21 - 27 February 2002
Issue No.574
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 21 - 27 February 2002 Issue No.574 |
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Don't forget me, America
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's trip to the United States last week was overall a success, albeit qualified
Just back from a three-day official visit to the United States -- preceded by another three days spent with his Boston-based son -- President Pervez Musharraf was naturally putting the best spin possible on his trip. Speaking on state television, he told his people that it helped achieve "deeper and broader understanding" between the US and Pakistan. Iffat Malik, in Islamabad reports that Musharraf also claimed progress in the areas of economic revival, defence spending and diplomatic standing. But, has his visit really achieved that much?
There is no doubt that the trip was a PR success for the Pakistani leader. It was a far cry from Clinton's visit to Pakistan in 2000, when it was made crystal-clear that Musharraf was not a man the US was planning on doing business with. The Pakistani president was feted, this time, in the highest circles. He met President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell and several senior administration officials. In addition, he made an address to a joint session of the prestigious Woodrow Wilson Centre and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and had a luncheon speaking engagement at the National Press Club. The fulsome praise he received in all quarters -- Bush described him as "a leader of great vision and courage" -- would have delighted any president. But it was particularly sweet for a leader who, just a few months ago, was an international pariah. Whereas with Clinton he had been unpopular, with Bush he was merely obscure -- in one celebrated instance Bush was given an impromptu general knowledge test on foreign relations by a journalist and could not even name Musharraf.
The grounds for the warm reception he received were laid by Pakistani cooperation in the US-led war on terror and by President Musharraf's moves to clamp down on religious extremism and militancy within his country. But there are many who, looking back on the US history of "fair-weather friendship," are sceptical about the sincerity and longevity of the latest US pro-Pakistan sentiment. Musharraf won a commitment on that from President Bush, albeit a conditional one: "We're committed (to Pakistan) as long as our goals remain the same."
On the economic front, Pakistan is in debt to the United States to the tune of $2.8 billion. In view of this, the $1 billion debt write-off that Musharraf secured in the US sounds generous -- until one reads the fine print. What the US actually promised was a $200 million line of credit that would amount, over 25 years, to a $1 billion debt write-off. In addition, even that has to receive Congressional approval and comes with attached conditions.
As well as seeking a debt write-off and direct aid, Musharraf was looking for greater market access for Pakistani goods. That is something the White House appears more willing to grant, but it faces opposition from American manufacturers fearful of the impact on their business. When all that Commerce Minister Dawood could secure in negotiations was a vague commitment to increase selected textile quotas, it seemed clear that American industry pressure had prevailed. Musharraf openly expressed disappointment with the paltry $142 million benefit that the quota increase would yield.
On the subject of military assistance, the protracted battle of closing the long-running dispute on the order of F- 16 jets for which Pakistan paid but has only been partially refunded after years of lobbying remained a "contentious issue." No other military hardware was offered to Pakistan, though some progress was made on supplying spare parts for existing weapons systems. India is a major obstacle to substantive American military assistance to Pakistan, and New Delhi would have raised shrill objections to Washington arming its old foe. The Americans did, however, agree to revive defence cooperation with Pakistan, starting with the formation of a joint defence policy group.
Musharraf did not include the issue of the confrontation with India in listing the goals he achieved while in the US, but American intervention in the Kashmir dispute was definitely something he was hoping to secure. That, too, did not materialise.
The Americans did stress the need for peace and "serious meaningful dialogue" between India and Pakistan. But, in offering their services as "facilitators," they did not budge from their long-held position of neutrality on the Kashmiri issue and on only becoming involved should both parties seek their help. India has consistently rejected outside mediation on Kashmir.
Musharraf did not help his cause by making unsubstantiated allegations that India was planning to carry out more nuclear tests. His academic audience at the Woodrow Wilson Centre viewed it as part of the on- going contest between the two South Asian rivals. As former Information Minister Mushahid Hussain commented -- he was a member of the government Musharraf deposed -- making such baseless claims erodes Pakistan's credibility and the legitimacy of its demands on Kashmir.
Musharraf made further controversial statements in berating the Muslim world for its lack of development and arguing that it would remain unenlightened unless it concentrated on scientific and technological advance.
"Today we're the poorest, the most illiterate, the most unhealthy, the most unenlightened, the most deprived, and the weakest of all the human race," he told delegates at a conference of science and technology attended by ministers from Muslim countries.
Pakistani nationals being held in the US as part of the crackdown that followed 11 September was another unspoken item on Musharraf's agenda. He did not raise the issue in public statements, but a Pakistani journalist put it to President Bush during his joint press conference with the Pakistani leader. Bush resorted to his characteristic 'American security comes first' doctrine -- something that cannot have offered much hope to the Pakistani detainees or their families.
Musharraf's pariah status before 11 September stemmed from the military coup he engineered in October 1999 which displaced Nawaz Sharif's elected civilian government. Pakistan's actions since 11 September have rehabilitated Musharraf, but not to the extent that long-needed democratic reforms be overlooked. During his sojourn in the United States, democracy was not stressed as much as it would have been in other circumstances, but it was made clear that Washington expects elections to be held on time in October this year. What was not made so clear, but is probably the case, is that Washington would be satisfied with a partial return of power to civilians and with US ally Musharraf continuing as president.
A final issue that overshadowed the trip was the on- going abduction saga of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, missing since 23 January. A joint Pakistani- US investigating team had been making strenuous efforts to recover him before Musharraf's visit.
They were unsuccessful, but the fact that the Pakistani government is clearly doing its best to find Daniel Pearl ensured that Musharraf did not come under as much American pressure as some had expected.
On balance, then, it was a good trip for the Pakistani leader. He did not come away with as many material goodies as he and many Pakistanis might have expected. But he got a very public and effusive thank you for his efforts since 11 September. Coming from the world's sole superpower, this was no mean achievement.
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