jan. 2002
Issue No.566
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 27 Dec. 2001 - 2 Jan. 2002 Issue No.566 |
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Overcoming the impasse
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed looks at some of the issues that should be addressed
The political game in the Arab-Israeli conflict is four-dimensional. With both advocates and opponents of a peaceful settlement in each camp, it is being played out by four distinct groups of actors. Ideally, it would end in a victory for the advocates of peace over its opponents, provided the settlement reached is a just and equitable one and not a capitulation to the forces of oppression and occupation. That is, provided both sides emerge as winners, not only the Israeli side.
In recent days, this already complicated game has entered a new and dangerous phase in which the focus of confrontation appears to be shifting into the ranks of the Palestinians themselves. If internecine strife is allowed to take precedence over the conflict between Arabs and Israelis, the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian issue will become even more remote than it already is. To stop the situation deteriorating beyond the point of no return, we needed to come to grips with the main problems now impeding a return to the negotiating table.
First, the problem of Arafat. The final declaration issued by the extraordinary meeting of Arab foreign ministers on 16 December reiterated confidence in the Palestinian leadership and called upon the Palestinian people, with all its movements and organisations, to unite in the face of the impending danger. What is significant about the declaration is that it was passed by a unanimous resolution, although opinions differed over Arafat's decision to call a halt to all military activities, with Egypt and Jordan supporting the decision and Syria opposing it. But all recognised that the main priority at this juncture is to express full Arab support for Arafat as the representative of Palestinian legitimacy, and to make Sharon's decision to stop dealing with him that much harder to implement. After all, Sharon has no right to decide who represents the Palestinian people, exactly as the Palestinians have no say when it comes to designating their Israeli interlocutors. If Sharon gives himself this right, then the Palestinians, and, indeed, all the Arab states, should also be allowed to choose who they will deal with on the Israeli side. Sharon should realise that if the principle of reciprocity is applied in this case, he will be the big loser.
However, any collective Arab decision to stop dealing with Sharon must be accompanied by a clear plan of action. Unless it is translated into concrete steps, it will be nothing more than an empty slogan. For example, would the decision to boycott Sharon extend to boycotting the Israeli ambassadors to Cairo and Amman, who represent not only the state of Israel but the prime minister himself? Would it involve having them recalled from either or both of the capitals? And what if the Palestinians decided to deal with people such as Yossi Beilin, Ben Ami or Yossi Sarid, with whom they negotiated before Sharon was elected prime minister? True, they are now members of the Israeli opposition, but Sharon's decision to stop dealing with Arafat sets a precedent for going over the head of the duly elected leader and negotiating directly with his opposition. Under Sharon's rule, Palestine has been carved up into non-contiguous cantons separated from each other by military checkpoints and outposts. The Israeli prime minister's dismissal of Arafat as "irrelevant" is the first step in his plan to deal one-to-one with local Palestinian authorities outside the umbrella of the PA. This would be a flagrant intervention in internal Palestinian affairs.
Second, the problem of Peres. Can Sharon's supposedly dovish foreign minister play an independent role? Peres agreed to join the Likud-led government under the pretext that he would work to soften Sharon's extremism and prevent him from undermining the peace process. As matters turned out, however, it was Sharon who co-opted Peres and not the other way round. That was only to be expected, given that Sharon, not Peres, is the elected leader of Israel, and that, moreover, he enjoys a higher approval rating in the polls than any of his predecessors. By adding Peres to his government, he managed to disperse the opposition and rule without any internal constraints.
Since joining Sharon's government, Peres has gone along, albeit sometimes reluctantly, with policies that are in direct contradiction with those he advocated in the past. Now is the time to work on the differences between the two men, so that the distinction between them is not only functional (prime minister versus foreign minister), but also political (one political line versus another). A useful card that could be played here is that on some issues the Bush administration's views are closer to those of Peres than to those of Sharon. For example, both Peres and Bush reject Sharon's argument that Arafat is the Bin Laden of the Middle East and hence unfit to act as a partner in the peace process.
Third, legitimate resistance and terrorism. The use of terror tactics to further any agenda, however worthwhile it may appear to their perpetrator, is totally unjustifiable. However, a certain amount of ambiguity still surrounds one specific case, namely, when terror is used in the context of a struggle against occupation. Although the right to resist occupation by all available means, including violence, is consecrated in the UN Charter, the exercise of this right today is branded as terrorism. This applied to the struggle of the Lebanese to liberate their land and applies today to the Palestinian struggle to shake off the yoke of Israeli occupation. There is an urgent need to make a clear distinction between terrorism on the one hand and the legitimate right of people to struggle against occupation on the other. Confusing the two issues reached ludicrous heights when Sharon decided to label Arafat the Bin Laden of the Middle East. Fortunately, Bush disagreed with Sharon's characterisation of the Palestinian leader. However, he considers Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine and Hizbullah in Lebanon to be terrorist organisations. The clashes that broke out between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas and Islamic Jihad after Arafat called for the cessation of all military activities in Palestine have heightened tensions within Palestinian ranks and threaten to make inter-Palestinian conflict more acute than the conflict with Israel.
An understanding on this issue is thus necessary between the various Arab entities, states or parties, particularly between the Arab states which have diplomatic relations with Israel and those which do not. But such an understanding will not be reached if inter-Arab conflict is left to escalate beyond the conflict with Israel and if each Arab entity acts unilaterally and places the others before faits accomplis. The Palestinian Authority must reach an agreement with the Palestinian opposition parties to foil any attempt by Sharon to play on the contradictions in their ranks.
A first step in this direction was the agreement Arafat reached with both Hamas and Islamic Jihad to suspend military operations. Following intense negotiations, Hamas announced "the halting of martyrdom operations inside the occupied lands of 1948 [i.e. in Israel proper] and the halting of the firing of mortar shells until further notice." Later, Islamic Jihad announced that it too would suspend attacks "for the national interest." Hamas was not coerced into relinquishing its military activities, because at the time it agreed to do so, Jihad remained reluctant to follow suit. The way relations are developing between the Palestinian organisations is promising. Eventually, it could reflect the will to upgrade democracy in the relations between the various factions, to develop a binding set of principles which would establish clear lines of demarcation between what should be perceived as legitimate struggle against occupation on the one hand and terrorism on the other.
The Palestinian Authority has submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly moving that Israel's duties and responsibilities as an occupying power be determined by the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Although the Palestinian cause enjoys the support of a comfortable majority in the General Assembly, procedural steps to push the resolution through could still take time. Because the issue is urgent, the Arab League might consider organising a conference similar to the one it held a few weeks ago on the issue of "Civilisations, Clash or Dialogue," under the title: "Legitimate Resistance to Occupation and Terrorism." This could codify preliminary rules to govern the relations between the various Palestinian factions. It could also set parameters for the Intifada to defeat attempts to brand it as terrorism.
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