21 - 27 February 2002
Issue No.574
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Al-Ahram Weekly Online 21 - 27 February 2002 Issue No.574 |
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Playing favourites
Are the US-Philippine joint military exercises a new leaf in the two countries' neo-colonial relationship? Nyier Abdou looks at what it means for US soldiers to stand "shoulder-to-shoulder" with Philippine troops
More than 10 years after the US vacated its military bases in the Philippines, American troops are back on Philippine soil, much to the dismay of many a local politico. Although the Philippines ceased to be a US colony in 1946, a strong American military presence in the country continued to be nurtured under an agreement that allowed the US to maintain strategically placed bases, such as Clark Airfield and Subic Bay. In 1991, the agreement expired and the Philippine government voted not to extend it, forcing the American troops to leave.
But the world after 11 September has re- ignited a lot of old Cold War mechanisms, and many political observers see the return of US forces in the role of military "advisers" as a harbinger of a more entrenched, hands-on interposition in Philippine -- and regional -- affairs. With Muslim populations in Southeast Asia under scrutiny in the US-led "war on terrorism," the possibility that the Philippines is being used as a beachhead for a wider campaign, perhaps for covert missions in less US-friendly territories like Indonesia or Malaysia, looms large.
Belinda Aquino, a Philippine political analyst who currently heads the Center for Philippine Studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, is quick to note that historically, the US has used the Philippines as a launching pad for other interventions in Southeast Asia, notably, Vietnam. Later, during the Gulf War, marines dispatched from Hawaii "would just descend on Subic [base] on the way to war."
Aquino suggests that the Philippines is "old familiar ground" and an "honoured ally," meaning "it's just easier to operate out of the Philippines, where every single administration after World War II has supported the American presence." On the point of justifying a sizeable US military presence, Aquino told Al-Ahram Weekly that it has not taken much, "since the Mutual Defence Treaty, though outdated, remains. I don't know why the Senate didn't press for the abrogation of that treaty in 1991 as well."
The 650-man US mission in Zamboanga, at the eastern tip of the southern island of Mindanao, is the largest American military deployment since Afghanistan. Dubbed "Balikatan" (meaning "shoulder-to-shoulder"), the US special forces still arriving in Mindanao join some 7,000 Philippine troops already on the ground. That so elaborate a production -- slated, initially, for a six-month run -- would be set up for the handful of rogue Islamic fighters conducting terrorist activities in the region breaches the domain of the absurd. And with so much speculation about the Pentagon eyeing Iraq and Somalia, that the US should choose the Philippines as its next front in the war on terrorism has raised some eyebrows.
But Armando Malay Jr, a specialist on the history of Southeast Asian radical movements and the dean of the Asian Centre at the University of the Philippines (UP), disagrees that the attention is unwarranted. Malay told the Weekly that the terrorist threat is "not exaggerated," but that the epithet "Islamic" is "displaced." The radical Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) -- the extremist group founded by former mujahedin fighter Abdurajak Janjalani in 1991 and renowned for its kidnapping exploits -- claims that an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines is its primary goal. But Malay scoffs at the assertion, declaring that the Al-Qa'eda- linked ASG, which operates out of the southern islands of Basilan and Jolo (close to Zamboanga), "are, to my mind, not animated by religion at all." Concurring with most experts on the region, Malay said he subscribed to the view that "they are plain bandits, out to make an easy buck." The ASG is estimated to number a few hundred.
Philippine security specialist Ramses Amer, a senior research adviser at the Department of Research Cooperation (SAREC) at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), agrees, saying that the Philippines was probably chosen as the next US front in the war on terrorism because American troops would be welcomed. "There have been armed rebellions off and on for decades in Mindanao," Amer told the Weekly. "I see no reason why this should suddenly be labelled as 'Islamic terrorism' after 11 September."
"The US chose Mindanao as its next front because it knows the Philippine government will do the 'right thing' and not put up any resistance as Iraq, Yemen or Somalia would," suggests UP's Malay. "I cannot recall any instance in the past when the Philippine government actually stood up to the US, right to the very end, over an issue of territorial sovereignty."
Whether the US intervention is popular or not depends on who you talk to. Not surprisingly, among the country's vibrant political left, the affront to national sovereignty is offensive -- and, some argue, unconstitutional. Following the end of the Military Bases Agreement, foreign troops were banned from operating on Philippine soil except under the provisions of the US-Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Mucha Arquiza, a Muslim peace activist based in Zamboanga and a spokeswoman for the Bangsamoro Civil Society Solidarity Conference, notes that the controversial agreement only allows for a "limited military exercise by joint US-RP [Republic of the Philippines] forces with only less than a hundred troops in at most a month-long activity in non-combat and non-operation areas." Arquiza concludes that the more than 600 troops settling in for a six-month mission, which may be extended to a year, in "Abu Sayyaf-infested" areas "is a clear violation of the agreement."
The Philippine Supreme Court disagrees. A ruling by the court determined that because the constitutional ban deals only with permanent foreign missions and facilities, the Balikatan exercises are within the purview of the VFA. Renato Cruz de Casto, a specialist on international security who is currently conducting research on the developments in Philippine-US security relations, told the Weekly that by supporting the US campaign against terrorism, Philippine President Gloria Marcapal-Arroyo has revitalised the country's alliance with Washington. De Casto, who teaches political science at De La Salle University in Manila, says that there is "widespread support" for the military exercise, and that any debate "is a matter of political exigency." The left, he argues, opposes it, "because it will mean a stronger Philippine military."
Regional security specialist Ramses Amer, who is also with the Southeast Asia Programme (SEAP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Sweden's Uppsala University, says that there is a political play between the designs of the US and Philippine military. While conceding that the US may want to use the Philippines as a staging ground, Amer said that the Arroyo administration would not want the US to launch operations against other ASEAN member-states. Rather, he said, the Philippines would want to use renewed military links with the US to bolster its position in the South China Sea.
Armando Malay, of UP's Asian Centre, says that there is indeed concern about "perceived US plans" to use the Philippines as a staging point in the region, "but I'm afraid this is a minority view." Malay notes that any discussion about US strategic actions "must be considered against the backdrop of the huge popularity of the American image, which cuts across all social classes." If there is a debate at all, he says, "it is going on over the heads of the majority, who do not see anything wrong with US hegemony, as this is conventionally defined, and -- dare I say it -- would not mind 're-colonisation'."
The Muslim minority in the south, however, is understandably worried about another incursion against them by the US, which, as Belinda Aquino notes, was at the forefront of measures to subdue resistance by Muslims during the so-called Moro wars. Malay agrees, but adds that though Muslims are angry about this development, elected Muslim leaders "are careful not to sound like [Al-Qa'eda leader Osama] Bin Laden or the ayatollahs."
Since the fall of the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, the US has been investigating any link extremist groups might have to Bin Laden's Al-Qa'eda terrorist network. Although the Abu Sayyaf is more of a criminal gang, there is a past link to Al-Qa'eda. De La Salle's de Casto notes that when the ASG was formed in the early 1990s, it was given financial assistance by charitable institutions funded by Al-Qa'eda. "But I believe the assistance ended in 1996 after the ASG began its guerrilla warfare against the government," says de Casto. This is probably one of the reasons the ASG shifted to criminal activities, he added.
"I've always wondered where the evidence was, or is, on this link between ASG and Al-Qa'eda," says Aquino. "Just one Indonesian saying there is a link doesn't constitute the kind of solid evidence we want to see." Saying that there is a lot of speculation involved in the widely referenced link, Aquino says she does not doubt that the Abu Sayyaf are "getting their support from somewhere." But underscoring the porousness of the borders in the southern Philippines, Aquino says this support could come from anywhere. "Is there an Al- Qa'eda 'cell' in Mindanao? How many Abu Sayyaf have gone to Afghanistan to 'train'?" she asks. "It's all so nebulous, but, of course, to justify the US's overkill approach, they have to exaggerate the threat -- make it really bigger than it is."
The Bangsamoro ummah
UNTIL 11 September, many people in the West did not realise that there was an Islamic separatist movement in the predominantly Catholic Philippines. This has been true, however, for decades -- if not centuries. The "Bangsamoro" is a collective name for the various, mostly-Muslim tribes of the southern Philippines. While some argue that many of the conflicts in the southern Philippines boil down to a fractured Muslim population along tribal lines, Muslim activists place emphasis on the separate nature of Bangsamoro culture (the ummah, or Muslim community), and the feeling of oppressive and uninformed political rule that has historically been handed down by Manila.
US troops in the Philippines (Photo:AP)
Mucha Arquiza, of the Bangsamoro Civil Society Solidarity Conference in Mindanao, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination for Muslim populations in the south. Arquiza contends that by reapplying the "US cudgel," the government of Philippine President Gloria Marcapal-Arroyo has "succeeded in reviving historically-rooted religious prejudices," which "now threaten to destroy the years of peace-building efforts and reconciliatory dialogues."
The establishment of a Bangsamoro republic was the original goals of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which signed an agreement with the Philippine government in 1976 that produced the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Independence is also the professed goal of the MNLF splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which is currently in negotiations with the government.
Philippine Islamic scholar Carmen Abubakar, dean of the Institute of Islamic Studies (IIS) at the University of the Philippines at Diliman, notes that Moro provinces continue to lag behind in development. She also concedes that "peace and order" remain a critical problem. "Independence is becoming a strong option for many Moros who are tired of the continuing deterioration of the Moro society," Abubakar told Al-Ahram Weekly. She added that federalism is also gaining acceptance among Moros in Mindanao as an alternative to secession.
Of all the armed conflicts in Southeast Asia, Abubakar cites the violent secessionist movement in the Indonesian province of Aceh as most similar to the conflict in the southern Philippines. The Free Aceh Movement, though not an Islamic movement, does share some similarities with Muslim guerrilla groups in the southern Philippines. Both, notes Abubakar, have a history of political independence, as both were sovereign powers in their own right before inclusion into their respective national states. And in both cases, the struggle for self-rule continues today.
Belinda Aquino, the director of the Center for Philippine Studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, told the Weekly that popular support for US cooperation with the Philippine army stems from historical demonisation of Moro populations. "The Moros in Mindanao have always, always been portrayed as pirates, savages, killers, murderers, traitors -- name any kind of negative stereotype and it has been applied to them by the majority of the population, who are Christians, [and] by the media ... They are really painted as the bad guys all the time."
Asked if she thought that the Philippine leadership has historically been well informed and adequately advised as to how to deal with Islamic culture in the south, the IIS's Abubakar says that there is enough -- "even substantial" -- information on the Moro people and their society, "but national government has not made use of this information to craft a balanced and holistic national policy for the development of the Moro society." Abubakar also cites the lack of Moros in the highest decision- making bodies as something which "adds to the inability of the government to address the particular needs of the Moro people."
Nyier Abdou
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